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General Abstract 
Suspect interviewing is a vital tool for law enforcement agencies.  However, a 
large body of empirical literature has demonstrated that many popular interviewing 
techniques limit the amount of information gleaned and demonstrate chance levels of 
deception detection accuracy under strict experimental control.  Research highlighting 
information gathering interviews that induce cognitive load and language-based 
deception detection techniques have demonstrated promise.  The series of studies 
presented here provide evidence that the application of Reality Monitoring (RM) to 
statements elicited by a modified version of the Cognitive Interview for Suspects (CIS) 
provides an effective method of suspect interviewing that improves deception detection 
accuracy in comparison to levels previously reported in the literature.   
Study 1 considers the accuracy of deception detection in statements provided by 
undergraduate students in a mock theft scenario.  Participants were interviewed using a 
modified version of the CIS.  Six RM criteria that had been validated in previous studies 
were applied to all statements as a measure of deception detection.  This study found an 
overall accuracy rating of 86.6%, supporting the use of this protocol.  Study 2 directly 
compares deception detection accuracy of RM to the subjective judgements of observers. 
Three hundred and ninety observers judged deceptiveness of 100 CIS interviews 
previously recorded in Study 1.  Collectively the average level of accuracy for observer 
ratings of the first question of the CIS interviews was 52.73% and only 47.82% at the 
conclusion of the interview.  Observer ratings of deception became significantly less 
accurate at the conclusion of the interview (t(389) = 4.75, p <.01).  In contrast, the RM 
scale was highly accurate (92.5 %) in a direct comparison of the same interviews.   
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 Study 3 considers whether certain personality traits, namely psychopathy and 
social dominance, increase successful deception both in terms of observer ratings and 
Reality Monitoring. Findings indicate that social dominance was related to increased 
observer ratings of honesty over time, however socially dominant people were not 
particularly successful deceivers.  Similarly, psychopathic traits were not significantly 
related to deceptive ability overall.  However, Factor 2 psychopathy was linked to being 
less believable by observers, even when telling the truth. These personality traits were not 
linked to an increased ability to beat Reality Monitoring, providing further evidence for 
the use of this scale.  Collectively, the series of studies presented provide evidence of the 
effectiveness of the use of Reality Monitoring on statements derived from the Cognitive 
Interview for Suspects.   
 
Keywords: Deception Detection; Reality Monitoring; Psychopathy; Dominance; 
Cognitive Interview for Suspects.  
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Deception detection is of vital importance to law enforcement professionals.  
Despite decades of research and numerous deception detection methods being proposed, 
studies have indicated a chance level of accuracy (Bond & Depaulo, 2006; Hartwig et al., 
2004; Kraut, 1980).  The goal of my dissertation is to validate an effective system of 
police interviewing that includes a reliable method of determining statement veracity.  
This interview must be compatible with a method of deception detection that provides a 
high level of accuracy regardless of the skill of the interviewer or characteristics of the 
interviewee.  Despite the previous failure to provide an accurate and consistent method of 
detecting deception in interviews, the research literature has provided some avenues of 
success.  First, language based deception detection techniques such as Reality Monitoring 
are more effective and reliable than nonverbal/body language techniques (Bond & 
Depaulo, 2006; Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2005).  Further, actively 
inducing cognitive load through interviewing techniques has demonstrated increased 
deception detection accuracy (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010).  My 
dissertation demonstrates the effectiveness of a modified version of the Cognitive 
Interview for Suspects (CIS) as a method of interviewing that increases the amount of 
information provided throughout an interview, and improves the sensitivity of the Reality 
Monitoring (RM) scale.  The series of studies presented provide evidence that Reality 
Monitoring is more accurate than subjective observer ratings, and it is not affected by 
personality traits that have been linked to an increased ability to deceive others. 
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1.2 Empirical Studies of Deception Detection Accuracy 
 Volumes of empirical literature have been conducted in the field of deception 
detection.  The vast majority of these studies may be broadly defined as “field” or 
laboratory studies.  Field studies generally involve having an observer rate deceptiveness 
of an individual after watching a video of a real life scenario such as a police interview of 
a suspect who has been accused of a crime.  For example, Whelan, Wagstaff, and 
Wheatcroft (2015) analyzed deceptive cues of real life video clips of people who were 
pleading for assistance in locating their missing family members, when some of these 
individuals were later found guilty of having involvement in their family member’s 
disappearance.  Mann, Vrij, and Bull (2002) examined interviews of 16 suspects of 
various criminal activities ranging from simple theft to homicide.  While many field 
studies involve interviews or transcripts of suspects, certain studies have examined the 
veracity of witness statements provided by victims (Esplin et al., 1998; Lamb et al., 
1997).   
Although field studies may provide more initial appeal, as they demonstrate real 
behaviours under pressure in high stakes scenarios, it is often difficult to establish the 
“ground truth.”  Put simply, in order to establish deception detection accuracy, the 
researcher must be able to conclusively determine whether the story presented is true or 
false.  Most researchers resort to corroborating evidence such as DNA or witness 
statements to determine whether the story is true or false as a measure of ground truth 
(Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2013).  Unfortunately, in many cases, such as historical child abuse, 
corroborating evidence is difficult to find.  Further, while corroborating evidence may 
allow one to determine the overall accuracy of the statement, a deceptive individual may 
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use portions of the truth to construct a story.  Therefore researchers using field studies are 
often unable to conclusively determine whether an individual is telling the complete truth 
or a full lie.  
 Laboratory studies are often used in the field of deception detection.  These 
methods typically involve randomly assigning participants to a truthful or deceptive 
condition.  The manipulation can be as simple as directing participants to tell a true or 
false story about their pasts (Geiselmann, 2012).  Studies have attempted to increase the 
immediacy of these scenarios by directing participants to tell the truth or lie about a film 
they just watched or whether they are currently concealing an item on their person (Vrij, 
Akyehurst, & Morris, 1997; Vrij et al., 2001).  Although laboratory studies allow for 
random assignment and increased control, these methods have drawn criticism for their 
lack of realism.  Specifically, these “low stakes” manipulations may not motivate the 
participant to lie or elicit the cues to deception that may be observed in real life scenarios.  
 More recent research has attempted to increase ecological validity by creating 
experimental scenarios where the participant either experiences or is directed to lie about 
participating in an event.  Examples of this paradigm include having participants commit 
a mock crime and being directed to lie about eating at a restaurant (Vrij et al., 2009).  
Alternatively, participants have been directed to deliver a package to a “secret location” 
on campus, with deceptive individuals being directed to lie about the details of the event 
(Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011).  Perhaps the most popular variation of this method 
has been utilized by Vrij and colleagues in a series of studies (Vrij et al., 2008, Vrij, 
Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010).  Participants are randomly assigned to a truthful or 
deceptive version of a game scenario.  In the truth condition, individuals participate in a 
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game with a confederate, during which money is reported to be missing from a wallet that 
is left in the room.  In the deception condition, participants are brought into the room and 
directed to take money out of the wallet by researchers.  They are then provided a 
template of the truthful scenario to create a believable lie.  Both sets of participants are 
then interviewed, with the goal of convincing an interviewer that they did not take the 
money.  Many of these studies provide financial incentives as a motivation to increase the 
stakes of deception.  Collectively, more modern approaches provide a more effective 
balance of control and realism as they provide both an empirical manipulation of 
deception and somewhat increased stakes for failure. 
1.2.1 Previously Reported Levels of Deception Detection Accuracy 
 Unfortunately, regardless of experimental method or manipulation employed in 
studies, volumes of research have indicated that deception detection accuracy hovers 
around chance.  In a meta-analysis, Bond and Depaulo (2006) observed a 54% overall 
deception detection accuracy.  Interestingly, despite training and experience in detecting 
deception, police officers do not perform appreciably better than lay individuals in 
controlled laboratory settings.  Kraut and Poe (1980) found that lay persons and customs 
officers could not detect deception when watching interviews of people who were 
suspected of smuggling contraband.  Experience has not been found to increase accuracy, 
as veteran officers do not perform better than new recruits when judging deceptiveness in 
audio interviews (Depaulo & Pfeiffer, 1986; Kohnken, 1987).  In perhaps the most 
ambitious study of deception detection, Ekman and O’Sullivan (1991) assessed over 500 
participants from a variety of fields including: polygraph technicians, state police 
officers, judges, lawyers, accountants, psychiatrists, and college students on their ability 
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to detect lies in 10 video statements.  In this study, only secret service agents performed 
better than chance (64%).  Vrij & Mann (2001) noted a slight increase in detection 
accuracy compared to baseline rates when officers viewed suspect interrogations (64%).  
However, results appeared to be influenced by context, as the same officers could not 
detect deception when watching videos of people who were asking for help finding 
family members whom they had actually murdered.  Researchers have argued that 
passively watching videos does not capture the experience of an investigator who can ask 
pertinent questions and interact with the suspect during actual police interviews.  Hartwig 
et al. (2004) investigated this concern, performing their study on experienced officers 
who actually interviewed the “suspect” university students who were potentially involved 
in a mock “drug deal.”   Consistent with previous findings, this study noted that officers 
who are actually interrogating suspects do not perform better than chance levels, even 
when given free rein to control the interview process. 
1.2.2 Signal Detection Theory 
 Signal Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1966) is an important consideration 
when determining the accuracy of a deception detection method.  This theory argues that 
overall accuracy must include not only the amount of times a deceptive statement is 
classified as deceptive, but also the proportion of correct to incorrect classifications.  In 
deception detection studies, a “Hit” occurs when a deceptive statement is correctly 
classified as deceptive.  A “Miss” occurs when a deceptive statement is miscategorised as 
truthful.  A “False Alarm” occurs when a truthful statement is classified as deceptive, and 
a “True Negative” occurs when a true statement is correctly determined to be truthful 
(Burgoon, 2015).  The goal of any deception detection method is to correctly detect 
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deception when present (sensitivity), and to classify non-deceptive statements as truthful 
(specificity).  In fact, while Bond and Depaulo’s (2006) meta-analysis revealed a 54% 
overall accuracy rating, it found that people were more accurate at classifying truthful 
statements (61%) but performed at below chance levels when detecting deception (47%).  
This finding has lead researchers to argue the already low levels of deception detection 
accuracy are inflated by a “truth bias” (Levine, Park, & McCormack, 1999).   
Unfortunately, in many instances of Signal Detection Theory, increasing the 
amount of “Hits” often is accompanied by an increase in “False Alarms”.  Considering 
the stakes of real world police investigations, a deception detection method must 
correctly classify both truth and lies.  An increase in “False Alarms” would mean that 
truthful people would be deemed to be deceptive by police, potentially leading to a 
variety of negative consequences.  Therefore my thesis will consider both sensitivity and 
specificity of Reality Monitoring in determining deception detection accuracy.  The goal 
of my research is to develop a deception detection method that increases the amount 
correctly classified deceptive accounts, without a corresponding increase in 
misclassifying truthful people as deceptive. 
  
1.3 Nonverbal Methods of Deception Detection 
 Collectively, the research literature has indicated that regardless of experimental 
manipulation, training or practical experience of the judge, deception detection rates 
hover around chance levels of accuracy.  The vast majority of deception detection 
research involves observer ratings of deceptiveness.  Perhaps the poor performance 
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observed may be explained by reliance on nonverbal, particularly body language, cues.  
Many theories of deception detection rely on the belief that lying is a cognitively and 
emotionally taxing practice that creates observable physiological responses in the body of 
the deceiver (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Zuckerman et al., 1981).  This long standing 
historical and cross cultural belief has led to numerous nonverbal methods of deception 
detection.  For example, an ancient Chinese deception detection method centers on the 
belief that lying decreases salivation.  This method called for a person to chew on rice 
powder during interrogation.  If the person did not salivate during this process, he or she 
was deemed to be deceptive (Kleinmuntz & Szucko, 1984).  
Perhaps the most common and popular method of nonverbal deception detection 
involves the interpretation of body language cues.  There is a pervasive belief that cues 
such as gaze aversion, rapid speech, and hand/foot movements are indicative of 
deception.  Numerous studies have indicated that both lay persons and professionals often 
rely on body language cues to deception.  The Global Deception Team (2006) 
investigated stereotypical beliefs regarding non-verbal cues to deception in 58 countries.  
This study provided a list of 103 body language cues and gestures that the general 
population believes are indicative of deception cross culturally.  These beliefs are 
represented in law enforcement training.  Police officers are often trained to search for 
body language cues to deception.  In a review of 18 policing manuals, King and Dunn 
(2010) noted that many indicated that nonverbal cues such as gaze aversion and fidgeting 
indicated deception.  Further, the “Reid Technique” a highly popular and influential, yet 
controversial, model of police interviewing centers on the use of nonverbal cues to 
deception.  Inbau, Reid, Buckley, and Jayne (2001) propose an extensive list of 
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“deceptive behaviours” including gaze aversion, grooming, postural, shifts and covering 
the eyes/mouth with one’s hands.  
 Despite the prevalence of nonverbal cues in deception detection settings, the 
research literature has indicated that they are largely ineffective.  In a meta-analysis of 
120 studies involving 158 body language cues, Depaulo et al. (2003) indicated that there 
is no universal body language cue that indicates deception.  The vast majority of cues 
reviewed were found to be inconsistent and unrelated to deception.  While some evidence 
has been provided that certain cues such as pitch, and hand and foot movements have 
been linked to deception, these cues are dramatically affected by context such as effort, 
rehearsal time, and potential consequences (Stromall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006).  
Further, Vrij, Mann, and Leal (2013) argue that studies that have reported significance 
have demonstrated such small effect sizes (Cohen’s D = 0.1-0.3) that these effects would 
be virtually imperceptible to the naked eye.   
 
1.4 Verbal Methods of Deception Detection 
 Collectively, the research literature has indicated that subjective observer ratings 
that rely on body language cues are not reliable measures of deception detection.  An 
interesting finding in Depaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis of deception detection 
research was that verbal cues to deception were more reliable than non-verbal cues.  
Further, a direct comparison of verbal versus nonverbal cues to deception demonstrated 
that language-based methods of deception detection may be more accurate.   Bond and 
Depaulo’s (2006) meta-analysis compared studies that involved 1.) Watching recordings 
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with sound 2.) Listening only to audio recordings 3.) Reading transcripts of statements, 
and 4.) Watching video clips without sound.  This analysis demonstrated that watching 
videos without sound and therefore only relying on body language cues led to 
significantly worse deception detection accuracy than the other conditions.  These results 
highlight the possibility that language-based cues are more effective than non-verbal 
cues.  
1.4.1 Criteria-Based Content Analysis 
There are two major competing models of verbal deception detection that are 
under examination in the empirical literature: Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) 
and Reality Monitoring (RM).  The CBCA method was developed in 1950’s Germany to 
assist clinicians and social workers to assess the veracity of children’s allegations of 
sexual abuse.   Raskin and Esplin (1991) developed a scale of 19 criteria that have been 
used to assess the accuracy of statements.  This scale is applied to an uninterrupted free 
narrative of the event to determine a validity score.  The effectiveness of the CBCA has 
been assessed in a variety of field studies and controlled laboratory experiments.  Field 
studies typically involve applying the CBCA to children’s witness statements in actual 
sexual abuse matters that have appeared before the court.  True accounts are determined 
by corroborating evidence, or perpetrator confession.   Statements are classified as false if 
the witness recants the statement or if the perpetrator is found to be not guilty.  Esplin et 
al. (1988) found that CBCA was successful in determining the truthfulness of 70% 
witness statements of sexual abuse provided by children age three to fifteen.   Lamb et al. 
(1997) assessed 98 statements of 4-12 year olds on 14 of the CBCA criteria and found 
that the CBCA significantly discriminated between true and false statements.  However 
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the effects in this study were small, as true statements contained 6.74 CBCA criteria as 
compared to 4.85 in false statements.  Craig et al. (1999) found similar results in sexual 
abuse statements of 3-16 year olds, noting that true statements contained an average of 
7.2 of 14 CBCA criteria as compared to 5.7 in false statements. 
Laboratory studies of the CBCA have been conducted by having participants tell 
one truthful and one fabricated story for researchers to apply the CBCA to determine 
accuracy.  Indeed studies have shown that the CBCA can discriminate between true and 
false stories above chance levels over a variety of participant ages and statement topics.  
Yuille (1988) had young children age 5-10 provide statements about a topic of their 
choice after a 2 day rehearsal period.   Researchers trained in CBCA correctly classified 
true stories (91%) and false stories (74%). Steller, Wellershaus, and Wolf (1988) found 
the CBCA to be effective in assessing truth (74%) or lies (62%) in children’s stories of a 
medically invasive procedure such as having blood taken or dental work.   Similar results 
have been found when assessing the veracity of adult statements.  Hofer et al. (1995) 
found that the CBCA was able to discriminate between recollections of a video of a 
robbery, or a story that was fabricated from a predetermined order of events.  Ruby and 
Brigham (1997) noted that the CBCA was able to correctly classify true stories of adults 
(89%); however this tool was unable to determine whether a participant was lying (8%).   
Although the body of literature on the CBCA has highlighted the importance of 
verbal cues to deception detection, there are caveats to this method.   Currently there is no 
agreement on which of the 19 criteria are important for deception detection.  Empirical 
studies have often only tested certain subsets of criteria, and each study differs in terms of 
which criteria are proven to be significant.  In a meta-analysis of all 37 CBCA studies 
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determined to meet empirical standards, Vrij (2005) reported that on average, CBCA can 
successfully detect true accounts in 73% of cases and false accounts in 72% of cases.  
While CBCA vastly outperforms nonverbal deception detection techniques, Vrij (2005) 
argues that this accuracy rate does not meet the threshold of “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
and therefore, CBCA should not be admitted as scientific evidence in criminal court. 
1.4.2 Reality Monitoring 
In addition to the aforementioned caveats of the CBCA, psychologists have 
expressed concern that this scale has been adapted from clinical experience.  Thus 
researchers have proposed a competing model, Reality Monitoring, which was developed 
through the application of scientific principles discovered through the study of human 
cognition.  Johnson and Raye (1981) originally proposed that truly experienced events 
will be encoded differently in the brain than fabricated creations.  Specifically, true 
accounts will contain more sensory, contextual, affective, and cognitive information than 
false accounts.  Later researchers have used this theory to create a Reality Monitoring 
scale to assess true and false statements using verbal cues.  This method applies 8 criteria: 
vividness, sensory information, spatial information, temporal information, coherence, 
emotion, realism, and cognitive operations (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005).  
Empirical research has shown that Reality Monitoring successfully discriminates 
between true and false statements above chance levels.  In a study of personally 
experienced or fabricated stories told at the time and after a one-week delay, Reality 
Monitoring was effective in correctly classifying true (68%) and false (70%) stories 
(Sporer & Kupper, 1995).  Additionally, Sporer and Hamilton (1996) noted that Reality 
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Monitoring was capable of discriminating between true and false stories of adults 
pertaining to childhood experiences (Masip et al, 2005).  Similarly, Vrij et al. (2000) 
conducted a study on stories provided by nurses who watched a video of a theft of a 
patient’s wallet.  Reality Monitoring correctly classified 70.6% of true cases and 64% of 
false cases.  Interestingly, 60% of the truthful participants reached the maximum possible 
Reality Monitoring score, as compared to only 12% of the deceptive statements.  Meta-
analysis of this method demonstrates a similar accuracy rating of true (71.7%) and false 
(66.10%) accounts.  However, similar to the CBCA, empirical research on Reality 
Monitoring has often only used subsets of the 8 criteria, and there is not universal 
agreement on which criteria are important for deception detection (Masip et al., 2005).   
Recently, Vrij and colleagues have successfully used a set of six specific Reality 
Monitoring criteria: visual, audio, spatial, temporal, cognitive, and affective details 
reported.  These criteria have the advantage of being concrete and simple to score, with 
little room for interpretation.  This 6-item scale has been demonstrated to detect 
deception above chance levels of accuracy in a variety of controlled laboratory studies.  
However, it should be noted that the effect sizes, while above chance, remain at about the 
same relative level found in other using differing subsets of Reality Monitoring criteria 
(Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010).  Direct comparisons of the CBCA 
and Reality Monitoring have revealed conflicting results.   Both methods have been 
applied to the same stories in eight studies, with Reality Monitoring outperforming the 
CBCA in five of these comparisons.  Additionally, the overall average accuracy rating 
was slightly higher when statements were scored using RM (68.13%) as compared to 
CBCA (63.63%) (Masip et al., 2005).   
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In summary, both CBCA and Reality Monitoring consistently perform better than 
behavioural cues at assessing deceit, highlighting the importance of verbal methods of 
deception detection.  However, the research on these methods does not allow for 
conclusions regarding which criteria are effective, and their current accuracy scores do 
not meet the legal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”.   One weakness of both of 
these approaches is that they are post-hoc scale measures that are applied to uninterrupted 
witness statements.  This approach suffers both from being limited by the quality of the 
witness statement and a lack of ecological validity, as police officers apply numerous 
techniques to elicit information from victims, witnesses and suspects.   One potential 
point of intervention to increase the accuracy of language-based deception detection is 
the police interview.  It is plausible that if the quality of the suspect statement is 
improved, the accuracy of CBCA and RM may also improve.  Therefore it is important to 
examine how police are interviewing suspects in order to determine whether 
interventions at the interviewing stage may increase deception detection using language-
based methods of deception detection.  
 
1.5 Current Models of Police Interviews 
1.5.1 Accusatory Versus Information Gathering Approaches 
While there are numerous variations of suspect interview methods practiced 
throughout North America, the overarching philosophy is interrogation.  This method, 
most popularly embodied by the “Reid Technique” focuses on gaining suspect 
confessions (Inbau et al., 2001).  In fact investigators using interrogation approaches such 
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as the Reid Technique often focus exclusively on eliciting a confession, even at the 
expense of potentially valuable information that could be used to verify the story at a 
later time (Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1992).  This method involves an initial 
stage of general questioning during which the investigator attempts to detect deception 
through nonverbal cues that have not been reliably proven in the empirical literature 
(Depaulo et al., 2003).  If the suspect has been deemed to be deceptive, the investigator 
will then shift to an interrogation, using a variety of coercive strategies to elicit a 
confession.  The interviewer will often provide a moral or “face saving” motivation for 
the suspect’s actions in an attempt to have the suspect confess.  The interviewer often 
aggressively confronts any denials of guilt and will urge the suspect to confess to atone or 
relieve guilt (Inbau et al., 2001).   
Although the Reid Technique is extremely popular, psychologists argue that this 
method has not proven to be effective under empirical scrutiny.  No specific facet of the 
Reid Technique, or any similar method, has been positively linked to increase in true 
confessions.  In fact, empirical studies have demonstrated that investigators trained in the 
Reid Technique actually perform worse than untrained investigators.  Investigators using 
this interview are more likely to view honest people as lying, and are much more 
confident in their assessments, despite performing worse than untrained participants 
(Kassian & Fong, 1999; Vrij et al., 2006). Perhaps one major reason for this finding is the 
reliance on behavioural cues to determine if someone is lying while being questioned.  In 
an interesting study, Vrij et al. (2006) demonstrated that regardless of whether a person is 
telling the truth or lying, he/she will change his/her behaviours in similar ways to 
correspond to the type of question being asked during an interview.  Therefore, the 
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questioning style embodied by the Reid Technique may in fact elicit the behavioural 
responses that the interviewer has been taught to interpret as signs of guilt.  Consistent 
with these findings, the Reid Technique has been linked to many publicized instances of 
coerced false confessions, specifically in cases of extended interviews, and individuals 
with diminished capacity or mental illness (Drizin & Leon, 2004; Kassin et al., 2010).  
Consequently, the use of coercive interview methods such as the Reid Technique is a 
topic of great controversy. 
Well publicized cases of false confessions led scholars in the United Kingdom to 
critically evaluate modern police interview procedures.  This investigation determined 
that the Reid Technique and similar coercive methods are not effective, leading to the 
adoption of a less coercive approach termed “PEACE” (Dixon, 2010).  The PEACE 
method involves five stages: planning and preparation, engage and explain, account, 
clarify and challenge, and evaluation.  The PEACE approach shifts the goal of the 
interview from eliciting a confession from a suspect to getting a statement from the 
witness that can be verified against corroborating evidence and statements (Dixon, 2010).   
Although this method has drastically reduced the negative consequences of coercive 
methods, the overall effectiveness of the PEACE method is questionable.  Clarke, Milne, 
and Bull (2011) noted that there is no measurable advantage to using the PEACE method 
in terms of actual information gathering and deception detection over taking a simple 
statement.  While the PEACE method has taken an important step in moving away from 
attempting to determine deception through body language and eliciting a confession 
towards using cooperative interviewing that focuses on statements, the PEACE method 
does not appear to actually improve the quantity and accuracy of information or the 
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ability of officers to detect deception.  Therefore the PEACE approach is not 
hypothesized to increase the accuracy of language-based deception detection methods.  
However it is conceivable that an information gathering interview will allow for 
increased deception detection by increasing the sensitivity of Reality Monitoring. 
1.5.2. Modern Interventions to Increase Cognitive Load 
 Recent advances in the empirical literature have provided techniques that may 
increase the amount of information gathered in an interview and to actively elicit 
differences between true and false accounts. In a series of studies, Vrij argues that the key 
to deception detection is cognitive load (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010; Vrij, Mann, & 
Leal, 2013).  Lying is argued to involve a series of cognitive operations, including; 
recalling a story that does not have rich mental associations from a script, inhibiting signs 
of anxiety, and monitoring the target to ensure that the false account is being accepted.  
Conversely, telling the truth is believed to be merely an exercise in recall.  Human beings 
are practiced liars, and therefore people’s mental processes have become so efficient that 
these extra cognitive demands are undetectable in most situations (Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 
2013).  However, Vrij, Mann, Leal & Fisher (2010) demonstrated that by manipulating 
cognitive load on the story teller, differences between true and false accounts emerge.   
Constantly maintaining eye contact is hypothesized to increase cognitive load, and 
placing this demand on story tellers resulted in liars making less mention of spatial 
features and being unable to recall events out of an unrehearsed order.  Additionally, 
untrained university students were able to discriminate between truth and lies above 
chance level when the person was directed to maintain eye contact, however the effect 
sizes were deemed to be small (Vrij et al., 2010).  Similarly, research has demonstrated 
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that reverse recall assists in deception detection.  Vrij et al., (2008) requested that college 
students either participate in a game with a confederate that culminated in a lost wallet, or 
asked participants to fabricate a story of such an event with appropriate guidelines.  
Participants were asked to tell their version of the story either forward, or in reverse 
order.  The reverse order condition allowed for greater discrimination between true and 
false accounts, when police detectives were requested to view this footage; however, the 
effect sizes were small.  The authors argue that the reverse recall condition increases 
cognitive load on participants, allowing for differences to emerge.   This current vein of 
research is consistent with the proposition that interventions in the interview process will 
allow for greater discrimination between true and false accounts, impeding a liar’s ability 
to tell a coherent, consistent, and believable story. 
1.5.3 The Cognitive Interview for Suspects  
 The research literature indicates that information gathering interviews may be 
ethically and practically superior to accusatory police interviews.  Further, information 
gathering interviews that actively induce cognitive load may increase the ability to detect 
deception.  The Cognitive Interview for Suspects (CIS- Geiselman, 2012) is an 
interviewing style that appears to satisfy both of these criteria.  The CIS is a modified 
version of the original Cognitive Interview (CI), which is a successful and empirically 
validated technique that has been used to elicit statements from victims and witnesses of 
crimes for decades.   The CI was developed using memory research and has consistently 
been found to increase the amount and accuracy of information recalled in a multitude of 
studies (Kohnken et al., 1999).  The CI, originally developed by Fisher and Geiselman 
(1984), has been successfully employed by numerous police services for the past 20 years 
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(Geiselman et al., 1984).   Following this protocol, the interviewee is first asked to recall 
the event to the best of his/her ability in a free narrative, with minimal intervention from 
the interviewer.  The second stage, relying on encoding specificity, asks the witness to 
reinstate the context of the event, both in terms of subjective feelings and external 
surroundings.  This stage is conducted verbally; however, more recent research has 
demonstrated the utility of allowing the witness to create a brief sketch to assist in 
recreating the context of the incident (Dando, Wilcox, & Milne, 2009).  In the next phase, 
the witness is asked to recall the event in different temporal orders, most prominently in 
reverse order.  Finally the witness is asked to recall the event from a different perspective 
in the same context.  This task can involve asking the witness how the event would have 
looked from the perspective of another person in the room, or alternatively from a camera 
placed overhead or on the wall.  After these interventions have been completed, the 
individual is asked to recall the event in its entirety.  In addition to the aforementioned 
stages, Fisher and Geiselman (1992) provided additional recommendations for police 
regarding communications skills that would allow the Cognitive Interview to be used to 
its fullest extent, which has been referred to as the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI). 
 The Cognitive Interview has been extensively tested in both field and strict 
laboratory studies for decades.  In a meta-analysis, Kohnken et al. (1999) reported that 
the CI significantly improved recall in 53 of the 55 studies reviewed.  Perhaps even more 
impressive, 32 of these studies demonstrating an increase of information recalled at least 
30% over baseline.  It is important to note that the increased information provided by 
interviewee is not a result of confabulations.  The studies have shown that the CI has an 
accuracy rating of 85%, outperforming the standard police interview (82%) for witness 
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statements.   The CI is a robust method that has been demonstrated to be effective in 
increasing accurate information recalled in a variety of contexts and among populations 
of differing mental faculties (Fisher et al., 2000 Robinson & McGuire, 2006; Wright & 
Holliday, 2007).   
 Recently, Geiselmann (2012) proposed a modified version of the Cognitive 
Interview, called the Cognitive Interview for Suspects (CIS) that would be suitable for 
suspect interviewing.  This protocol involves an initial rapport building stage, followed 
by the first retelling of the story in its entirety.  The interviewee is requested to draw the 
scene and use this tool to tell the story again.  Once the interviewee has told the story 
again, the interviewer asks a series of open ended-follow up questions.  The interviewee 
is then directed to tell the story backwards.  At this point the interviewer challenges any 
inconsistencies that are present in the story, followed by a final recall of the event.  
Geiselmann (2012) conducted an initial pilot study that demonstrated the efficacy of this 
method.  Twenty participants were directed to tell one true and one fabricated story to a 
trained interviewer.  While the interviewers could not distinguish between true and false 
accounts during the initial telling, they were highly accurate at the conclusion of the 
interview. 
 The Cognitive Interview for Suspects is a promising method of police 
interviewing that meets the objectives of a successful deception detection technique.  
First, from a policing perspective, it shifts the focus away from accusations to an 
information gathering approach.  The original CI has been a long standing and effective 
method of police interviewing that is accepted in court and that has been demonstrated to 
increase the amount of information provided in a wide array of populations and 
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timeframes.  Further, this method adopts many of the interventions that have been 
demonstrated to increase deception detection through increased cognitive load.  Finally, 
this method appears to be compatible with verbal deception detection techniques.  The 
increased information provided should increase the sensitivity of actuarial scales, such as 
Reality Monitoring and CBCA techniques.  
 While Reality Monitoring and the CBCA are both empirically validated actuarial 
measures with comparable levels of accuracy, the current thesis argues that Reality 
Monitoring may be more applicable to police interviews for a variety of reasons.  First, 
Reality Monitoring is simpler to score and has been modified to rely on concrete scaling 
such as amount of visual details rather than CBCA, which provides subjective opinions 
such as “coherence” and “realism” (Sporer, 1997; Vrij et al., 2004).  Second, Reality 
Monitoring is steeped in cognitive principles and directly measures details that are 
actively elicited through the CIS.  Third, in a comparison study, Vrij et al. (2004) 
observed that Reality Monitoring dramatically outperformed the CBCA in a mock theft 
scenario.  Finally, Reality Monitoring includes a measure of deceptiveness, in contrast to 
the CBCA which only assesses degree of honesty.  Therefore, while the CBCA is a 
reliable deception detection method, the current research considers the effectiveness of 
Reality Monitoring in detecting deception in statements gained through the CIS. 
 
1.6. Overview of Studies 
 The purpose of my dissertation is to combine an information gathering interview 
and language-based deception detection technique to provide an effective method of 
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police interviewing that allows for reliable deception detection regardless of the 
experience of the interviewer and personality traits of the interviewee.  The collective 
body of empirical literature has indicated that the use of actuarial scales provides reliable 
deception detection above chance levels.  Further, researchers have argued for the 
movement towards interviewing methods that emphasize information gathering over 
confessions, and that may actively elicit cues to deception.  The series of studies 
presented will provide evidence that the application of Reality Monitoring to statements 
elicited by a modified version of the Cognitive Interview for Suspects provides an 
effective method of suspect interviewing that increases the amount of information 
provided and detects deception with a high degree of accuracy.  Reality Monitoring will 
be operationalized using the 6 criteria previously validated by Vrij in a series of studies 
(Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010).  The purpose of using this scoring 
system is to provide concrete and unambiguous criteria, eliminating more subjective 
criteria such as “vividness”.  Further it should be noted that my thesis will be using a 
modified version of the CIS, which eliminates the follow-up questioning phase and 
standardizes the rapport building phase.  The purpose of this alteration is to ensure that 
the questions are standardized to minimize the effects of interviewer beliefs on the 
results. 
Study 1 considers the effectiveness of the combination of Reality Monitoring in 
the Cognitive Interview for Suspects in a mock theft scenario.  This study demonstrated 
an overall deception detection accuracy of 86.6% under controlled laboratory conditions.  
Study 2 provides further evidence for the necessity of Reality Monitoring by comparing 
the accuracy of this measure to subjective observer ratings.  In this study, participants 
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viewed the interviews conducted in Study 1 and were requested to rate deceptiveness.  
The results indicated that Reality Monitoring was highly accurate, while subjective 
observer ratings hovered around chance.  Further analysis indicated that the CIS led to 
more details recalled at the conclusion of the interview, further validating the CIS as an 
effective information gathering interview.  Study 3 considers whether certain personality 
traits lead to increased ability to deceive others, both in terms of subjective ratings and 
the RM scale.  This study considered sub-clinical psychopathy and social dominance.  
The results of Study 3 indicated that neither personality trait led to an increased ability to 
deceive either subjective observers or the RM scale.  Collectively, the three studies 
presented provide strong evidence for the use of the CIS in combination with Reality 
Monitoring as an effective method of increasing information gathered and detecting 
deception. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
1.7 References 
Blair, J. P., Levine, T. R., Reimer, T. O., & McCluskey, J. D. (2012). The gap between 
reality and research. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & 
Management, 35(4), 723-740. doi:10.1108/13639511211275553. 
Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of Deception Judgments. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214-234. 
doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2. 
 
Buller, D.B., Burgoon, J.K. (1996). Interpersonal deception theory. Communication  
Theory, 6, 203–242. 
 
Burgoon, J. K. (2015). Deception Detection Accuracy. The International Encyclopedia of 
Interpersonal Communication, 1–6. 
 
Clarke, C., Milne, R., & Bull, R. (2011). Interviewing suspects of crime: The impact of 
peace training, supervision and the presence of a legal advisor. Journal of 
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 8,(2), 149-162. 
doi:10.1002/jip.144. 
 
Craig, R. A., Scheibe, R., Raskin, D. C., Kircher, J. C., & Dodd, D. H. (1999). 
Interviewer questions and content analysis of children's statements of sexual 
abuse. Applied Developmental Science, 3(2), 77-85. 
doi:10.1207/s1532480xads0302_2. 
 
Dando, C., Ormerod, C., Wilcock, R., & Milne, R. (2011). When help becomes 
hindrance: Unexpected errors of omission and commission in eyewitness memory 
resulting from change temporal order at retrieval? Cognition, 121(3), 416-421. 
 
Dando, C.,Wilcox, R., & Milne, R. (2009). The cognitive interview: The efficacy of a 
modified mental reinstatement of context procedure for frontline police 
investigators. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23, 138–147 
 
Depaulo, B., Malone, B., Lindsay, J., Mulhenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. 
(2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 74-118. 
 
DePaulo, B. M., & Pfeifer, R. L. (1986). On-the-job experience and skill at 
detecting deception. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16, 249–267. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1986.tb01138.x 
 
Dixon, D. (2010). Questioning suspects: A comparative perspective. Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice, 26(4), 426-440. 
 
 
 25 
 
 
 
Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. A. (2004). The problem of false confessions in the post 
dna world. North Carolina Law Review, 82, 891-1004. 
 
Ekman, P., & O'Sullivan, M. (1991). Who can catch a liar? American Psychologist, 
46(9), 913-920. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.46.9.913 
 
Esplin, P. W., Boychuck, T., & Raskin, D. C. (1988, June). A field validity study of 
criteria-based content analysis of children's statements in sexual abuse cases. 
Paper presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Credibility 
Assessment, Maratea, Italy. 
 
Fisher, R.P., Falkner, K,L., Trevisan, M., & McCauley, M. (2000). Adapting the 
Cognitive Interview to Enhance Long-Term (35 Years) Recall of Physical 
Activities. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(2), 180-189. 
 
Fisher, R. P., & Geiselman, R. E. (1992). Memory enhancing techniques for investigative 
interviewing:The Cognitive Interview. Springfield, IL: Charles C.Thomas. 
 
Geiselman, R. E. (2012). The cognitive interview for suspects. American 
Journal of Forensic Psychology, 30, 1–16. 
 
Geiselman, R. E., & Fisher, R. P. (2014). Interviewing victims and witnesses. 
Investigative interviewing: A handbook of best practices. Toronto, 
Canada: Thomas Reuters Publishing. 
 
Geiselman, R. E., Fisher, R. P., Firstenberg, I., Hutton, L. A., Sullivan, S. J., Avetissian, 
I.,and Prosk, A. (1984). Enhancement of eyewitness memory: an empirical 
evaluation of the cognitive interview. Journal of Police Science and 
Administration, 12, 74-80. 
 
Gnisci, A. Caso, L. Vrij, A. (2010) Have You Made Up Your Story? The Effect of 
Suspicion and Liars’ Strategies on Reality Monitoring. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 24, 762–773. 
 
Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and pscyhophysics. New 
York, NY: Wiley. 
 
Hare, R. D. (1993). Without Conscience: The disturbing world of psychopaths among us. 
New York: NY, Pocket books.  
 
Hartwig, M. Granhag, P. Stromwall, L &Vrij, A. (2004). Police officer’s lie detection 
accuracy: Interrogating freely vs observing video.  Police Quarterly, 7(4), 429-
456. 
 
 26 
 
 
 
Höfer, E., Akehurst, L., & Metzger, G. (1996, August). Reality monitoring: A chance for 
farther development of CBCA? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
European Association on Psychology and Law, Siena, Italy. 
 
Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. C. (2001). Criminal interrogation 
and confessions (4th ed.). Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publishers, Inc. 
 
Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. 
(2010). Police-induced confessions: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and 
Human Behavior, 34, 3–38. 
http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.brocku.ca/10.1007/s10979-009–9188-6. 
 
Kassin, S. M., & Fong, C. T. (1999). "I'm innocent!": Effects of training on judgments of 
truth and deception in the interrogation room. Law and Human Behavior, 23(5), 
499-516. doi:10.1023/A:1022330011811 
 
King, W., & Dunn, T. (2010). Detecting deception in field studies. Policing: An 
International Journal of Police Studies and Management, 33(2), 305-320. 
 
Kleinmuntz B., & Szucko, J.J. (1984). Lie detection in ancient and modern times: a call 
for contemporary scientific study. American Psychologist, 39,766–776. 
 
Köhnken, G. (1987). Training police officers to detect deceptive eyewitness statements. 
Does it work? Social Behaviour, 2, 1–17. 
 
Köhnken, G., Milne, R., Memon, A., & Bull, R. (1999). The cognitive interview: A meta-
analysis. Psychology, Crime & Law, 5(1–2), 3-27. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10683169908414991. 
 
Kraut, R. E. (1980). Humans as lie detectors: Some second thoughts. Journal of 
Communication, 30, 209–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.1980.tb02030.x 
 
Lamb, M. E., Sternberg, K. J., Esplin, P. W., Hershkowitz, I., Orbach, Y., & Hovav, M. 
(1997). Criterion-based content analysis: A field validation study. Child Abuse & 
Neglect, 21(3), 255-264. doi:10.1016/S0145-2134(96)00170-6 
 
Lee, Z., Klaver, J. R., & Hart, S. D. (2008). Psychopathy and verbal indicators of 
deception in offenders. Psychology, Crime & Law, 14(1), 73-84. 
doi:10.1080/10683160701423738 
 
Levine, T.R., Park, H.S., & McCornack, S.A.  (1999).  Accuracy in detecting truths  and  
lies: Documenting the “veracity effect”. Communication Monographs, 66, 125–
144. 
 
 27 
 
 
 
Mann, S., Vrij, A., Bull, R. (2002). Suspects, lies and videotape: an analysis of authentic 
high-stakes liars. Law & Human Behavior, 26, 365–376. 
 
Massip, J., Sporer, S., Garrido, E., & Herrero, C. (2005). Detection of deception with 
reality monitoring: A critical review. Psychology, Crime and Law, 11(1), 99-122. 
Mortensen, C., & Cialdini, R. (2010). Full-cycle social psychology for theory and 
application. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4, 53–63. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00239.x 
 
Moston, S., Stephenson, G. M., & Williamson, T. (1992). The effects of case 
characteristics on suspect behavior during police questioning. British Journal of 
Criminology, 1, 23–40. 
 
Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The Dark Triad of personality: Narcissism, 
machiavellianism and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36(6), 
556-563. doi: http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.brocku.ca/10.1016/S0092-
6566(02)00505-6 
 
Raskin, D.C. & Esplin, P.W. (1991). Statement validity assessment: Interview procedures 
and content analysis of children's statements of sexual abuse. Behavioral 
Assessment, 13, 265-291.  
 
Robinson, J. & McGuire, J. (2006). Suggestibility and children with mild learning 
disabilities: The use of the cognitive interview. Psychology, Crime & Law, 12(5), 
537-556. 
 
Ruby, C. & Brigham, J. (1997). The usefulness of the criteria-based content analysis 
technique in distinguishing between truthful and fabricated allegations. A critical 
review. Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 3(4), 705-737. 
 
Sporer, S. L. (1997). The less travelled road to truth: Verbal cues in deception detection 
in accounts of fabricated and self-experienced events. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 11, 373–397. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0720(199710)11:5_373::AID-ACP461_3.0.CO;2-0 
 
Sporer, S. L. & Hamilton, S. C. (1996). Should I believe this? Reality monitoring of 
invented and selfexperienced events from early and late teenage years. Poster 
presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute. Port de Bourgenay, France, 
June 1996. 
 
Sporer, S. L. & Kupper, B. (1995). Realita¨tsu¨berwachung und die Beurteilung des 
Wahrheitsgehaltes von Erza¨hlungen: Eine experimentelle Studie [Reality 
monitoring and the judgment of credibility of stories: an experimental study]. 
Zeitschrift fu¨ r Sozialpsychologie, 26, 173-193. 
 
 28 
 
 
 
Steller, M., Wellershaus, P., & Wolf, T. (1988, June). Empirical validation of Criteria-
Based Content Analysis. Paper presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute 
on Credibility Assessment, Maratea, Italy. 
 
ten Brinke, L., & Porter, S. (2012). Cry me a river: Identifying the behavioral 
consequences of extremely high-stakes interpersonal deception. Law and Human 
Behavior, 36, 469–477. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0093929. 
 
The Global Deception Research Team. (2006). A World of Lies. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 37(1), 60-74. doi:10.1177/0022022105282295. 
 
Vrij, A. (2005) Criteria-based content analysis: A review of the first 37 studies. 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 11(1), 3-41. 
 
Vrij, A. (2006). Challenging interviewees during interviews: The potential effects on lie 
detection. Psychology, Crime & Law, 12(2), 193-206. 
 
Vrij, A. (2008) Nonverbal dominance vs verbal accuracy in lie detection: A plea to 
change policing practice. Criminal Justice and Behaviour,35(10), 1323-1336. 
 
Vrij, A., Akehurst, L., & Morris, P.M. (1997). Individual differences in hand movements 
during deception. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 21, 87–102. 
 
Vrij, A., Akehurst, L., Soukara, S., & Bull, R. (2004). Let me inform you how to tell a 
convincing story: CBCA and Reality Monitoring scores as a function of age, 
coaching and deception. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue 
canadienne des sciences du comportement, 36,113–126. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0087222 
 
Vrij, A., Edward, K., & Bull, R. (2001). Stereotypical verbal and nonverbal responses 
while deceiving others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 899–909. 
 
Vrij, A. Edward, K. Roberts, K. & Bull, R. (2000). Detecting deceit via analysis of verbal 
and nonverbal behavior. Journal of Non Verbal Behaviour, 24 (4), 239-263. 
 
Vrij, A. & Mann, S. (2006). Criteria-Based Content Analysis: An empirical test of its 
underlying processes. Psychology, Crime & Law, 12 (4), 337-349.  
 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Fisher, R., Leal, S., Milne, B., & Bull, R. (2008). Increasing cognitive 
load to facilitate lie detection: The benefit of recalling an event in reverse order. 
Law and Human Behavior, 32, 253-265. 
 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Fisher, R. (2010), ‘Look into my eyes’: can an instruction 
to maintain eye contact facilitate lie detection? Psychology, Crime & Law,16(4), 
327-348. 
 
 29 
 
 
 
Vrij, A. Leal, S., Mann, S., & Granhag, P.A. (2011). A comparison between lying about 
intentions and past activities: verbal cues and detection accuracy. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 25, 212–218. 
 
Vrij,. A., Leal, S., Granhag, P.A., Mann, S., Fisher, R.P., Hillman, J., & Sperry, K. 
(2009). Outsmarting the liars: the benefit of asking unanticipated questions. Law 
and Human Behavior, 33, 159–166. 
 
Wright, A., & Holliday, R. (2007). Interviewing cognitively impaired older adults: How 
useful is a Cognitive Interview? Memory, 15(1), 17-33. 
 
Wright Whelan, C., Wagstaff, G.F., & Wheatcroft, J. M. (2015). Subjective cues to 
deception/honesty in a high stakes situation: An exploratory approach. The 
Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 149(5), 517-534.  
 
Yuille, J. C. (1988). The systematic assessment of children's testimony. Canadian 
Psychology/Psychologie canadienne, 29(3), 247-262. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.brocku.ca/10.1037/h0079769. 
 
Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and nonverbal 
communication of deception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental 
social psychology (Vol. 14, pp. 1–57). New York, NY: Academic Press 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Using Reality Monitoring to Improve Deception Detection in the Context of  
the Cognitive Interview for Suspects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Research has found that deception detection accuracy in the context of suspect 
interrogation hovers around chance levels. Geiselman (2012) adapted the Cognitive 
Interview (typically used for witnesses) for use with suspects (CIS) and found that 
judgments of deception were more accurate than previous interrogation techniques. The 
current study attempted to use the CIS to improve deception detection with Reality 
Monitoring (RM: Vrij et al., 2008), which has already been validated in the context of 
witness statements. One hundred and sixty-six undergraduate students were randomly 
assigned to two conditions. In the Truthful condition, participants played a game with a 
confederate, while in the Deceptive condition, participants rehearsed (but did not 
experience) a synopsis of the game scenario. Participants in the Deceptive condition were 
also instructed to steal $10 from a confederate’s wallet. In both conditions, $10 was 
purported to be missing and a researcher blind to condition conducted a CIS. Statement 
veracity was coded using six of the RM criteria advanced by Vrij et al. (frequency of 
visual, auditory, spatial, temporal, cognitive, and affective details). According to results 
from a MANOVA, truthful and deceptive statements differed significantly on all RM 
criteria, with the exception of affective details, validating the importance for evaluation 
of statement veracity (p ≤ .01). Further, a binary logistic regression found that combining 
the RM criteria together correctly classified 86.6% of statements, χ2 (6) = 114.4, p <.001, 
with excellent sensitivity and specificity (.899 and .833, respectively). As well, Visual, 
Auditory and Cognitive details uniquely predicted condition. Findings support using RM 
criteria to detect deception in interviews conducted with the CIS.  
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Chapter 2: Study 1 
Note: This section is based on the article Logue, M. Book, A., Frosina, P., Huizinga, T., 
& Amos, S. (2015). Using Reality Monitoring to improve deception detection in the 
context of the Cognitive Interview for Suspects. Law and Human Behaviour, 39, (44), 
260-367. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000127. Certain portions of this section 
may differ from the article as published.  Any questions regarding these differences may 
be addressed to Michael Logue. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Deception detection is an area of psychological research that has great theoretical 
and practical applications, particularly in the field of law enforcement.  Problematically, 
attempts to establish reliable deception detection techniques have not been fruitful 
(Geiselman, 2012; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Vrij, 2004).  In fact, numerous 
studies of many different populations have demonstrated an accuracy rating of 
approximately 54-57%, not significantly better than the 50% success rate that would be 
expected by chance (Bond & Depaulo, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Vrij, 
2004; Kraut, 1980).  Given the relative frequency of deception in police interviews and 
the experience of officers in an interviewing context, it would be expected that law 
enforcement officers should be better equipped to detect deception.  Surprisingly, law 
enforcement training and experience do not predict accurate judgment in laboratory 
settings.  For example, Kraut and Poe (1980) found that lay persons and customs officers 
did not differ in their ability to detect deception of individuals suspected of smuggling 
contraband.  Further, veteran police officers do not perform better than new recruits when 
listening to interviews (Depaulo & Pfeiffer, 1986; Köhnken, 1987).  Vrij & Mann (2001a, 
2001b) noted a slight improvement over chance in detection accuracy when officers 
viewed suspect interrogations (64%).  However, the same officers performed at chance 
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level when watching videos of people who were asking for help locating members of 
their families whom they had actually murdered.  Additionally, Hartwig, Granhag, 
Stromwall and Vrij (2004) demonstrated that officers did not fare any better in detecting 
deception when they were directly interviewing the suspect in comparison to passively 
watching the interviews.  
2.1.1 Verbal vs Non-Verbal Cues to Deception 
One potential contributing factor to the poor performance observed in laboratory 
settings is the reliance on body language cues to determine deception.  This practice is 
evident in law enforcement, as policing manuals give higher relative importance to 
behavioral cues over verbal cues in determining statement veracity.  In a review of 18 
policing manuals, King and Dunn (2010) noted that authors often perpetuated the notion 
that one could reliably differentiate between truth and lies using nonverbal cues such as 
gaze aversion, fidgeting and sweating.  Unfortunately, the empirical literature has not 
validated the link between non-verbal behavior and deception, and results have been 
quite mixed.  Studies have demonstrated somewhat reliable trends for higher pitch (Vrij, 
2000) and increased hand and foot movement (Sporer & Schwandt, 2002) during 
deception.  However, these cues are extremely context dependent and may vary as a 
function of various factors such as time to rehearse, content, and relative stakes 
(Stromwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006).  A review of 120 studies assessing 158 different 
non-verbal cues such as body positioning, vocal speed and pitch, sweating and eye 
movements found that there is no completely reliable non-verbal cue to deception.  While 
this review does indicate that liars tend to speak in a higher pitch and use fewer gestures, 
these general guidelines can be dramatically impacted by context (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
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 Although the efficacy of body language cues in determining deceit has been 
mixed, research has indicated that verbal methods of deception detection may improve 
accuracy.  Johnson and Raye (1981) proposed the hypothesis that truly-experienced 
events and fabricated stories of events are experienced differently and therefore are in 
fact encoded differently in the brain.  Truly-experienced events are encoded with sensory 
cues, the person’s physical and emotional state, and in chronological order.  Conversely, 
fabricated events are created through imagination, and will lack the aforementioned cues. 
The differences in encoding may be reflected in the language that people use to describe 
these events.  This process was termed Reality Monitoring (RM), and researchers have 
applied these principles to create post-hoc scales to assess veracity of witness statements 
(Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005).  Reality Monitoring assumes that true 
accounts will contain more sensory, contextual, affective, and cognitive information than 
false accounts.  Within Reality Monitoring, a subset of eight original criteria are applied 
to statements to determine veracity: vividness, sensory information, spatial information, 
temporal information, coherence, emotion, realism, and cognitive operations (Masip et 
al., 2005).  Empirical research has shown that Reality Monitoring successfully 
discriminates between true and false statements above chance levels.  This method has 
been applied to classifying true and false stories from varying timeframes ranging from 
childhood experiences to immediate recall of experienced or fabricated events (Sporer & 
Kupper, 1995; Sporer & Hamilton, 1996; Masip et al., 2005).  Additionally, Reality 
Monitoring has been used to classify true and false recollections of individuals who 
watched videotapes of thefts, simulating the experience of witnesses of crime (Vrij et al., 
2000).  Meta-analysis of this method reveals that numerous studies have often found 
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accuracy ratings ranging between 64-71% (Masip et al., 2005).  However, empirical 
research on Reality Monitoring has often only used subsets of the eight criteria.  Also, 
there is not universal agreement on how certain criteria should be operationalized, or 
which criteria are important for deception detection (Masip et al., 2005). 
Reality Monitoring has an additional benefit of using objective criteria and 
scoring rather than the subjective judgment of the interviewer to determine statement 
veracity.  In various fields, the empirical data are compelling: Research has demonstrated 
that actuarial scales that use statistical relationships to predict outcomes always out-
perform subjective judgments (Garb, 1989; Grove et al., 2000; Mossman, 1994). 
Actuarial measures are comprised of cues/items that have been empirically derived, that 
is, have been shown to relate to the outcome in numerous research studies.  Garb’s (1989) 
meta-analysis found that subjective judgments in a variety of contexts are around chance 
levels, regardless of expertise and experience, and that actuarial measures tend to perform 
much better.  
Reality Monitoring consistently performs better than behavioral cues at assessing 
deceit, and provides an objective basis for judging deception in comparison to the 
subjective classifications that have not been validated in the literature.  However, 
previous research on this approach has typically applied the criteria to uninterrupted 
statements (Masip et al., 2005), while real world police interviews involve the asking of 
questions that may serve to increase the information gathered in the statement.  Applying 
Reality Monitoring to interviewing methods that emphasize information gathering may 
increase the sensitivity of the scale and improve the accuracy of deception detection. 
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2.1.2 Information Gathering  
Police interviews often have two major yet often conflicting goals, to gather 
information and to obtain a confession.  Accusatory interrogations tend to emphasize 
obtaining a confession, while non-accusatory confessions emphasize information 
gathering.  Until recently, the most popular suspect interviewing method in North 
America has been the Reid Technique, which has been taught to hundreds of thousands 
of officers internationally (Snook et al., 2010).  Reid and similar techniques often involve 
using nonverbal cues to determine whether the person being interviewed is being 
deceptive.  If the suspect has been deemed to be deceptive using these cues, the 
investigator will then shift to an interrogation.  The interviewer will repeatedly confront 
and directly dispute any denials of guilt, will appeal to morality, urging the suspect to 
confess to “get it off your chest”, and will often provide a face-saving alternative 
explanation that the suspect can adopt as a rationale for the offense.  The Reid Technique 
focuses primarily on eliciting a confession, even at the expense of getting an account of 
the event that could later be verified (Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1992).  Not 
only does the motivation to gain a confession influence the line of questioning of an 
interviewer away from potentially valuable information, the questioning style often 
negatively influences the responsiveness of the suspect.  Vrij, Mann, Kristen and Fisher 
(2007) observed that suspects who were interviewed in an accusatory fashion responded 
with short statements and provided the fewest verbal signs of deceit.  Evans et al. (2013) 
found that adopting an “information gathering” approach to suspect interviewing led to 
an increase in critical details disclosed by the interviewee and even a greater number of 
admissions as compared to those interviewed with an “accusatory” style.  
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In contrast to the accusatory interviewing style that has typically been used with 
suspects, police services often adopt an information gathering style when interviewing 
victims and witnesses.  The Cognitive Interview has been a successful and empirically 
validated approach for interviewing victims and witnesses.  This method applies the 
principles of encoding specificity and memory retrieval to increase the quality of witness 
statements.  The Cognitive Interview has been strenuously tested in both field and strict 
laboratory studies for the past two decades. In a review of 55 experimental comparisons 
involving over 2,447 interviews, Köhnken, Milne, Memon, and Bull (1999) reported that 
the Cognitive Interview significantly improved recall in 53 of the 55 studies.  Perhaps 
even more impressively, the Cognitive Interview provided an increase in amount of 
recalled information ranging between 25% and 147%, with 32 studies demonstrating an 
increase of over 30%.  The increased information does not sacrifice accuracy.  Studies 
have shown that the Cognitive Interview has an accuracy rating of 85%, slightly better 
than the standard police interview (82%).  This method has been validated in a variety of 
contexts, and witness populations, over an extended period of time (Robinson & 
McGuire, 2006; Wright & Holliday, 2007; Fisher, Falkner, Trevisan & McCauley, 2000).  
The success of the Cognitive Interview with victims and witnesses led Geiselman 
(2012) to adapt it for use with suspects.  Geiselman named this approach the Cognitive 
Interview for Suspects (CIS).  The resulting interview has eight stages: 1) rapport 
building, 2) initial recall of event, 3) reinstate the context of the event by drawing the 
event in sequential order, 4) additional recall, 5) follow-up questions (open ended), 6) 
recall of event in reverse order, 7) interviewer challenges the story as false, and 8) final 
recounting of event.  In the last stage, the suspect is allowed to clarify or change any 
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information he/she wishes, before the interview is concluded.  In the first empirical test of 
this process, Geiselman (2012) studied whether this new method would increase 
deception detection.  Geiselman requested that 20 students tell one true and one false 
story while being interviewed by one of six trained interviewers using this protocol.  
After each stage, the researchers rated whether they felt the suspect was being truthful or 
deceptive.  Geiselman (2012) discovered that while the interviewers were not able to 
accurately detect deception in the initial stages, they became progressively more accurate 
throughout the interview, to an “almost perfect level of discriminability” (Geiselman & 
Fisher, 2014, p.14).  In addition to the preliminary study on the entire CIS conducted by 
Geiselman, studies have provided support for individual stages of the CIS, providing 
insight into why this method may be successful.  There are at least three characteristics of 
the CIS that could account for this accuracy.  First, the emphasis is on information 
gathering, which allows for detection of inconsistencies.  Second, the CIS (specifically, 
the reverse recall stage) increases cognitive load, tending to enhance the differences 
between truth tellers and liars (Vrij et al., 2010).  Finally, the increased interaction with 
the suspect may also improve accuracy. 
As mentioned, the use of techniques such as recall in reverse order increases 
cognitive load on suspects, which has been effectively used to enhance the differences 
between truthful and deceptive individuals.  A series of studies have been conducted 
suggesting that placing cognitive demands on storytellers increases accuracy of deception 
detection.  For instance, Vrij, Mann, Leal and Fisher (2010) demonstrated that imposing 
the cognitively demanding task of maintaining eye contact reduced the amount of details 
that people could provide in false stories and consequently increased the ability of raters 
 39 
 
 
 
to detect deception.  Recalling a story in reverse order is a cognitively demanding task 
that also increases deception detection.  Vrij et al. (2008) requested that college students 
either participate in a game with a confederate that culminated in a lost wallet, or asked 
participants to fabricate a story of such an event with appropriate guidelines.  Participants 
were asked to tell their version of the story either forward, or in reverse order.  The 
reverse order condition elicited fewer details in false accounts and allowed for greater 
discrimination when police detectives viewed this footage.  While the effect sizes in these 
studies were relatively small, they highlight the possibility that police interviewing 
techniques may serve to actively increase deception detection.  In fact, Vrij and Granhag 
(2012) have recently called for a shift away from attempting to passively construct a list 
of cues of deception to actively eliciting differences among truthful and deceptive 
“suspects” through empirically validated techniques.  
 Research also suggests that a more interactive interview (such as one that 
emphasizes information gathering) can also improve the interviewers’ ability to detect 
deception.  Dando and Bull (2011) allowed police officers to interview suspects while 
being privy to some of the “evidence” collected in the investigation.  The officers 
interviewed suspects by either confronting the suspects with evidence at the beginning of 
the interview, near the end of the interview, or gradually introducing the contradictory 
evidence as the officer saw fit.  This study indicated that officers who were able to 
strategically introduce contradictory evidence (termed tactical interviewing) were able to 
determine statement veracity (67% deceptive and 74% truthful) better than the other 
interview styles which performed at chance levels.  This method draws many parallels 
with the CIS, which challenges the suspect during the interview and requires the suspect 
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to adapt to the numerous questions and tasks that are required throughout the various 
stages. 
2.1.3 Present Study 
The purpose of the present study was to provide support for the use of Reality 
Monitoring (RM) by using a suspect interview that is effective at gathering information. 
The Cognitive Interview for Suspects (CIS; Geiselman, 2012) appears to be a viable 
method of suspect interviewing that may improve the quality of suspect statements and 
therefore should increase the effectiveness of Reality Monitoring.  This technique 
employs an interactive interview style and induces cognitive load; two factors that have 
been shown to increase deception detection.  The CIS uses many of the techniques of the 
CI that have been shown to increase the number of details recalled by orienting the 
interviewee to many of the Reality Monitoring criteria; including the sensory, spatial and 
temporal factors of a memory.  Presumably, the improvement in accuracy noted by 
Geiselman (2012) throughout the stages of the CIS are due to the increase in details 
recalled throughout truthful statements, and possibly changes in behavioral cues due to 
the increase in cognitive load (as found by Vrij et al., 2008).  The present study focused 
on RM criteria for statement veracity in the context of the CIS.  The scale was applied to 
statements gathered at the conclusion of the CIS to determine whether the RM criteria 
can detect deception with the improved information gathered through the Cognitive 
Interview.  Specifically, we expected that truthful statements would differ from false 
statements on all of the tested RM criteria, and that the combination of all RM criteria 
would accurately predict whether a statement was true or fabricated.  
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2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 166 Brock university students (67 men and 99 women 
Mage=21.3 age range=17-43) participating for course credit and the possibility of 
winning $10.  Participants were randomly assigned to either the Truthful or Deceptive 
condition using a random numbers generator. 
2.2.2 Procedure 
Upon entry into the laboratory, participants were informed that the study involved 
storytelling, and that they would be asked a series of questions based on their experience 
in the laboratory.  Prior to experimental manipulation, participants were introduced to 
researcher one and completed consent forms, as well as personality questionnaires that 
were used for a separate research project.  Upon completion of these materials, the 
experimental manipulation began. 
2.2.2 (a) Stage 1 
The experimental paradigm involved a game of Connect 4 with a researcher, 
culminating in an additional researcher coming into the room and stating that money had 
gone missing.  Participants in the Truthful condition actually played the game with the 
researcher.  Participants in the Deceptive condition did not actually play the game but 
read a transcript of events that they use to construct an alibi.  This paradigm was adapted 
from previously published research (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, Leal & Fisher, 2010). 
 42 
 
 
 
Truthful Condition: Participants in this condition remained in the original room 
(further denoted as the “game room”) and were introduced to a second researcher. 
Researcher one left the room, allowing researcher two to start to play a game of Connect 
4 with the participant.  During this game the researcher engaged the individual 
participants in conversations on such topics as course load, vacation, future plans and 
social life.  After approximately five to seven minutes, researcher one re-entered the 
game room, picked up a textbook and left the room.  The game continued for 
approximately five to seven minutes until researcher two stepped out to answer a phone 
call, leaving the participant in the room alone for a brief period before returning. 
Researcher two returned and the game-play resumed. After approximately three minutes, 
researcher one returned to the game room and stated that he forgot his wallet.  Researcher 
one picked up a wallet that was left on the desk during the entire game and stated that $10 
was missing.  Researcher two reported that the participant was only left alone in the room 
for a brief period of time while she took a phone call.  Researcher one left the room, 
under the guise that he was going to enlist the help of a third researcher (the interviewer) 
to help determine what happened.  Researcher two informed the participant that he/she 
would be interviewed by a third researcher in a separate room to determine whether 
he/she took the money.  The participants were informed that if they were able to convince 
the interviewer that they did not take the money, they would earn $10. 
Deceptive Condition: Participants assigned to this condition did not experience 
the above event (game), but were asked to create a story about experiencing the event 
after reading a short synopsis of the event as experienced by the participants in the 
Truthful condition.  First, participants were provided the initial informed consent and 
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questionnaires by the first researcher.  The second researcher entered the game room and 
explained that the participant would be required to take $10 out of the wallet in the room. 
Researcher two provided the participant with a template based on the Truthful condition 
that the participant can use to construct an alibi.  The second researcher informed the 
participants that they would be interviewed by a third researcher in a separate room and 
instructed them to add whatever information they deemed appropriate to make their 
respective alibis believable.  In addition to the verbal instructions, participants in this 
condition were provided the template with the following information on a sheet of paper: 
 “You entered the room and played a few games of connect four with [researcher two]. 
Connect Four is a board game similar to tic-tac-toe played with discs similar to checkers 
pieces. The goal of the game is to be the first to line up 4 pieces on the board while taking 
alternating turns. A short time later, [researcher one], who shares the laboratory, enters 
the room and you all have a brief conversation and he leaves. The game continues until 
[researcher two] receives a phone call and leaves the room before returning. The game 
continues until [researcher one] comes back into the lab and locates the wallet that is on 
the desk. This person opens the wallet, and claims that there is $10 missing.” 
“The wallet is sitting on the table in the corner of the room. Take the $10 out of the 
wallet. You will be interviewed by a separate person to determine whether you took the 
$10. If you convince the interviewer that you did not take the money, you will get to keep 
the $10.” 
When they had read the template and confirmed they understood the instructions, 
participants were left alone in the room for 10-14 minutes to construct and practice their 
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alibi without input or assistance from either researcher.  After approximately 5 to 7 
minutes, a researcher entered the room to ask if the participant had any questions before 
leaving the participant to continue to practice.  After the allotted practice time was 
complete, researcher two asked the participant if he/she was ready for the interview.  The 
participant was brought into the next room to be interviewed.  The timing allotments 
were chosen to provide consistency with the Truth condition and to ensure there was 
equal delay between the manipulation and subsequent interview.  While participants in 
the Deceptive condition were not explicitly told not to mention practicing their alibi 
during the interview, none of the participants discussed this during their interview.  
Video Recording: A video recorder was placed in the game room to record the 
entire interaction of stage one for both the Truthful and Deceptive conditions. This 
camera was hidden in a file folder box in the corner of the room that allowed for the 
entire room to be monitored.  The purpose of this camera was to ensure that the 
information that participants provided in the interview was accurate.  The conversations 
between the participants and researcher were reviewed for accuracy, and each game room 
session was viewed to ensure that participants in the Truthful condition did not take the 
money and the participants in the Deceptive condition actually took the money from the 
wallet. 
2.2.2. (b) Stage 2 
After the first stage of the study was completed, participants in both conditions 
were taken to a second room to meet with the interviewer.  The participant was directed 
to a pre-arranged chair which was positioned approximately 2.5 feet from the interviewer. 
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A video camera sat in the corner of the room in plain sight, recording the participant. The 
interview was conducted face to face, with both parties seated in chairs directly across 
from each other without any obstructions. 
Participants in both conditions were asked the same questions in the same order 
by the same interviewer, who was blind to the experimental condition.  All interviews 
began with the same introduction by the interviewer: 
“As you know my lab-mate [researcher one] is missing money, and we just want to find 
out what happened. I am not necessarily blaming you, but I would like you to provide me 
with a story that makes sense so I can understand what happened in the previous room. “ 
The interview began with two baseline questions that served as the rapport stage of the 
cognitive interview.  The first question involved recounting the events of the past 
weekend and the second involved projecting where the participant saw his or her self in 
the next 5 years.  The introduction and personal questions were based on Geiselman’s 
(2012) recommendation to present the interviewer not as a superior or authority figure 
but an equal who shows interest in the “suspect” as an individual.  After the baseline 
questions were answered the interview commenced.  The interviewer asked the five 
questions based on the CIS in the same order.  The stages were comprised of an initial 
recall of the event, drawing the scene to explain the sequence of events, reverse order 
recall, a challenge question where the researcher reports that the participant has been 
inconsistent, and a final recall of all the previous information including anything else the 
participant would like to add.  The wordings of these questions followed the same 
structure as used by Vrij et al. (2008) in order to maintain a measure of experimental 
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consistency across studies.  At the conclusion of each phase, the interviewer asked “is 
there anything else you would like to add?” before moving on to the next stage.  The 
interviewer did not ask any clarification or additional follow up questions of any of the 
participants.  
The interview was concluded when all questions were answered.  The interviewer 
left the room briefly, instructing the participant that he needed to review the answers 
provided.  After approximately 5 minutes, Researcher one returned to the room and 
informed all participants that the interviewer was unable to determine whether or not they 
were telling the truth.  Depending on condition, participants were either provided with or 
allowed to keep $10 for their participation.  Participants were debriefed about the purpose 
of the study, but were not told that the incentive was distributed regardless of 
performance, as any discussion with their classmates would have resulted in 
contamination of future participants.  
2.2.3 Reality Monitoring Scoring  
A separate researcher trained in Reality Monitoring scored the audio recording of 
the final interview question of each participant according to protocol.  The final interview 
question was scored because it explicitly directed the participant to recount everything 
that the participant could remember about what happened in the game room, including all 
information previously stated and anything else that the participant would like to add. 
The researcher listened to the entire interview for inconsistencies throughout the 
questions.  As a manipulation check, 30 randomly selected interviews were transcribed 
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and checked for accuracy to ensure that the information reported remained consistent 
throughout.  
The third researcher, blind to experimental condition, tallied the frequency of six 
Reality Monitoring criteria: Visual details, auditory details, spatial details, temporal 
order, cognitive operations and affect.  For example the statement: “He walked towards 
me and then asked if I took the money?” would score one tally for spatial, two for 
temporal, one point for visual and one point on the auditory scale. The statement, “She 
was sitting in the room on a chair.  She had her phone in her hand and there was a cup on 
the table” would score 5 points for visual cues, 4 points for spatial cues”.  Conversely, a 
comparatively vague statement such as “We played the game in the room” would score 1 
point for temporal cues 1 and one point on the spatial scale.  The research literature is 
inconsistent on which facets of Reality Monitoring are used in deception detection 
research.  The current study considered the same six scoring factors used by Vrij et al. 
(2008) in a study adopting the current experimental protocol, in an effort to maintain a 
measure of consistency across studies for potential comparison.  Reality Monitoring 
criteria are easy to understand, relatively simple to score and concrete with little room for 
interpretation (Sporer, 1997; Vrij et al., 2004; Vrij et al., 2008).  The criteria used were 
adopted from numerous previous studies that demonstrated inter-rater reliability ( r = .72-
.96: Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij et al., 2004; Vrij et al., 2008).  
 In this study, it should be noted that cognitive operations are defined as 
inferences of mental states or motivations of others, rather than references to one’s own 
thought process.  The research literature on Reality Monitoring is often unclear as to the 
exact definition of cognitive processes (Masip, 2005; Vrij et al., 2008).  In previous 
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studies, cognitive factors have been defined both as one’s own thoughts during an 
experience and a third party’s mental state or motivations (Vrij et al., 2008).  The present 
authors contend that references to the thought processes of others are fundamentally 
different than recollection of one’s own thoughts. Specifically it is argued that fabricating 
a lie may involve creating a consistent thought narrative, which would cause one to 
reference the thoughts of others to make what sounds to be a believable story.  This 
theory makes sense with previous conflicting findings that some studies indicate that 
cognitive operations indicate honesty and others have found that cognitive operations 
signal deception (Masip et al., 2005; Vrij et al., 2008).  McCormack et al.(2009) observed 
that people telling fabricated autobiographical stories provided limited details of the 
event and will often attempt to “fill in the gaps” in the story by providing rationalizations 
for the actions of another that the story teller should not know.  For example in the 
current study, the statements “[researcher 1] is absent minded, he always loses things” or 
“[researcher 2] was upset with her roommate over paying the rent, so she went outside to 
take the call because she did not want to argue about money in front of me” would be 
considered cognitive processes that are indicative of deception.  This study only 
considered inferred mental processes and motivations of others as cognitive processes in 
an attempt to eliminate this potential confound.  Therefore the current study predicts that 
cognitive operations will indicate deception. 
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2. 3. Results 
The original sample contained 166 participants.  A total of 9 participants were 
removed from analysis.  In the Deceptive condition, participants were removed for the 
following reasons: not taking the money (n = 3), confessing to taking the money in the 
interview (n = 3), refusal to participate in the interview (n=1) and technical difficulties 
with the camera (n = 1).  One participant in the Truthful condition was removed due to 
technical difficulties with the camera that did not allow the interview to be scored.  Of the 
remaining 157 participants, there were 78 in the Truthful condition and 79 in the 
Deceptive condition.  All participants in both conditions used at least one visual, 
auditory, spatial, and temporal cue, while cognitive operations and affective details were 
underutilized with 77% and 78% of participants having a score of 0 on these scales.  
 To determine whether the Reality Monitoring criteria were significantly different 
between the Truthful and Deceptive conditions, a multivariate analysis of variance was 
conducted which allowed us to control for inflation of Type I error that comes from 
conducting multiple t-tests.  The multivariate test was significant, F (6,149) = 25.06, p < 
.001. With the exception of the Affective Details subscale, all of the Reality Monitoring 
criteria differed significantly between the groups (see Table 2.1 for means, univariate F-
tests, and effect sizes), with people in the Deceptive condition using significantly fewer 
visual, auditory, spatial, and temporal details, and significantly more cognitive 
operations. Cohen’s d values indicate that there were small effects for affective details, 
moderate effects for visual, spatial and cognitive details, and large effects for temporal 
and auditory details.  
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2. 3. 1. Reality Monitoring Predicting Statement Veracity 
         A binary logistic regression was conducted to determine whether combining the 
RM criteria would accurately predict whether an individual was in the Truthful or 
Deceptive condition.  All six criteria were entered as predictors of condition.  The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test was not significant, meaning that the model 
fit well with the data, χ2 (8) = 5.60, p =.69, and the overall model significantly predicted 
condition, χ2 (6) = 114.400, p <.001, indicating that the full RM scale reliably 
distinguished between conditions.  The RM scale correctly classified 89.9% of Truthful 
interviews and 83.3% of Deceptive interviews for a combined accuracy score of 86.6% 
(specificity = 90%; sensitivity = 83%), which translates into a large effect size (Nagelkirk 
R2 = .698).  Positive predictive value (PPV) was 89, indicating that a person predicted to 
be in the Deceptive condition had an 89% chance of actually having been assigned to that 
condition, and negative predictive value (NPV) was 85, meaning that a person predicted 
to be in the Truthful condition had an 85% chance of being in that condition.  
When looking at the specific RM criteria within the model, visual, auditory and 
cognitive factors uniquely predicted condition (β= -.22, Wald = 4.29; p= <.05, β= .40, 
Wald = 30.24; p= <.001, and β = -.693, Wald = 4.78; p = .03 for visual, auditory and 
cognitive details, respectively).  The remaining RM criteria were not uniquely predictive 
of condition.  Interestingly, references to cognitive details were relatively uncommon, 
with only 35 of the 157 suitable cases referencing cognitive operations of others (22%). 
Of these 35 participants, 31 were in the Deceptive group (88%).  
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2. 4. Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to determine the predictive utility of Reality 
Monitoring Criteria (RM: Masip et al., 2005) in the context of the Cognitive Interview for 
Suspects (CIS; Geiselman, 2012).  As predicted, the Truthful and Deceptive conditions 
differed significantly in their scores on the RM criteria.  More specifically, participants in 
the Deceptive condition reported fewer visual, auditory, spatial, and temporal details, and 
significantly more cognitive operations.  These findings are in agreement with previous 
research conducted by Vrij et al. (2008) and McCormack et al. (2009).  The second step 
in determining predictive utility was to conduct a binary logistic regression, predicting 
condition (Truthful vs. Deceptive) from all six of the RM criteria.  The overall accuracy 
of classifying participants into Truthful and Deceptive conditions was 86.6%, with RM 
accurately classifying true and false accounts in 89.9% and 83.3% of cases, respectively. 
Taken together, the findings of our study are in line with previous research finding that 
RM accurately predicts whether recalled events are experienced or fabricated (Masip et 
al., 2005; Sporer & Hamilton, 1996; Sporer & Kupper, 1995), and true versus false 
witness statements (Vrij et al., 2000).  
Interestingly, although this study provides experimental support for the idea that 
Reality Monitoring can reliably detect deception, the specific facets of Reality 
Monitoring were not equally predictive of statement veracity.  As predicted, visual cues, 
auditory details and the use of cognitive operations uniquely predicted condition. 
However, while spatial and temporal references were also significantly higher among 
truthful statements; the effect sizes of these factors were relatively small. The 
experimental design may have contributed to the relatively small effect sizes of certain 
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facets of the scale.  Participants in the Deceptive condition met the same researchers, sat 
in the same room and were provided a transcript of the same sequence of events in the 
Truthful condition.  These controls were necessary so that those in the Deceptive 
condition would not provide false descriptions of the room or confederates that the 
research team would know to be false, potentially biasing the interviewer or scoring of 
the scale.  However, providing the same visual, spatial, and temporal details may have 
served to mute the effects of certain facets of the Reality Monitoring scale.  
While this study adopted a similar experimental paradigm to Vrij et al. (2008), 
and the CIS as described by Geiselman (2012), there were variations in this study from 
previous research that deserve mention.  These deviations were specifically made in an 
effort to make the use of Reality Monitoring in the context of the CIS applicable to law 
enforcement officers.  First, this study differed from previous research by using audio 
recordings rather than transcripts to score Reality Monitoring criteria.  While officers do 
take written statements from witnesses, suspect interviews are often video recorded. 
Real-time assessment of deception will allow officers to conduct timely investigations 
instead of waiting for lengthy interviews to be accurately transcribed.  Additionally, the 
questioning methodology in this study deviated slightly from Geiselman’s (2012) 
approach, omitting the stage involving a series of follow-up and open- ended questions. 
The current study used a student interviewer with no prior police interviewing experience 
or deception detection training.  Pre-determined questions were asked in the same order 
without any latitude for further questioning in order to ensure that the process, not the 
specific attributes or skills of the interviewer, determined results.  The success of this 
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study indicates that the process may be effective for officers of differing skill and 
experience levels.  
2.4.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
While we have provided more support for the ecological validity of the Reality 
Monitoring scale, there is much research left to be done.  Our study did examine the use 
of Reality Monitoring within an interview that includes questioning, which more closely 
matches the type of suspect interview conducted in the real world.  However, our 
scenario is not one involving high stakes, as would be the case in real world 
interrogations, and it is quite possible that results would differ in situations that did have 
high stakes, as suggested by ten Brinke & Porter (2012).  Considering this, as well as our 
reliance on a student sample, there is a clear need for verification of ecological validity. 
As suggested by Mortensen & Cialdini (2010), applied social psychological research 
needs to be conducted using multiple methodologies in both laboratory and field settings 
if ecological validity is to be assumed.  
We used CIS to increase information gathered, but because this interview 
increases cognitive load and also increases the amount of information gathered, the 
interview itself may lead to better deception detection, regardless of the use of Reality 
Monitoring.  In fact, Geiselman (2012) found that raters were much more accurate after 
viewing an entire CIS, which highlights the need for a direct test to directly test this 
(subjective ratings versus Reality Monitoring in context of CIS). Such a study would 
examine the accuracy of subjective judgment in comparison with the accuracy of 
prediction based on Reality Monitoring.  
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Finally, while the current research examines the utility of Reality Monitoring as a 
deception detection method, it should be noted that Criteria Based Content Analysis 
(CBCA) is a viable and competing nonverbal method of deception detection.  Meta-
analysis reveals that these methods have comparable accuracy ratings (Masip et al., 
2005), and in a direct comparison of both scales using a similar methodology, Vrij et al. 
(2004) found that Reality Monitoring (74%) dramatically outperformed the CBCA (60%) 
in overall deception detection.  There are three major advantages to using Reality 
Monitoring in conjunction with the CIS.  First, Reality Monitoring is much simpler to use 
and requires less training and expertise (Sporer, 1997; Vrij et al., 2004).  This method 
should therefore be more accessible to law enforcement personnel.  Second, Reality 
Monitoring has been used in a series of studies of cognitive load using similar 
experimental paradigms (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, Leal & Fisher, 2010).  Using 
Reality Monitoring in the present sample allows for a more direct comparison of results. 
Finally, CBCA exclusively measures honesty, while the cognitive facet of the Reality 
Monitoring scale allows for a direct measure of deception, which proved to be significant 
in this sample (Vrij et al., 2004).  Although the current project focused on Reality 
Monitoring, the CBCA is a valuable tool with potential for success in this paradigm. 
Further research should assess the accuracy of the CBCA in relation to statements elicited 
by the CIS.
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Table 2.1. 
Summary of descriptive statistics for Reality Monitoring variables in Deceptive and Truthful conditions. 
 
 
Truthful 
  
Deceptive 
       
            
Variable Mean SD SE Mean SD SE F-test p-value 
Cohen's 
d 
CI 
lower 
CI 
Upper 
       
 
    
Visual   7.88 4.00 0.44 6.20 2.55 0.32   2.55   0.01 0.50  0.31   2.44 
Auditory 16.88 7.99 0.92 5.60 3.58 0.42 11.02 <.001 1.81  9.16 13.11 
Spatial   8.92 2.94 0.34 7.66 2.90 0.32   2.78   0.01 0.43  0.38   2.22 
Temporal 12.37 3.59 0.41 9.48 3.23 0.36   5.35 <.001 0.85  1.84   3.99 
Cognitive   0.12 0.54 0.06 1.03 1.93 0.22  -4.00 <.001 -0.64 -1.36  -0.46 
Affective   0.35 0.88 0.10 0.16 0.46 0.05   1.65   0.10  0.27  0.04   0.41 
            
Note. N’s were 79 and 78 for Deceptive Alibi and Truthful conditions, 
respectively. Confidence intervals are also listed for the difference 
between the means.  
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Abstract 
Volumes of research have indicated that deception detection techniques are 
largely ineffective under controlled experimental conditions.  Recent research has moved 
away from body language cues and accusatory interviews to verbal deception detection 
methods and interviews that emphasize information gathering.  Logue et al. (2015) 
demonstrated that applying the Reality Monitoring scale to statements elicited through 
the Cognitive Interview for Suspects (CIS) was highly effective in detecting deception 
(86.6% overall accuracy; true = 89.9%, false = 83.3%). The current study considers 
whether the CIS alone allows for third party raters to accurately detect deception, or if 
Reality Monitoring in conjunction with the CIS is more effective. Three hundred and 
ninety Brock University students viewed video recordings of the first and last questions 
of 100 CIS interviews conducted in previous research (Logue et al., 2015) and were 
asked to judge deceptiveness after each question.  These interviews were conducted after 
participants in a previous study completed a mock theft scenario where money was 
missing from a wallet, or were instructed to take money from a wallet and construct a 
convincing lie based on a template provided.  In the current study, subjective observer 
ratings hovered around chance levels of accuracy for both the first (52.73%) and last 
(47.82%) questions.  Subjective ratings of deception were significantly worse after the 
CIS was completed compared to the initial question (t (389) = 4.75, p <.01).  Conversely 
the Reality Monitoring scale was extremely effective, with an overall deception detection 
accuracy of 92.5% (True = 91.7%, False = 93%).  Results provide further support for the 
use of Reality Monitoring and the CIS as an accurate measure of deception detection. 
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Chapter 3. Study 2. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Lie detection is a topic of theoretical interest and practical importance among law 
enforcement agencies.  Despite numerous volumes of literature on body language cues 
and interviewing styles, the vast majority of research has observed chance level accuracy 
for deception detection.  In a meta-analysis of 206 samples, Bond and Depaulo (2006) 
demonstrated a 54% overall accuracy rating with 61% of people correctly classifying 
truthful statements and only 47% correctly classifying lies.  The authors further noted that 
overall accuracy was normally distributed, ranging between 31-73%.  In these studies the 
outlying positive effect sizes involved small sample sizes, with the larger sample studies 
hovering around the mean.  Perhaps more alarmingly, researchers have argued that 
accuracy of detecting truth may be over-inflated by the well-established “truth bias” 
(Levine, Park, & McCormack, 1999; Vrij, 2000).  Standard practice in lie detection 
studies has been to counterbalance truth and lies.  Given the natural inclination to believe 
in a person’s honesty, the small but significant increase in classifying truthful statements 
above chance may be an artifact of cognitive bias, rather than true deception detection 
(Blair, Levine, Reimer, & McCluskey, 2012).  Interviewing experience does not appear 
to improve accuracy.  Numerous studies have indicated that trained law enforcement 
investigators do not perform appreciably better at detecting deception than the average 
lay person.  Vrij (2008) reviewed 28 studies of professional law enforcement officers 
(customs, police officers, secret service) and found 56% accuracy rating.  Similarly, 
Aamodt and Custer (2006) found that experts demonstrated lie detection accuracy rates 
(55.5%) that were comparable to lay persons (54%).  Consistent with the finding that 
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experience does not increase deception detection accuracy, a review of training programs 
has provided a similarly bleak outlook.  Meta-analytic findings suggest that specific lie 
detection training programs led to an average of 58% accuracy rating, only 4% better 
than the level observed in lay individuals and through placebo controls (Frank & Feeley, 
2003).   
 One potential reason for the failure of deception detection techniques may be the 
reliance on physiological and body language cues to deception.  There is a long standing 
historical and cross cultural belief that deception is accompanied by changes in physical 
states, and many deception detection techniques have been created to measure 
physiological differences (Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2013).  For example, an ancient Chinese 
measure of detection involved having the perceived liar chew rice powder and spit it out.  
Lying was believed to decrease salivation, and if the powder remained dry, the person 
was deemed to be deceptive (Klienmuntz & Szucko, 1984; Trovillo, 1939).  Similarly, 
modern techniques often operate on the principle that lying causes emotional 
dysregulation and physiological signs of distress that will be readily observable in 
deceptive individuals (Vri, Mann, & Leal, 2013).  While there is tenuous evidence that 
liars may have higher pitch (Vrij et al., 2000) and lower hand/foot movements (Sporer & 
Shwandt, 2002), much of the evidence for body language cues is conflicting.  For 
example, although many theories indicate that liars will demonstrate signs of nervousness 
including trunk movement and blinking, analysis of tapes of suspect interviews actually 
demonstrate lower levels of these behaviours among those guilty of arson, rape, and 
murder (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2002). A large scale meta-analysis of 158 body language 
cues indicated that there is no universally reliable cue to deception and that these cues are 
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dramatically influenced by context (Depaulo et al., 2003).  Interestingly, Depaulo et al., 
(2003) noted that the more often cues which demonstrated initial significance were 
studied, the smaller the effect sizes became.  Levine (2010) argues that the small effect 
sizes and inconsistent findings for body language cues can be explained by a few outliers 
in each study that are easily detected.  Vrij, Mann, and Leal (2013) argue that 
physiological methods are flawed in that both truthful and honest people may be nervous, 
particularly in cases of direct accusation, such as a police interview.    
Police interviewing manuals often stress the importance of physiological or body 
language cues to deception (King & Dunn, 2010), possibly explaining the lack of 
increased accuracy by professionals.  More recent research has attempted to move 
beyond often studied behavioural cues such as trunk movement, blinking and gaze, to 
more sophisticated physiological measures such as the fMRI.  Although sophisticated 
brain imaging may have intuitive appeal for deception detection, it has not been proven to 
be effective under empirical scrutiny (Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2013).  There are large 
individual differences in brain activity during deception, and studies have been unable to 
locate a specific cortical area related to lying (Spence, 2008).  As a result of these 
failures, Vrij, Mann and Leal (2013) have argued for the movement away from 
physiological methods of deception detection to more effective approaches.  Despite 
numerous challenges and disappointments in the empirical study of deception detection, 
more modern research approaches have shown increased accuracy.  Two major 
advancements in the study of deception detection are: the use of actuarial measures 
instead of subjective judgements, and interviewing styles that emphasize information 
gathering and induce cognitive load.   
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3.1.1 Actuarial Methods of Deception Detection 
Given the limited effectiveness of subjective judgments based on body language 
cues, more recent research has demonstrated the utility of objective, actuarial scales that 
assess verbal cues to deceit.  Reality Monitoring is an actuarial scale method that focuses 
on language cues and has reliably shown deception detection above chance levels.  
Reality Monitoring indicates that truly experienced events are encoded with sensory, 
temporal, emotional and cognitive details, and these details will be more prevalent in the 
language used to describe the event.  Conversely, fabricated events will not be encoded 
with such cues, and these details will be less prominent in deceptive stories.  This 
hypothesis was originally proposed by Johnson and Raye (1981) and researchers have 
adapted these principles to create actuarial measures of deception detection.  Reality 
Monitoring measures: emotion, vividness, coherence, realism, spatial information, 
sensory information temporal information, and cognitive operations.  Higher quantities of 
verbal details reported in these categories are typically indicative of honesty (Masip, 
Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005).  However it should be noted that, depending on how 
cognitive operations is defined, this category may be indicative of deception (Logue et 
al., 2015; McCormack et al., 2009). 
In a series of studies, Reality Monitoring has shown accuracy ratings between 64-
71% (Masip et al., 2005).  This method has been demonstrated to classify true and false 
statements among people who recalled or generated stories from various times in the past 
to even third-party witness statements of a mock theft (Masip et al., 2005; Sporer & 
Kupper, 1995; Sporer & Hamilton, 1996; Vrij et al., 2000).  However, it should be noted 
that there is debate about the relative importance of each category, and whether more 
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subjective interpretations such as realism and coherence are required for adequate 
deception detection.  More recent studies have demonstrated comparable levels of 
success by measuring the amount of visual, auditory, spatial, temporal, affective, and 
cognitive details reported in each story (Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij et al., 2004, Vrij et al., 
2008).  The aforementioned Reality Monitoring criteria have the advantage of being 
concrete, simple to score, and relatively unambiguous.  The apparent superiority of 
Reality Monitoring over subjective ratings of deception is in line with Garb’s (1989) 
meta-analysis, which concludes that actuarial scale measures dramatically outperform 
subjective judgements in a variety of contexts, and highlight a potential method of 
objectively detecting deception above chance levels. 
3.1.2 Information Gathering Interviews and Cognitive Load  
A second major development in deception detection research is the application of 
interviewing styles that increase the amount of information gathered during the interview.  
Until recently, the most common method of police interviewing for potential suspects 
was the Reid Technique (Snook et al., 2010).  In the first stage of this method, a general 
interview is conducted, during which the interviewer uses nonverbal cues to detect 
deception.  If the interviewee is determined to be deceptive, the interview shifts to a nine 
stage interrogation with the goal of eliciting a confession.  This interview involves 
repeatedly accusing the suspect, providing face-saving motivations that one could admit 
to and minimizing the seriousness of the alleged offence.   
Despite its popularity, researchers have argued that there is no empirical evidence 
that this method can accurately detect deception or leads to higher rates of confessions 
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(Snook et al., 2010).  Further, others have expressed concerns that minimization of 
crimes and face-saving alternatives may lead to false confessions (Russano, Meissner, 
Narchet, & Kassin 2005).  In addition to the concerns regarding poor deception detection 
and false confessions, studies have demonstrated that accusatory interview styles often 
lead to less information being provided.  Vrij, Mann, Kristen and Fisher (2007) observed 
that accusatory interviews elicited extremely short statements and fewer signs of deceit.  
Further, Evans et al. (2013) noted that information gathering interviews led to greater 
disclosure of details and more admissions than accusatory interviews. The concerns 
regarding a lack of empirical evidence for the utility of the Reid Technique and the 
potential for false confessions have led researchers to call for the abandonment of 
accusatory approaches and move towards an information gathering approach to suspect 
interviewing (Snook et al., 2010).   
Perhaps the most effective interviewing techniques for deception detection are 
information gathering approaches that also increase cognitive load.  Vrij, Granhag, Mann 
and Leal (2011) have argued that lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the 
truth for many reasons.  The liar must invent the story and monitor the details to ensure 
consistency.  The liar must inhibit the truthful narrative and emotional reactions to being 
questioned to appear honest.   While it is argued that most people are so practiced at 
deception that they are able to manage these tasks under normal conditions, inducing 
cognitive load through questioning should reduce the resources available for these tasks, 
and in doing so, decrease the ability to lie effectively.  Studies have attempted to induce 
cognitive load through various methods to exacerbate the differences between truthful 
and deceptive individuals.  For example, Vrij et al. (2008) conducted a study during 
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which police officers were requested to determine statement veracity after watching a 
taped interview.  Cognitive load was induced by requesting that the storyteller recount the 
event in reverse order in comparison to the control condition who told the story 
chronologically.  The reverse order condition significantly increased deception detection 
accuracy (60%) as compared to when interviewees told their stories in chronological 
order (42%).     
Additionally, keeping consistent eye contact has been hypothesized to induce 
cognitive load and has also been linked to increased deception detection.  For instance, 
Vrij, Leal, Mann and Fisher (2010) found that deceptive people who were directed to 
maintain eye contact remembered fewer details and were more likely to be correctly 
classified as deceptive than those who were not.  Finally, drawing a scene and describing 
it in the interview has been successfully used to increase deception detection (Vrij et al., 
2010).  The authors argue that the unexpected nature of this request and new perspective 
that this task requires increases cognitive load and aids in deception detection.  While it 
should be noted that cognitive load was not directly tested in these studies, these 
interventions have been successful in improving deception detection accuracy. Further 
lines of research have indicated that deceptive individuals take consistently more time to 
respond to questions.  A series of studies demonstrated that deceptive individuals took 
230 ms longer to respond to questions (Walzcyk et al., 2003; Walzcyk et al., 2005).  
While this response time may not allow for accurate human deception detection, it is 
consistent with Vrij’s theory that deception requires more cognitive load, which may be 
exploited to increase detection.  As a result of these findings, Vrij & Granhag (2012) 
have argued that the empirical literature must move away from passive observation of 
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ineffective physiological cues to actively eliciting differences between deceptive and 
truthful individuals by increasing cognitive load. 
Converging lines of research have indicated that information gathering interview 
styles that induce cognitive load may be more effective in eliciting statements that allow 
for accurate deception detection.  One interviewing method that appears to increase 
information gathered and cognitive load is the Cognitive Interview for Suspects (CIS).  
Recently, Geiselmann (2012) has adapted the cognitive interview, a police interviewing 
method that has been used to increase the quantity and accuracy of details provided in 
witness statements, to suspect interviewing.  The CIS has eight stages: (a) rapport 
building, (b) initial recall of event in question, (c) drawing the scene and explaining the 
event in chronological order, (d) additional recall, (e) open ended follow-up questions, (f) 
telling the story backwards, (g) interviewer challenges the story as false and (h) final 
recall of the event. During the final recall, the interviewee is permitted to make any 
alterations or additions to the story as required.  Geiselmann (2012) demonstrated the 
effectiveness of the CIS in an initial study of 20 students.  According to this paradigm, 
each participant was requested to tell one true and one false story to trained interviewers, 
who rated statement veracity after each question.  Geiselmann noted that although 
interviewers were unable to discriminate between true and false stories at the beginning 
of the interview, they became quite accurate by the conclusion. 
 Logue et al. (2015) replicated and extended the findings of Geiselman, providing 
additional support for the effectiveness of the cognitive interview for suspects in 
deception detection.   In this study, the authors argued that the CIS adopts many 
techniques that have been individually demonstrated to increase deception detection 
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through cognitive load, such as reverse recall and drawing of the scene.  Further, volumes 
of studies of witness statements have demonstrated that these techniques increase the 
quantity of information provided without decreasing accuracy (Köhnken, Milne, Memon, 
& Bull, 1999).  Finally, this interview style was argued to lend itself to the use of Reality 
Monitoring, as it orients the interviewee to visual, audio, spatial and temporal details, 
specific facets of this scale.  Therefore, Logue et al. (2015) argued that the CIS would 
allow for increased deception detection using the Reality Monitoring scale by eliciting 
more detailed statements from truthful, not deceptive participants.  In this study, the 
“truthful” participants were involved in an experimental paradigm that culminated in 
money missing from a wallet.  Conversely, the “deceptive” participants read a transcript 
of the event: They were then directed to take money out of the wallet and use the 
template to create an alibi.  Both participants experienced an interview of pre-determined 
questions from an interviewer based on Geiselman’s CIS.  In order to determine if a 
person was being deceptive, Logue et al. (2015) used facets of the Reality Monitoring 
scale that have been validated by in previous studies.  The results of this study indicated 
that the Reality Monitoring scale applied to statements elicited by the CIS successfully 
classified true and false statements in 86.6% of cases (89.9% true, 83.3% false). 
3.1.3 The Current Study  
3.1.3 (a) Deception Detection Accuracy Using Observer Ratings and Reality 
Monitoring 
 While Logue et al. (2015) demonstrated that the combination of Reality 
Monitoring and the CIS may be used to accurately detect deception, it is important to 
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determine whether the CIS alone is sufficient for accurate deception detection.  Although 
meta-analyses of the separate literatures have indicated that Reality Monitoring has an 
overall accuracy rating that is higher than subjective ratings, studies that directly compare 
Reality Monitoring to observer ratings of the same interviews are relatively scarce.  
Further, Geiselmann (2012) indicated that subjective ratings of deception at the 
conclusion of the CIS led to “an almost perfect level of discriminability” (Geiselmann & 
Fisher, 2014, p.14).  While actuarial judgments have been demonstrated to improve 
deception detection accuracy in a variety of settings, it is conceivable that the additive 
effects of the cognitive load throughout the CIS may make truth and deception easier to 
determine subjectively, by merely watching the interviews.   The present study attempts 
to determine whether the CIS alone is able to elicit accurate, subjective judgements, or if 
Reality Monitoring is required for accurate deception detection.  Participants watched 
videos of CIS interviews that were conducted after the mock theft scenario outlined in 
Logue et al. (2015).  The observer ratings of honesty and deception were compared to 
Reality Monitoring scales to determine whether it is the specific combination of Reality 
Monitoring and the CIS that leads to accurate deception detection. Due to the superiority 
of actuarial methods over subjective judgments in many contexts (Garb, 1989), we 
expected that Reality Monitoring scores would more accurately predict deception than 
subjective judgments after watching interrogation videos.  
3.1.3 (b) Validating the Cognitive Interview for Suspects as an Information 
Gathering Approach 
Logue et al. (2015) considered the Reality Monitoring scores of the final, post 
interview questions.  In the discussion of this study, the authors hypothesized that true 
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and false statements may show differential patterns of information throughout the 
interview that may lead to increased deception detection.  Specifically, the interventions 
of the CIS should increase memory in true statements which would lead to more visual, 
auditory, spatial, temporal, and affective details at the conclusion of the interview.  
Conversely, fabricated accounts would not demonstrate this effect and the cognitive load 
induced by the CIS may actually reduce the information gathered. The present study 
reanalyzes the data set from Logue et al. (2015) to directly test whether truthful and 
deceptive accounts differ in the amount of Reality Monitoring criteria mentioned 
throughout the interview.  An additional goal of this study was to directly test if using the 
pattern of information provided during the interviews is an effective method of detecting 
deception. Reality Monitoring criteria have been demonstrated to be more prevalent in 
truthful accounts prior to any information gathering interventions (Masip et al., 2005). 
The CIS has been hypothesized to preferentially increase the amount of information 
provided in truthful statements.  Therefore, Reality Monitoring scores will be calculated 
using both the baseline interview response and the pattern of information provided 
throughout the interview. The specific hypotheses of this paper are: 
1.) Reality Monitoring will be a significantly more accurate deception detection method 
than observer ratings. 
2.) Truthful accounts will demonstrate a significantly higher increase in Reality 
Monitoring criteria from initial to final CIS question responses than deceptive accounts. 
3.) Using initial Reality Monitoring scores and the difference scores of the first and last 
question of the CIS will be an accurate method of detecting deception. 
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3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
 Interviews: Participants in the mock theft scenario and interviews were 166 
Brock University students (67 men, 99 women, M = 21.3 age range 17-43).  These 
individuals completed the study for course credit and the possibility of winning $10. 
 Observer raters: Participants in this study were 390 Brock University students 
(97 men, 293 women, age: M = 21.3, SD = 1.21).  Participants received course credit for 
completion of this study.  
3.2. 2 Procedure 
3.2.2 (a) Stage I 
 Interrogation Videos:  The videos that participants viewed were segments from 
the CIS as completed in Logue et al. (2015).  In this study participants were interviewed 
after experiencing a game manipulation adapted from Vrij, Leal, Mann & Fisher (2010).  
Participants in the truthful condition of this study completed a game scenario during 
which they were left alone in a room with a wallet.  Eventually, the participant was 
confronted by a confederate who claimed that money was missing out of the wallet.  
Conversely, participants in the deceptive condition were provided a transcript of the 
game protocol and directed to take the money out of the wallet.  They were directed to 
use the template provided to come up with a convincing lie and given equivalent time to 
practice it.  Participants in both conditions were informed that they would win/keep the 
money if they were able to convince the interviewer that they did not take the money. 
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Participants in both groups were interviewed using the CIS.  The videos that the 
participants in this study observed depicted the interviewee sitting in a chair, facing the 
camera, which was clearly in sight.  The video was shot from a “first person perspective” 
over the right shoulder of the interviewer, so that the interviewer was not in the frame.  
The camera was approximately 5 feet away from the interviewee and was adjusted to 
each participant’s height to provide a clear view of the interviewee’s face, arms, and body 
below the knee.   
One hundred videos were selected from 157 interviews that were obtained in 
previous research.  These 100 videos were selected based on length of answers, so that 
participants could watch 10 different interviewee’s answer two questions during the 
allotted time frame.  The selection pool was limited to answers that were a maximum of 3 
minutes including the initial question asked by the interviewer.   Videos of the first 
question were between 1:04 and 2:48 minutes.  Videos of the second question ranged 
between 1:21 and 2:57 minutes.  Only 38 of the original 77 truthful answers were less 
than 3 minutes, and therefore only these videos were used in this sample.  The 62 
deceptive answers were randomly selected out of the original pool of deceptive answers 
that fit the time restrictions to be used in this study. 
3.2.2 (b) Stage II 
 Participants were informed that this study involved how people make social 
judgments.  Study sessions were run with groups of one to eight people.  Participants 
selected their own timeslots on a university website.   Each participant viewed the 
answers to the first and last question asked during the interview, so that they viewed an 
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interviewee answer 2 questions, for a total of 20 videos watched.  The order of video 
targets was counterbalanced to eliminate practice effects. Approximately 40 participants 
viewed each set of video targets (in groups of 10 targets). Thus, each participant viewed 
and rated 20 videos (10 first question videos, and 10 last question videos). Accuracy was 
defined as the number of targets correctly classified by each participant, separately for the 
first and last question videos.  
The first question that each interviewee responded to was: 
 “Please tell me in as much detail as possible, what happened when you were in 
the room with [Researcher 1] just now.  Please mention all details, all conversations that 
took place, and give as much information as possible, including everyone whom entered 
the room, however irrelevant it may seem.  Please tell me as much as you possibly can, as 
I will use all the information to decide whether or not I think you are telling the truth.” 
This question served as the initial recall of the event, prior to the CIS. 
The second question each interviewee responded to was: 
“Please tell me in as much detail as possible, what happened when you were in 
the room with [Researcher 1] just now.  Please mention all details, all conversations that 
took place, and give as much information as possible, including everyone whom entered 
the room, however irrelevant it may seem.  Please tell me as much as you possibly can, as 
I will use all the information to decide whether or not I think you are telling the truth.  It 
is very important that you tell me all of the information you have told me throughout the 
interview, even if you have mentioned it in previous questions, as well as anything else 
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you may like to add. This will be your last chance to convince me you are telling the 
truth.” 
This question was the last question in the CIS protocol, which was asked after all 
of the CIS steps were completed.  The interviewer was not allowed to direct, challenge, 
or ask any further questions of the interviewee.  The videos were the full and complete 
uninterrupted statements of the interviewee.  All parties watched the videos on a large 
projection screen. At the conclusion of each clip, participants were asked to make 
judgements on the truthfulness of each answer.  Participants rated each video both after 
the initial control question, and on the final question of each interview. Participants were 
separated and judged truthfulness individually.  A researcher remained in the study room 
to ensure independent answers.   
3.2.3 Scoring Criteria 
Observer Ratings: Participants were requested to subjectively rate deception 
after watching each question in the interview two separate ways.  Participants were first 
asked to decide whether the interviewee was being deceptive by circling T (truthful) or D 
(deceptive).  This categorical measure served as a measure of accuracy.   Additionally, 
participants also rated the deceptiveness of each participant after each answer on a 1 (very 
untruthful) to 6 (very truthful) Likert scale to provide a dimensional measure of accuracy. 
Qualitative Data: After watching all 20 video clips, participants were asked to 
provide researchers with the criteria by which they chose to judge truthfulness.  This was 
completed using an open-ended question format, so that researchers could understand 
general strategies that participants used to make decisions. 
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Reality Monitoring: In addition to the subjective judgments provided by 
participants, the accuracy after viewing the final question of each scale was compared to 
the Reality Monitoring score obtained on the sample of targets (Logue et al., 2015).  
Scoring was conducted by a separate researcher, blind to experimental condition.  The 
researcher scored both the first and the final interview question based on 6 Reality 
Monitoring criteria: visual, spatial, auditory, temporal, affective, and cognitive details.  
Scoring consisted of a simple frequency tally of each facet of the scale.  For example, the 
statement: “She took her black coat off and hung it on the chair to the left.   Then she sat 
down and placed a red book between us on the table” would score higher on Reality 
Monitoring than the statement “She came into the room and we played the game”.  The 
Reality Monitoring criteria used in this study are concrete, reliable, and simple to score, 
with little room for interpretation.  It should be noted that in this study cognitive 
operations refers to inferred mental states of others, rather than one’s own thoughts.  
There is a debate in the literature regarding the classification of cognitive operations in 
RM.  The authors adopt the viewpoint as espoused by McCormack et al. (2009) that 
fabricating a story may involve creating a narrative of the actions of others to create a 
more believable story.  Numerous researchers have noted that deceptive individuals often 
attempt to “fill in the gaps” in the story by providing motivations that would not be 
known to them.  For example the statement “She was worried about her test coming up, 
so she was off her game,” would indicate deception.  Full scoring procedure and rationale 
can be found in Logue et al. (2015).  
 It is hypothesized that truthful participants will provide higher RM criteria during 
initial questioning and the amount of RM details should increase by the conclusion of the 
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CIS.  Conversely, the CIS should not increase the details of false accounts.  Therefore, 
the pattern of information provided throughout the interview in combination with the 
original, pre-CIS scores may provide a more accurate measure of deception detection.  In 
order to test this theory, the difference scores of the first and last questions of the CIS 
were calculated and included in the model in conjunction with the original RM scores 
after the first question of the CIS.  Accuracy was calculated using the full data set of 
Logue et al. (2015) to determine the overall effectiveness of this method, and the subset 
of interviews that were rated by observers to provide a direct comparison of 
effectiveness.  
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Observer judgements of deception 
Dimensional Measures of Deception: Although participants in this study 
provided subjective judgements on 100 interviews, seven of these cases had missing data 
in subjective ratings making them unsuitable for analysis.  Ninety three of the original 
100 cases were included in the analysis.  Of those cases, 36 were truthful and 57 were 
deceptive.   
A binary logistic regression was conducted to determine whether the average 
dimensional ratings of truthfulness were predictive of deception/truth of the target.  
Average ratings of truthfulness of each video were not significantly related to 
deception/truth of the target λ= .996, χ2 (2) =.381, p = .83. The canonical correlation was 
extremely low (r =. 064).  It is important to note that while the model correctly classified 
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60% of cases in their original group, this is reflective of the ratio of truthful and deceptive 
interviews and indicates a chance level of accuracy, which was 61.3% due to the 
inequality of group numbers.  These results indicate that subjective ratings of 
deceptiveness whether pre- or post- CIS were not predictive of condition. 
Accuracy of Subjective Judgments of Deception: an additional hypothesis 
under examination in this study was whether participants were more accurate in detecting 
deception after the completion of the CIS compared to baseline.  In order to determine 
whether participants could accurately detect deception, their categorical ratings of 10 
videos were averaged to provide an overall accuracy percentage for both the first and the 
last question of the CIS.  Participants demonstrated poor deception detection after 
viewing both the initial (M= 52.73%, SD = 16.41%) and final question of the CIS (M = 
47.82%, SD = 17.38%).  A t-test indicated that participants were actually significantly 
worse at detecting deception after viewing the final CIS question than the initial control 
question (t(389) = 4.75, p < .01).  These results are in contrast to Geiselman’s (2012) 
initial study, which found that detection increased throughout the interview from chance 
level to “an almost perfect level of discriminability” (p. 14). 
Qualitative Data: Three hundred and sixty three of the 390 observers provided 
qualitative data regarding the criteria they used to determine whether an interviewee was 
being honest or deceptive.  While a detailed analysis of the specific criteria used is 
beyond the scope of this paper, these results may provide some insight into the general 
strategies that observers used.  References to non-verbal cues were common, with 300 of 
the 363 (82.6%) of participants making reference to cues such as smiling, hand/foot 
gestures, and eye contact as indicators of honesty or deception.  Observers also 
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considered the consistency of answers of both questions.  One hundred and sixty-four 
observers (45.2%) referenced consistency between answers as a measure of honesty and 
inconsistent stories as an indicator of deception. 
3.3.2 Reality Monitoring 
Overall Sample Accuracy: A binary logistic regression was conducted with the 
initial CIS and difference scores included in the model for the overall original sample of 
157 cases (78 truthful, 79 deceptive).  The model was significant, χ2 (12) =137.73, p < 
.01 with a large effect size (Nagelkirke R² = .78).  The overall accuracy of RM when the 
initial CIS and difference scores are included in the model was 88.5% with the scale 
correctly classifying 87.3% of deceptive cases and 89.7% of truthful cases (see Tables 3.1 
& 3.2 for model statistics and accuracy).  This finding supports the use of difference 
scores in combination with initial CIS scores to improve the accuracy of the RM scale. 
 The Cognitive Interview for Suspects as an Information Gathering 
Interview: An additional hypothesis under examination is whether the CIS does in fact 
increase the amount of details provided at the conclusion of the interview in comparison 
to the first baseline question.  A series of paired-sampled t-tests were conducted to 
determine whether the CIS is an effective information gathering interview.  As predicted, 
regardless of condition, participants reported significantly more details at the conclusion 
of the CIS.  Specifically, participants reported more visual t(156) = 6.02, p< .01, auditory 
t(156) = 7.75, p < .01, spatial t(156) = 8.01, p < .01, temporal t(156) = 7.82, p < .01, and 
total RM facet details t(156) = 10.47, p < .01 at the conclusion of the CIS.  Cognitive 
t(156) = -.80, p = .42 and affective details t(156) = .41, p = .68 did not significantly 
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increase throughout the CIS.  Cohen’s d indicates a small effect for visual details, a 
medium effect for auditory, spatial and temporal details, and a large effect for total 
details.  These results indicate that the Cognitive Interview for Suspects is an effective 
information gathering interview that may increase the accuracy of Reality Monitoring by 
improving the amount of information gathered (means and descriptive statistics provided 
in Table 3.3). 
 While the CIS has been demonstrated to increase the amount of Reality 
Monitoring details provided, a hypothesis under examination in this paper is that truthful 
participants will demonstrate a greater increase in Reality Monitoring details provided at 
the conclusion of the interview than deceptive participants.  A series of independent t-
tests were conducted on the differences scores of the first and last questions of the CIS 
(means and descriptive statistics found in Table 3.4).  As predicted participants in the 
truthful condition demonstrated a significantly higher increase in the amount of 
information provided at the conclusion of the interview than deceptive participants.  
Specifically truthful participants demonstrated a significantly greater increase in auditory 
t(155) = 5.64, p < .01, temporal t(155) = 2.77, p = .01 affective t(155) = 2.73, p = .01 
and total details t(155) = 4.98, p < .01.  Visual details were also marginally significant 
t(155) = 1.85, p = .07.  There were no significant differences in the difference scores of 
truthful and deceptive participants in spatial t(155) = 1.28, p = .20 and cognitive details    
t(155) = .01, p = .99 provided.  Cohen’s d indicates a small effect for visual, spatial, 
temporal, and affective details, and a large effect for auditory and total details.  
Collectively, truthful participants demonstrate a greater relative increase by the 
conclusion of the interview in compared to deceptive.  However, it should be noted that 
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deceptive individuals also provided more details at the conclusion of the interview in 
comparison to baseline.  Specifically, truthful participants provided 12.23 more details in 
the last question in comparison to initial questioning.  In comparison, deceptive 
individuals provided 4.51 more Reality Monitoring details in the response to the final 
question than the initial response.   
3.3.3 Observer Ratings and Reality Monitoring 
   Given that initial responses and difference scores produced a high degree of 
accuracy of Reality Monitoring, this method was applied to the same 93 interviews that 
were subjectively rated to provide a direct comparison of effectiveness.  Of those 93 
cases, 36 were truthful and 57 were deceptive.  A binary logistic regression was 
conducted to determine whether Reality Monitoring scores added significant predictive 
utility to the subjective judgments. Subjective judgments (first and last CIS responses) 
were entered in Block 1 (see results from subjective scores above), and Reality 
Monitoring scores (first CIS and difference between first CIS and last-CIS response) 
were entered in Block 2. The results indicated that the overall model was significant χ2 
(14) = 90.41, p < .01 and explained 84% of the variance (Nagelkirke R² = .844).  Further, 
the addition of the RM scores led to a 92.5% overall accuracy, with the model correctly 
classifying 91.7% of true cases and 93% of false cases (see Tables 3.5 & 3.6 for accuracy 
and model). 
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3.4 Discussion 
 The results of this study indicate that Reality Monitoring was more accurate than 
subjective judgment in detecting deception in the same interviews conducted using the 
Cognitive Interview for Suspects.  Observer ratings of deception hovered around chance 
both in initial accounts and the final retelling of the story after all of the steps of the CIS.  
Interestingly, participants’ subjective judgments of accuracy were actually significantly 
worse after seeing both interviews.  Reality Monitoring scores increased accuracy levels 
to 92.5% (91.7% true, 93% false) indicating that the scale increased the ability to detect 
deception over and above observer ratings.  This study confirms the importance of 
actuarial scales over subjective judgment in deception detection. 
 An interesting finding in this study is that, while subjective judgments were poor 
both in the baseline question and after completing the CIS, they were significantly worse 
when judging the answer after completing the CIS.  This study is somewhat unique in 
that it requires the rater to make CIS judgements of deception for the first and last 
questions of the CIS, in contrast to the majority of the literature, which requires a single 
rating.  The qualitative data may provide some insight into the reasoning behind these 
judgments.  Numerous participants mentioned body language cues such as eye contact, 
fidgeting, and body posture that have not been linked to accurate deception detection 
(Depaulo et al., 2003).  While these cues may have led to poor deception accuracy in both 
questions, it does not clearly explain why participants would be significantly worse at 
judging deception after completing the CIS. Interestingly, many participants (45.2%) 
mentioned consistency as a determining factor in deception detection with consistent 
stories being a measure of honesty and inconsistencies signaling deception.  The current 
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experimental design lends itself to using consistency, as it involves rating two 
recollections of the event.  Despite its intuitive appeal, numerous studies have 
demonstrated that consistency is not a strong predictor of deception.  Granhag and 
Stromwall (2002) conducted a study during which police officers repeatedly questioned a 
suspect regarding a single incident, and the officers were directed to rate the consistency 
and coherence of the statement.  There was no perceived difference in the consistency 
and coherence of deceptive and honest individuals in this sample.  Stromwall, Granhag, 
and Jonsson (2003) conducted a similar study using lying pairs and observed that 
deceptive partners told stories that were rated to be more consistent than honest 
individuals.  Raters in this study reported using consistency of stories between partners as 
a measure of honesty.  Blair et al. (2012) argue that consistency of stories, both within the 
same individual and across suspects, is an ineffective and often misleading cue.  Suspects 
who have time to practice their stories often do not demonstrate inconsistencies and may 
be more consistent than honest individuals.  In fact, methods of verbal deception 
detection often indicate that revising one’s story is a measure of honesty rather than 
deception.  Raskin and Esplin (1991) argue that deceptive individuals are motivated to 
appear believable and honest individuals are motivated to tell a full and accurate story.  
Deceptive individuals are therefore less likely to admit that they do not recall portions of 
an event, and honest people are more likely to spontaneously correct answers they have 
given in an effort to provide the full truth, rather than appear honest.  Reality Monitoring 
considers the amount of information provided at the conclusion of the interview, without 
prejudice to corrections or additions to the story.  Thus two of the potential benefits of 
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using Reality Monitoring over subjective cues are the elimination of body language cues 
and judgements of statement consistency. 
 It should be noted that the finding that participants got significantly worse after 
viewing the final CIS recounting of the event is directly in contrast to Geiselman’s (2012) 
original results.  Geiselman noted that interviewers’ subjective ratings increased from 
chance level to near perfection.  Procedural differences between these studies may 
explain the contrasting findings.  First, Geiselmann allowed the interviewers to judge 
deception.  These interviewers actively participated in the entire interview and were able 
to direct the questioning as they saw fit throughout the process.  Conversely, in this study, 
participants were only able to passively view the baseline and completed version of the 
CIS.  While being able to actively participate in the interview may be seen as an 
advantage, the literature is conflicting as to whether this has an effect on accuracy.   
Numerous studies have demonstrated that professionals who actively participate in 
interviews do not perform better than those who passively watch videos.  However, 
recently, Dando and Bull (2011) demonstrated increased deception detection accuracy 
among police officers who conducted a series of interviews.  In this study, the police 
officers were allowed to present conflicting evidence they were privy to throughout the 
interview.  This sample of police officers were able to accurately classify truth (74%) and 
deceit (67%) above chance levels.  The present study purposely chose to use 
uninterrupted videotaped statements to ensure internal consistency throughout the tapes.  
Allowing the interviewer the latitude to control the process may have led to differential 
questioning that could have influenced judgments.   It is important to determine whether 
the CIS process itself allows for accurate discrimination between truth and lies, rather 
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than relying on varied skills and expertise of the interviewer.  While it should be noted 
that studies have begun to demonstrate that proper interviewing techniques may allow for 
involved interviewers to detect deception, the current study indicates that subjective 
ratings from third party observers hover around chance.  This finding, in conjunction with 
Logue et al.’s (2015) finding that Reality Monitoring was able to accurately detect 
deception under controlled experimental conditions lend support to the use of actuarial 
scales over subjective judgments. 
 In comparison to observer ratings, the Reality Monitoring scale was more 
accurate in detecting deception.  This study confirms the effectiveness of the specific 
combination of Reality Monitoring and the CIS as originally presented in Logue et al. 
(2015).  This study also provides direct evidence that the CIS is an effective information 
gathering approach that increases the information obtained in truthful stories.  The results 
of this study indicated that truthful participants provided an average of 12.23 more 
Reality Monitoring details at the conclusion of the interview than the beginning.  This is 
in contrast to deceptive accounts which led to an average increase in 4.51 details.  These 
results are in agreement with the hypothesis that the CIS will orient individuals to 
specific facets of the Reality Monitoring scale and that true accounts will become more 
detailed at the conclusion of the interview.  Interestingly, the false stories did lead to 
some increase in details at the conclusion of the interview, which is in contrast to the 
hypothesis that the increased cognitive load experienced during the CIS would decrease 
the amount of information provided by the conclusion of the interview.  The 
methodology of this study may explain why deceptive individuals did not demonstrate a 
decrease in information provided.  This study was designed as a strict test of the CIS 
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under controlled experimental conditions.  Participants in the deceptive condition met the 
confederate researchers, sat in the same room, and were provided a template of the 
sequence of events in the mock theft protocol.  These steps were necessary to ensure that 
participants in the deceptive condition were able to tell consistent stories and provide 
relatively uniform information in order to ensure study integrity.  However, this step 
provided deceptive individuals visual, spatial, and temporal details that they could draw 
on during the CIS.  Considering the deceptive individuals actually met the confederate 
researchers and sat in the experimental room, the CIS may have elicited some true 
memories that they were able to recount during the interview.  Notwithstanding this 
advantage, Reality Monitoring was able to accurately distinguish between true and false 
stories with a 92.5% accuracy rating.  This study demonstrates that Reality Monitoring is 
able to accurately distinguish between true and false statements under controlled 
conditions, and when many shared cues are provided.   
 A further unique finding of this study is the demonstration that difference scores 
of RM first and last CIS responses accurately predict deception.  The use of difference 
scores may assist in developing a deception detection protocol within specific 
individuals.  While large group studies may indicate that overall people who are telling 
the truth express more visual, auditory, spatial, temporal and affective details, and may 
demonstrate significantly less cognitive details, these are large group tendencies that may 
not be directly applicable to certain individuals.  Specifically, Reality Monitoring may 
falsely classify honest people who have a general pattern of speaking less as deceptive.  
Focusing on the pattern of information provided rather than absolute information may 
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provide a method of increased accuracy, and may serve to provide an accurate measure of 
deception for an individual statement.  
3.4.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current study demonstrates that Reality Monitoring is more effective than 
subjective judgments based on third party raters at detecting deception under controlled 
experimental conditions.  As previously stated, certain studies have found an increase in 
deception detection accuracy when the subjective rater is actively participating in the 
interview.  While the current paradigm allows for strict empirical control, further research 
should provide a direct comparison between the Reality Monitoring scale and subjective 
ratings of active participants to determine which method is better at detecting deception. 
 While Reality Monitoring is an effective actuarial scale that has been 
demonstrated to work effectively with the CIS to detect deception, other scales have been 
created and are actively used in the research literature.  Criteria Based Content Analysis 
(CBCA) is an alternative scale measure that has been demonstrated to detect deception at 
above chance levels.  Meta-analysis reveals that this method has comparable accuracy to 
RM (Masip et al., 2005).  Reality Monitoring was used in this sample as it is a simpler 
scale which leaves less room for interpretation, and has been used in volumes of previous 
research (Sporer, 1997; Vrij et al., 2004).  Further, Vrij noted that Reality Monitoring 
was more accurate than the CBCA using similar methodology (Vrij et al., 2004).  Despite 
the perceived advantages of Reality Monitoring, the CBCA is an important tool that may 
also be highly effective in determining deception.  Future research should compare 
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Reality Monitoring and the CBCA to determine which scale is more effective at detecting 
deception on statements elicited by the CIS. 
 Finally, while Reality Monitoring has proven to be a highly effective deception 
detection scale that can reliably distinguish between true and false accounts elicited by 
the CIS, the present study considers large group averages.  Future research should 
determine whether this protocol is effective in cases across individual differences.  As 
previously stated, the use of difference scores rather than overall information provided 
may provide increased accuracy for individuals who provide less information.  Consistent 
with this argument, the Cognitive Interview has been demonstrated to increase the 
quantity of details provided in a variety of populations.  Brown and Geiselmann (1990) 
demonstrated that the Cognitive Interview increased recall among people with mild 
intellectual disabilities.  Wright and Holliday (2007) confirmed these findings in an 
elderly population.  While converging lines of research indicate that the CIS should lead 
to increased information provided in a variety of populations, further research must 
confirm this theory.  Furthermore, deception detection research is fundamentally different 
from the original Cognitive Interview in that participants are actively trying to deceive 
the interviewer.  Certain personality traits such as psychopathy and social dominance 
have been linked to an increased propensity and ability to deceive others.  Now that 
Reality Monitoring has been established as an effective measure of deception detection, 
future research should consider characteristics of the deceiver to determine whether 
Reality Monitoring is effective at detecting deception regardless of personality traits of 
the interviewee.
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Table 3.1 
Binary logistic regression using difference scores in full sample. 
 
 
Note. N = 157. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Predicted 
condition 
 Total 
Percentage 
correct 
Condition True False  
 
True 70   8       89.7% 
False          10          69       87.3% 
 
      Total    88.5% 
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Table 3.2 
Full sample binary logistic model 
 
 B SE Wald Df Exp (b) Significance 
Question 1 
RM score 
      
Visual  0.47 0.21    5.29 1   1.60           .02* 
Auditory -0.60 0.13      23.26 1   0.55       <.01** 
Spatial -0.69 0.28    6.02 1   0.50           .01* 
Temporal  0.19 0.20    0.89 1   1.21           .35 
Cognitive  1.39 0.50    7.77 1   4.01     .01* 
Affective  1.11 0.63    3.14 1   3.03    .08 
Difference 
Score Q5-Q1  
      
Visual 0.17 0.13   1.64 1 1.19           .20 
Auditory   -0.31 0.09 13.20 1 0.73      <.01** 
Spatial   -0.14 0.16   0.80 1 0.87           .37 
Temporal 0.02 0.16   0.01 1 1.02           .92 
Cognitive 0.40 0.40   1.01 1 1.49           .31 
Affective   -0.22 0.56   0.15 1 0.80           .70 
 
Note. N = 157 
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Table 3.3 
Paired t-tests of Reality Monitoring details provided pre and post-CIS. 
 
 Question 
1 
 Question 
5 
    
 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
      Mean Standard 
Deviation 
t-test  Cohen’s 
d 
p-value 
Visual 
 
   5.68   2.61         7.04     3.45     6.02 0.48    <.01** 
Auditory 
 
   7.89   5.57        11.21    8.37     7.75 0.62    <.01** 
Spatial 
 
   6.42   2.43         8.29    2.99     8.01    0.64    <.01** 
Temporal 
 
   9.04   3.20        10.92    3.70     7.82    0.62    <.01** 
Cognitive 
 
   0.50   1.19        0.58    1.49    -0.80    0.06      .42 
Affective 
 
   0.29   0.65        0.27    0.72     0.41    0.04      .68 
Total 
 
      29.83 10.62        38.3     14.78   10.47    0.84    <.01** 
Note. N = 157 (78 truthful, 79 deceptive). 
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Table 3.4 
T-tests comparing truthful and deceptive Reality Monitoring details using difference scores 
 
 Truthful  Deceptive     
 
 
Mean Stand Dev Mean Stand 
Dev 
t-test Cohen’s 
d 
p-value 
Visual 
 
1.78 3.12 0.95    2.47  1.85      0.30     .07 
Audio 
 
5.54 6.46 1.13    2.57  5.64     0.90 <.01** 
Spatial 
 
2.17 2.90 1.57    2.93  1.28     0.21     .20 
Temporal 
 
2.53 3.39 1.23   2.41  2.77     0.44 .01* 
Cognitive 
 
0.08 0.66 0.08   1.55 0.01     0.00     .99 
Affective 0.14 0.77 -0.19   0.75  2.73     0.43 .01* 
 
Total      12.23 11.46 4.51   6.92 4.98     0.82 <.01** 
 
Note. N = 157 (78 truthful, 79 deceptive). 
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Table 3.5 
Binary logistic regression using difference scores in current sample. 
 
 Predicted 
condition 
 Total 
Percentage 
correct 
Condition True False 
 
 
True 33   3  91.7% 
False  4 53     93% 
 
Total   92.5% 
Note. N = 93 
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Table 3.6 
Binary logistic regression including observer ratings and difference scores. 
 B SE Wald Df Exp (b) Significance 
Observer 
ratings 
      
Q1    0.80 1.05 .58 1 2.23 .45 
Q5   -0.06 2.06 .00 1 0.94 .98 
RM score: Q1       
Visual   -0.65 0.51 1.64 1 0.52 .20 
Auditory    0.87 0.26    10.69 1 2.37   <.01** 
Spatial    0.93 0.59 2.50 1 2.52 .11 
Temporal   -0.18 0.27 0.45 1 0.84 .50 
Cognitive -18.55 4163.78 0.00 1 0.00 .99 
Affective -23.02 6451.70 0.00 1 0.00 .99 
Difference in 
RM (Q1 to 
Q5) 
      
Visual    0.00 0.42 0.00 1 1.00 .99 
Auditory    0.21 0.13 2.51 1 1.23 .11 
Spatial   -0.50 0.40 1.60 1 0.61 .21 
Temporal    0.12 0.28 0.17 1 1.12 .68 
Cognitive    0.39 1.03 0.14 1 1.47 .71 
Affective   -1.45 3.35 0.19 1 0.23 .66 
Note. N = 93
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Abstract 
Recent research has demonstrated that a modified version of the Cognitive 
Interview for Suspects (CIS) in conjunction with Reality Monitoring (RM) is a reliable 
method of deception detection (Logue et al., 2015).   A follow-up study found that 
observers of the CIS interview were unable to accurately classify true and false accounts, 
indicating the superiority of actuarial scales in deception detection (Logue et al., under 
review).  The current study examines whether social dominance or psychopathic traits 
influence deceptive ability, both in terms of subjective observer ratings and Reality 
Monitoring.  Participants were randomly assigned to a truthful or deceptive condition and 
went through the CIS, with the goal of convincing the interviewer that they did not take 
the money.  Participants completed measures of social dominance (SSSS) and subclinical 
psychopathy (SRP-III) prior to the experimental paradigm.  Findings indicated that social 
dominance was related to increased ratings of honesty over time, however, socially 
dominant people were not particularly successful deceivers.  Similarly, psychopathic 
traits were not significantly related to deceptive ability overall.  However, Factor 2 
psychopathy was linked to being less believable, even when telling the truth.  These 
personality traits were not linked to an increased ability to defeat Reality Monitoring, 
providing further evidence for the use of this scale.    
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Chapter 4.  Study 3 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Deception detection is a field of scientific literature that despite great empirical 
interest, has demonstrated limited success.  Almost five decades of close empirical 
scrutiny has indicated that regardless of experience or training, people are often able to 
detect deception at approximately chance levels of accuracy (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
Hartwig et al., 2004; Kraut, 1980).  A prevailing theory on the poor deception detection 
observed in theoretical and practical settings is the over reliance on nonverbal, 
particularly body language cues.  Many lay theories and professional policing manuals 
have taught that cues such as vocal pitch, response latencies, eye contact, and hand/foot 
movements may indicate deception (King & Dunn, 2010).  Despite the prevalence of 
these beliefs, the vast majority of body language cues have been found to be unrelated to 
deception detection.  While some body language cues have demonstrated significance in 
certain studies, the effects often disappear with large sample sizes and strict empirical 
control (Depaulo et al., 2003; Levine, 2010).  A large scale meta-analysis indicated that 
there was no truly reliable nonverbal cue to deception (Depaulo et al., 2003).  While other 
studies have demonstrated limited empirical support for certain gestures as deception 
cues, these cues can be drastically affected by circumstances such as rehearsal time and 
potential ramifications of failure (Stromwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). 
 While nonverbal cues have demonstrated limited usefulness in deception 
detection, verbal indicators have demonstrated increased success.  Reality Monitoring is a 
form of verbal deception detection that is based on cognitive processing.  Johnson and 
Raye (1981) posited that truly experienced events will be encoded differently in memory 
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in comparison to fabricated accounts, and that this differential encoding will lead to 
distinguishable differences in language.  Specifically, true recollections will involve 
greater descriptions of visual, auditory, spatial, affective and temporal details.  An 
additional factor, cognitive details, will lead to differential patterns based on 
operationalization.  Recollections of one’s own internal thoughts during the event is often 
indicative of honesty.  Conversely, when fabricating a story, individuals may often create 
a false narrative of the thought processes and motivations of others to create a believable 
story.   Cognitive details of others in an account have been linked to deception in many 
studies involving Reality Monitoring (McCormick et al., 2009).  Collectively, meta-
analysis has indicated that Reality Monitoring can reliably detect deception above chance 
levels (64-71%; Masip et al., 2005).  More recent research has focused on increasing the 
accuracy of Reality Monitoring by developing interview strategies that elicit greater 
details, subsequently increasing the sensitivity of this scale.  Logue et al. (2015) studied 
the accuracy of Reality Monitoring in determining deception from verbal interviews 
conducted using a modified version of the Cognitive Interview for Suspects (CIS).  This 
study indicated that Reality Monitoring was effective in accurately discriminating 
between true and false events.  Follow up studies demonstrated that, similar to previous 
findings in the literature, observers were unable to detect deception after watching videos 
of the CIS interviews (Logue et al., under review).  While the combination of the CIS and 
Reality Monitoring have shown an overall increase in accuracy in deception detection in 
comparison to the previous literature, it is important to consider the skill of the deceiver 
in deception detection.  Simply, certain personality traits may make a person a more 
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believable liar.  The two personality traits under examination in this paper are 
psychopathy and social dominance. 
4.1.1 Psychopathy and Deception 
 Deceptiveness stems from many of the core personality traits that comprise the 
construct of psychopathy.  Psychopaths have long been described to lack empathy, guilty, 
anxiety, and fear.  They are believed to demonstrate impulsivity and shallow emotional 
processing.  While the specific factor structure underlying the construct is under debate in 
the literature, assessment measures indicate psychopaths have personality characteristics 
such as: superficial charm, manipulation, shallow affect and a lack of remorse (Cleckley, 
1941).  These core traits have direct implications for a willingness and potential ability to 
deceive.  In fact, Hare (1993) describes psychopaths as “silver tongued swindlers.”  It is 
important to note that psychopathy is often considered an overarching personality trait 
that consists of underlying factors.  Theorists have presented two-, three-, and four-factor 
models of psychopathy.  A comparison of the specific models of psychopathy is beyond 
the scope of this paper; however, it is important to note that differential scores on various 
factors predict distinct behavioural outcomes.  The most common distinction in 
psychopathy stems from Hare’s original 2-factor model.   Factor 1outlines the personality 
features of psychopathy such as superficial charm, lack of empathy, shallow affect, 
manipulation, lying, impulsivity, and lack of remorse.  Factor 2 represents the 
antisocial/lifestyle dimension that has become synonymous with criminality.  Items in 
this factor include early behavioural problems, poor behavioural control, juvenile 
delinquency, promiscuity, failure during probation and criminal versatility (Harpur, Hare, 
& Hakstian, 1989; Hare, 1991; Hare, 2003).  This factor structure has led to the 
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proposition of primary (Factor 1) and secondary (Factor 2) psychopathy. These separate 
factors appear to have important behavioural distinctions in a variety of ways.  Lykken 
(1995) proposed that the fundamental difference between primary and secondary 
psychopathy is trait anxiety.  Hicks et al. (2004) found a 2-factor model of psychopathy 
based on emotional stability.  In this study, emotionally stable psychopaths demonstrated 
less fear, anxiety and reaction to stress than reactive psychopaths, who demonstrated the 
hallmark signs of secondary psychopathy.  Skeem et al. (2003) observed that primary 
psychopaths are more likely to engage in instrumental aggression, as compared to 
secondary psychopaths, who respond to provocation with immediate unbridled 
aggression.  Hicks et al’s. (2004) emotionally stable psychopaths were less likely to have 
violent versatile criminal histories and outbursts of reactive aggression than their reactive 
counterparts.  Falkenbach, Poythress, and Creevy (2008) mirrored these findings, 
demonstrating that primary psychopaths are more likely to demonstrate goal oriented and 
dispassionate physical force than secondary psychopaths, who demonstrated reactive 
aggression.     
Despite personality traits and anecdotal descriptions that portray psychopaths as 
prolific and adept deceivers, the empirical literature has been mixed.  Consistent with the 
general conception of psychopathy, researchers have noted that psychopaths are more 
likely to engage in deceptive acts of criminality such as fraud (Molto, Poy, & Torrubia, 
2000), and use deception in both sexual and nonsexual interactions (Seto, Khattar, 
Lalumiere, & Quinsey, 1997).  Rogers and Cruise (2000) noted that psychopaths are 
more likely to use manipulation and denial in various contexts.  Baughman et al. (2014) 
noted that psychopathy was linked to an increased propensity to lie in the context of 
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mating and academic dishonesty.  Further, psychopathic traits in this sample were linked 
to experiencing positive emotions while lying.  Some other measures of deceptiveness are 
less clear.  While certain studies have indicated that psychopathy is correlated with 
malingering, others have not substantiated this relationship (Lee, Klaver, & Hart, 2008).  
Further, Hare, Forth, and Hart (1989) reported that psychopaths do not appear to 
demonstrate deceptive responses in psychological measures.  Finally psychopaths have 
not been demonstrated to score higher on a battery of tests that are specifically designed 
to detect malingering (Poythress, Edens, & Watkins, 2001). 
 Not only is the frequency of deceptiveness of psychopaths unclear, but opinions 
vary in terms of effectiveness.  Numerous studies have indicated that psychopaths use a 
variety of nonverbal strategies in an attempt to successfully deceive others.  Gilstrom and 
Hare (1988) report that psychopaths are more likely to use small unrelated hand gestures 
known as “beats” during deception.  Louth et al. (1998) reported that psychopaths speak 
in lower tones when lying.  Differences appear early in life, as Rime et al. (1978) 
observed that young children who score high on psychopathic traits lean forward, have a 
focused gaze and smile less at interviewers.  Klaver, Lee, and Hart (2007) report that 
these strategies are specific attempts to assert dominance and control during the interview 
process, in an attempt to be viewed as more believable.  In a systematic review of 
nonverbal behaviour and deception, Klaver, Lee, and Hart (2007) reported that 
psychopaths spoke faster and demonstrated an increase in head movement and blinking 
behaviour.  However, it should be noted that the authors report that nonverbal indicators 
of psychopathy are extremely limited.   
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 Verbal behaviours of psychopaths have been studied to a limited extent in the 
empirical literature.  These studies, while relatively few in number, have highlighted 
deficiencies in the response patterns of psychopaths.  Newmann, Harpur and Johnson 
(1999) found that accounts of psychopaths were less cohesive and coherent than controls.  
Similarly, Williamson (1991) observed that psychopathy is associated with disordered 
communication and poorly constructed narratives in both neutral and emotionally 
arousing events.  Williamson argues that it is the lack of social anxiety and a dominant 
personality rather than sophisticated verbal accounts that allows psychopaths to be 
successful deceievers.  Klaver, Lee, Spidel and Hart (2009) found that psychopathy, as 
measured by total PCL-R scores, was negatively related to deceptive ability.  Similarly, 
Lee, Klaver, and Hart (2008) demonstrated a conflicting pattern of verbal deceptiveness 
and psychopathy.  Psychopaths were more likely when lying to provide increased details 
and spontaneous corrections, verbal indicators of honesty.  However, psychopaths were 
seven times more likely to be seen as deceptive when telling the truth.  Although 
psychopaths were not demonstrated to be more successful liars overall, Factor 1 
psychopathy was associated with increased credibility in the deceptive condition.  One 
potential source of the conflicting results in the literature is that very few studies have 
examined deceptive behaviour among primary and secondary psychopaths.  The findings 
of Lee, Klaver, and Hart (2008) are consistent with the characterization of primary 
psychopaths as cold, calculating and manipulative individuals, and secondary 
psychopaths as those who are prone to reactive outbursts of anger and frustration.  
Perhaps the attributes of primary psychopaths are better suited to deceiving others than 
secondary psychopaths.     
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 Collectively, the empirical literature has provided mixed results on both the 
propensity and effectiveness of lying behaviour among psychopaths.  Numerous studies 
have provided an unclear picture of whether or not psychopaths actually lie more often 
than the general population.   Some studies have demonstrated that psychopaths believe 
that they are better liars, and they seem to engage in specific nonverbal methods of 
attempting to convince others of their honesty.  However, numerous studies have 
indicated that psychopaths demonstrate poor verbal strategies in during deception.  Their 
stories are often not coherent, and the specific content is not believable.  Instead, they 
appear to rely on nonverbal cues to deceive.  Whether they are actually successful at 
deceiving others remains unclear.  Lee, Klaver, and Hart (2008) have posited that the 
mixed results in studies have been due to a failure to separate psychopathy into its 
primary and secondary factors.  The current study aims to provide insight into whether 
primary or secondary psychopaths are in fact more convincing liars, and whether 
deceptive ability is moderated by interview style.  Observers attempted to detect 
deception among interviewees both prior to, and after completion of the Cognitive 
Interview for Suspects (CIS), in order to determine whether psychopathic traits moderate 
deceptiveness. 
4.1.2 Social Dominance and Deception Detection 
 Although not as extensively studied as psychopathy, social dominance is a 
personality trait that may be linked to increased ability to successfully deceive others.  
Social dominance is a trait that leads one to behave in forceful and assertive ways, and is 
often linked to the ability to control social interactions (Judge, Bono, Illies, & Gerhardt, 
2002).  Socially dominant people have been demonstrated to gain control in group 
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decision making processes.  In fact, a meta-analysis of 85 years of research indicates that 
trait social dominance was the best predictor of who would emerge as a leader of a group; 
even more then specific skills or intelligence (Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986).  
Interestingly, although social dominance is a higher predictor of group influence than 
specific task skill, trait social dominance is not sufficient to gain leadership.  Studies have 
demonstrated that forceful personalities who have a demonstrated lack of knowledge in a 
specific area will not achieve dominance (Van Vugt, 2006).  Functionalist theories of 
leadership indicate that groups allow those with specific knowledge and expertise to have 
greater influence than others, and attempt to put their most qualified members in charge.  
Leadership entails both specific task knowledge and the social skills to communicate with 
and motivate others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009).  Despite the importance of knowledge 
in leadership, socially dominant individuals are often able to exhibit control in areas that 
they do not have a claim to authority on, such as ethical dilemmas (Aries, Gold, & 
Weigel, 1983).  Anderson and Kilduff (2009) argue that socially dominant individuals are 
able to achieve social influence despite a lack of actual knowledge due to engaging in 
specific behaviours that allow them to appear more competent than they actually are.  
Consistent with this reasoning, the authors observed that people high on trait dominance 
were rated by group members and independent raters as more competent when solving 
group math problems, regardless of level of quantitative skills demonstrated in 
standardized testing.  Further, numerous studies have indicated that individuals high on 
trait dominance demonstrate nonverbal behaviours that have been linked to the 
appearance of competence including speaking in more assertive tones, relaxed posture, 
and direct eye contact (Buss, 1981; Snyder & Sutker, 1977). 
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Research has demonstrated that socially dominant people use body language and 
nonverbal cues to create the appearance of task competence, which in turn leads to 
greater social influence.  What remains unclear is whether socially dominant individuals 
have a general social interaction style that naturally uses these cues, or if they are 
purposefully using this body language to attain influence.  It is quite conceivable that 
socially dominant individuals may purposefully use impression management skills to 
create the image of competence.  Numerous studies have indicated that lying is part of 
everyday social interaction.  Studies have demonstrated that people typically lie in one 
out of every three to five interactions.  Further, these lies are often not overtly nefarious, 
such as cheating on a test or denying a transgression.  Instead, many lies are often used 
for impression management, to maintain relationships or create a more favourable 
impression of oneself (Depaulo et al., 1996).  Given that trait dominant individuals are 
more motivated to create an impression of competence, it is possible that they may be 
more likely to engage in deception to increase their social standing.  Further, given their 
powers of persuasion, it is conceivable that people higher on social dominance may be 
more likely to be considered to be believable during deceptive accounts.  Keating and 
Heltman (1994) studied the relationship between social dominance and successful 
deception throughout the lifespan.  The authors noted that both adult males and young 
children who were higher on peer reported levels of dominance were more successfully 
deceptive.  Dominant children were able to successfully deceive others by smiling, and 
dominant adult males were successful due to greater eye contact.  Further research has 
linked Machiavellianism, a trait related to social dominance, with greater skill at 
deception in both children and adults (Braginsky, 1970; Geis & Moon, 1981).  
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4.1.3 The Current Study 
 As previously reported, despite volumes of empirical study, deception detection 
has not shown particularly rapid advancement in the empirical literature.  There has been 
a recent shift away from attempting to determine deception by passive observance of 
verbal and non-verbal cues to using questioning to actively elicit differential cues to 
increase deception detection (Vrij & Granhag, 2012).  It is important to determine 
whether certain personality traits are linked to increased deceptiveness, both in baseline 
questioning and after completing a more cognitively demanding interview.  Given the 
success of the CIS in previous studies, this paper will examine the first and last question 
of the CIS in relation to interviewee levels of social dominance and psychopathic traits.  
Both Factor 1 and Factor 2 psychopathy scores will be used to determine whether 
differential patterns of psychopathy predict deceptiveness.  This paper will consider both 
observer ratings of honesty and Reality Monitoring to determine whether certain 
individuals can appear honest while being deceptive.   
While direct research on the effectiveness of Reality Monitoring when 
considering personality differences is limited, Reality Monitoring is hypothesized to be 
successful in detecting deception in those high on social dominance and subclinical 
psychopathy.  Reality Monitoring is a verbal deception detection tool that considers the 
pattern of details recalled.  Logue et al. (2015) demonstrated that higher Reality 
Monitoring criteria mentioned at the conclusion of a CIS interview allowed for accurate 
discrimination between truthful and deceptive accounts.  The research literature has 
highlighted nonverbal strategies that have been used by those high on psychopathy and 
social dominance to successfully deceive others.  Given that social dominance is 
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unrelated to intelligence or task-specific knowledge, it is likely that nonverbal, rather than 
verbal methods are successful in achieving influence.  Further, certain studies have 
suggested that psychopathy is linked to ineffective verbal strategies while being 
deceptive.   While the evidence suggests that those high on social dominance and 
psychopathic traits rely on non-verbal cues, it is conceivable that they may also adopt 
verbal styles that are successful in defeating the RM scale.  This theory needs to be 
directly tested.  The current study predicts that the personality traits under examination 
will not be related to an increased ability to avoid deception detection through Reality 
Monitoring on verbal accounts elicited through the CIS.  Further, it is also hypothesized 
that those high on social dominance and psychopathic traits will not provide more Reality 
Monitoring details at the conclusion of the interview in the deceptive condition. 
 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
 Participants in this study were 390 Brock University students (97 Male, 293 
Female, age: M = 21.3, SD = 1.21) who completed the study for course credit.  
4.2.2 Materials 
 Psychopathic Traits. The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale: Version III (SRP-III) 
was used to measure psychopathic traits of interviewees in this study.  This scale consists 
of 64 items measured on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) likert scale.  The 
SRP-III is divided into four facets: callous affect, interpersonal manipulation, erratic 
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lifestyle and anti-social traits, which are associated with Factors 1 and 2 of the original 
PCL-R (Williams & Paulhus, 2004).  The SRP-III is also consistent with the expansion of 
the two factor model into four facets: Impulsive Thrill-seeking, Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Interpersonal Manipulation, and Cold Affect. The SRP-III has been demonstrated to be 
related to anti-social personality and behaviours (Williams et al., 2007).  This measure 
has been demonstrated to be an appropriate measure of subclinical psychopathic traits 
(Williams et al., 2003).  
 Social Dominance. Social dominance was measured using the Self-Perceived 
Social Status Questionnaire (SSSS: Buttmore, James & Kirkpatrick, 2005).  This self-
report scale was measured on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) Likert scale.  
The SSSS consists of a scale of social dominance and a scale of prestige.  Social 
dominance involves using aggressive and forceful tactics to exert control.  Specific items 
on this scale are “I demand respect from members of my peer group,” and “Others 
believe they can push me around” (reverse-scored).  Prestige involves gaining social 
status not by having a forceful or assertive personality, but instead by having skills and 
competencies that are useful to the group.  While prestige has been noted to be a factor in 
areas of peer influence, this subscale is beyond the scope of this paper and was not 
included in analyses. 
 Videos.  Participants were shown segments from the CIS as completed in Logue 
et al. (2015).  In a previous study (Logue et al., 2015) participants were interviewed after 
completing a game scenario adapted from Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Fisher (2010).  
Participants in the Truthful condition of this study played a game with a confederate, 
during which they were left alone in a room with a wallet.  Eventually, the participant 
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was confronted about money that had allegedly been stolen from a wallet that was in the 
room during the game.  Instead of actually participating in the scenario, participants in 
the Deceptive condition were provided a transcript of the sequence of events in the Truth 
condition, and directed to take the money out of the wallet.  They were then directed to 
use this template to construct a convincing lie and given equivalent time to practice it.  
Depending on condition, participants were told that they would win/keep the money if 
they were able to convince the interviewer of their innocence.  After completing the 
initial scenario, participants in both conditions were interviewed using the CIS.  The 
videos of these interviews served as the materials that participants in the current study 
used to rate honesty and deception.  These videos depict the interviewee, facing the 
camera in a “first person perspective” to the right of the interviewer.  The interviewer is 
not visible in any of the videos.  The camera was approximately 5 feet away from the 
interviewee and was adjusted to provide a clear view of the interviewee’s face, arms and 
body below the knee.  The current study required that raters were able to view the initial 
(control) and final question of the CIS.  Interviews were limited to a maximum total time 
of 3 minutes, including the questions of the interviewer.  One hundred videos of the 
original 157 were selected.  Only 38 truthful videos fit these criteria, and therefore all 
were included in the 100 stimulus materials.  The remaining videos were randomly 
selected out of a pool of deceptive videos that met the aforementioned time constraints. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
 Sessions were conducted in groups of up to eight participants, and composition 
was determined through self-selection on a university website.  Each participant watched 
10 interviewees answer both the first and last question of the CIS.   After each question, 
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participants were asked to rate the honesty of the interviewee, so that there were two 
ratings per interview, and a total of 20.  Each interview was watched a total of 40 times, 
to create an aggregate score of honesty, and interviews were counterbalanced to avoid 
practice effects. 
The first question that each interviewee responded to was: 
 “Please tell me in as much detail as possible, what happened when you were in 
the room with [Researcher 1] just now.  Please mention all details, all conversations that 
took place, and give as much information as possible, including everyone whom entered 
the room, however irrelevant it may seem.  Please tell me as much as you possibly can, as 
I will use all the information to decide whether or not I think you are telling the truth.” 
This question served as the initial recall of the event. 
The second question each interviewee responded to was: 
“Please tell me in as much detail as possible, what happened when you were in the room 
with [Researcher 1] just now.  Please mention all details, all conversations that took 
place, and give as much information as possible, including everyone whom entered the 
room, however irrelevant it may seem.  Please tell me as much as you possibly can, as I 
will use all the information to decide whether or not I think you are telling the truth.  It is 
very important that you tell me all of the information you have told me throughout the 
interview, even if you have mentioned it in previous questions, as well as anything else 
you may like to add. This will be your last chance to convince me you are telling the 
truth.” 
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This question was the last question in the CIS protocol, which served as a final, 
comprehensive account after all of the steps had been completed.  The videos depicted 
the full answers of the interviewee.  The interviewer did not ask any follow-up or 
clarifying questions. At the conclusion of each clip participants were asked make 
judgements on the truthfulness of each answer.  Participants viewed the interview on a 
large projector screen collectively, but provided ratings of honesty individually.  A 
researcher was present in the room to ensure independent ratings.  As previously stated, 
participants rated truthfulness after both the initial and final questions of each interview.   
4.2.3 (a) Scoring Criteria 
Observer Ratings. Participants were requested to provide judgments of 
deceptiveness after each interview question in the following ways.  First, they were asked 
to provide an initial categorical judgment by circling T (truthful) or D (deceptive).   
Additionally, participants also rated the level of honesty after each answer on a 1 (very 
untruthful) to 6 (very truthful) Likert scale. 
Qualitative Measure. At the conclusion of the study, after watching and rating 
all videos, participants were requested to provide researchers with the criteria they used 
to judge truthfulness.  Answers were provided in an open-ended format to provide insight 
into the general strategies that participants used to make judgments. 
Reality Monitoring. Scoring was conducted by an additional researcher, blind to 
experimental condition.  The researcher scored the last CIS responses based on six 
Reality Monitoring criteria: visual, spatial, auditory, temporal, affective, and cognitive 
details.  Scoring consists of a simple frequency tally of each criterion.  The Reality 
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Monitoring criteria used in this study are concrete, unambiguous, reliable, and simple to 
score.   It should be noted that in this study cognitive operations refers to inferred 
motivations and thought processes of others, rather than one’s own thoughts.  There is a 
debate in the literature regarding the operationalization of cognitive operations.  The 
authors adopt the viewpoint of McCormack et al. (2009) that fabricating a story may 
involve creating a narrative of the motivations of others to create a more believable story.  
Numerous researchers have noted that deceptive individuals often attempt to “fill in the 
gaps” in the story by providing motivations for the actions of others.  Full scoring 
procedure and rationale can be found in Logue et al. (2015). 
Logue et al. (2015) demonstrated that Reality Monitoring was a highly effective 
verbal deception detection method in conjunction with the CIS.   The current study aims 
to determine whether psychopathic traits or social dominance may be related to success 
in defeating the Reality Monitoring scale. The predicted probability of success was 
calculated by correlating success in being deemed truthful by the Reality Monitoring 
scale and the aforementioned traits. 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Psychopathy and Observer Ratings of Honesty 
 Seven of the 100 videos initially included in this analysis had missing data in 
observer ratings, making them unsuitable for analysis.  Of the remaining 93 cases, 36 
were truthful and 57 were deceptive.  When considering the overall sample, regardless of 
condition, psychopathy was not significantly associated with deceptiveness ratings after 
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the first question.  However, total SRP-III score (r = -.19, p = .06) and Factor 2 (r = -.19, 
p = .06) were negatively correlated with observer ratings of honesty after the second 
question (see Table 4.1).  Although these results are only marginally significant they 
suggest that regardless of condition, people who score high on Factor 2 psychopathy 
traits appear less truthful at the conclusion of the CIS.  Similarly, in the truthful 
condition, total SRP-III, Factor 1, and Factor 2 traits were not significantly related to 
observer ratings of truthfulness during initial questioning.  However, in the truthful 
condition, Factor 2 psychopathy was negatively related to truthfulness (r = -.28, p = .09) 
at a marginally significant level (see Table 4.2).  Interestingly, in the deceptive condition, 
total SRP-III, Factor 1 and Factor 2 scores were not correlated to observer ratings of 
honesty after the initial or final CIS questions (see Table 4.3).  These results indicate that 
contrary to popular opinion, people with psychopathic traits are not able to appear more 
honest than others either while being deceptive initially, or after completing the CIS.  
Interestingly, total SRP-III score, particularly Factor 2, appears to be negatively 
associated with observer ratings of honesty after completing the CIS, even while being 
truthful.  Although these results were only marginally significant, they highlight the 
possibility that Factor 2 psychopathic traits may be counterproductive during questioning. 
4.3.2 Social Dominance and Observer Ratings of Honesty 
 When considering the overall sample, regardless of condition, social dominance 
was not significantly correlated to observer ratings of honesty for the initial or final CIS 
question.  Further, social dominance was not significantly correlated with observer 
ratings of honesty in the first or last question in the truthful condition.  In the deceptive 
condition, social dominance was not significantly related to overall observer ratings of 
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honesty in either CIS question.  However, social dominance was positively correlated to a 
change in observer ratings of honesty from initial to final question in the CIS (r = .29, p = 
.03).  These results indicate that socially dominant people do appear more honest over 
time, although not enough to change initial opinions in this sample (see Tables 4.1-4.3). 
4.3.3 Reality Monitoring and Deception Detection as a Function of Social 
Dominance and Psychopathy  
 When considering the full sample, social dominance was negatively correlated to 
successfully being judged as truthful (r = -.16, p = .05).  Conversely, Factor 1, Factor 2, 
and total SRP-III were unrelated to success.  In the truthful condition Factor 1, Factor 2, 
Total SRP-III and social dominance were not related to being judged as truthful by the 
Reality Monitoring scale.  Finally, when considering the deceptive condition, Factor 1, 
Factor 2, total SRP-III, and social dominance were not related to being judged truthful by 
the Reality Monitoring scale (see Table 4.4). 
The previous study found that only 7 of 79 deceptive people were judged to be 
deceptive by the Reality Monitoring scale (Logue et al., 2015).  A series of independent t-
tests were conducted to determine whether participants who successfully defeated the 
Reality Monitoring scale differed from those who were caught by the scale on 
psychopathic traits and social dominance.  Factor 1, Factor 2 psychopathy, and social 
dominance were not related to successfully defeating the scale.  When considering 
predicted probability of defeating the Reality Monitoring scale, none of the personality 
traits under examination were significantly related to success.  Given the disparity in 
sample sizes, effect sizes were calculated.  Cohen’s d  indicates small effects for social 
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dominance, in that deceptive people who were judged as truthful had slightly higher 
SSSS scores.  Conversely, Cohen’s d indicated a small effect for Factor 1, Factor 2, and 
total SRP-III scores, in that deceptive people who were judged as truthful by RM had 
lower scores on these scales.  However, given the lack of significance of t-tests, these 
results should be interpreted with caution. 
4.3.4 Verbal Deception Strategies 
 Only 7 of 79 participants were able to defeat the Reality Monitoring scale, 
limiting the conclusions that may be drawn due to low power.  Although a small 
percentage of individuals were actually successful, it is important to determine whether 
persons high on the traits under examination use verbal strategies that would be suited to 
defeat Reality Monitoring.  Therefore, social dominance, Factor 1 and Factor 2 
psychopathy were correlated with Reality Monitoring scores at various times throughout 
the CIS interview.  When considering the deceptive condition, participants who scored 
high on Factor 1 psychopathy were more likely to mention increased visual (r = .23, p 
=.04), spatial (r = .23, p = .05), and temporal (r = .23, p = .04) details in the initial 
question.  Similarly, individuals high on social dominance were also more likely to 
reference visual (r = .23, p = .04), spatial (r = .24, p = .04) and temporal (r = .25, p = .03) 
details during initial questioning.  Factor 2 was not related to an increase in Reality 
Monitoring criteria.  SRP-III was marginally related to an increase in spatial details (r = 
.22, p = .06) in the initial question (see Table 4.7).  When considering the final question 
in the deceptive condition, Factor 1 (r = -.33, p = .01), Factor 2 (r = -.20, p = .08) and 
total SRP-III (r = -.30, p = .01) were related to a decreased amount of spatial details 
provided.   No other Reality Monitoring criteria were correlated with F1, F2 or social 
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dominance in the final CIS question (see Table 4.8).  Finally, participants in the deceptive 
condition who were high on Factor 1 psychopathy showed a significant reduction in 
visual (r = -.25, p = .03) and spatial details (r = -.33, p < .01) provided at the conclusion 
of the interview in comparison to the beginning. Similarly, participants high on total 
SRP-III also showed a significant reduction in spatial details provided at the conclusion 
of the interview when compared to initial report (r = .30, p = .01) (see Table 4.9).  These 
results indicate that those high on F1 and social dominance may attempt to provide more 
details at the beginning of the interview to appear believable, however they are unable to 
report these details after the cognitive load induced by the CIS.  
When considering the truthful condition, Factor 1 (r = -.34, p < .01), Factor 2 (r = 
-.26, p = .02) and social dominance (r = -.34, p < .01) were all correlated with less 
temporal details being provided during the initial recall (see Table 4.10).  There were no 
significant correlations observed between the personality traits under examination and 
Reality Monitoring criteria at the conclusion of the interview among truthful participants 
(see Table 4.11).  Further, participants high on Factor 1 (r = .26, p = .02) and total SRP- 
III (r = .23, p = .05) demonstrated a significant increase in temporal details at the 
conclusion of the interview.  Those higher on social dominance demonstrated an increase 
in the amount of audio (r = .31, p = .01) details provided at the conclusion of the 
interview (see Table 4.12).  These results are consistent with Logue et al.’s (under 
review) finding that truthful individuals provide more details at the conclusion of the CIS.   
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4.4 Discussion 
 The current research investigates two personality traits that have been linked to 
increased ability to deceive others, psychopathy and social dominance.  Despite 
numerous conceptualizations of psychopaths as skilled liars, research has been divided on 
whether those with psychopathic traits are seen as more believable than non-psychopathic 
controls.  The current study examines the perceived honesty of those with psychopathic 
traits, prior to and after completing an adapted form of the CIS.  Consistent with previous 
research, psychopathy was not linked to increased observer ratings of honesty at the 
beginning or conclusion of the CIS.  Factor 1 psychopathy was unrelated to believability 
of responses prior to or after completing the interview, whether the participant was 
actually truthful or deceptive.  Interestingly, higher total psychopathy score was linked to 
lower perceived honesty overall, particularly in the truthful condition.  This effect 
appears to be driven by those scoring high on Factor 2 psychopathy.  Although the effects 
were marginally significant, it appears that those who are high on Factor 2 psychopathy 
will appear to be less truthful after an information gathering interview such as the CIS, 
even when they are actually telling the truth.  This finding may provide insight into the 
conflicting results regarding the deceptive ability of psychopaths in the literature, 
particularly when using total PCL-R scores (Klaver, Lee, Spidel & Hart, 2009).  It is 
possible that Factor 2 psychopathy is counter-productive to deceptive ability. 
 One potential reason for the failure of psychopaths to successfully deceive 
observers in this sample is the potential lack of consistency between stories.  As 
previously stated, people with psychopathic traits tend to tell stories that are less coherent 
and consistent (Newmann, Harpur & Johnson, 1999; Williamson, 1991).  This study 
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involves participants observing a party tell two versions of the same event, shown back to 
back.  In cases of repeated stories, observers often use consistency as a measure of 
honesty, even though in many cases this is a poor strategy (Granhag & Stromwall, 2002).  
In fact, many studies have demonstrated that people who are telling repeated lies go to 
great efforts to tell a consistent story (Blair et. al, 2012).  While this strategy may be 
ineffective in the general population, it may be effective among psychopaths who do not 
appear to go to great efforts to tell a consistent and coherent story.  Recklessness and 
impulsivity is a core feature of psychopathy. In a comparison of psychopathy and 
Machiavellianism, Baughman et al. (2014) noted that while both traits were linked to 
deceptiveness, only Machiavellianism was associated with increased effort to tell a 
convincing and detailed story.  
Collectively, the results of this study indicate that psychopathic traits do not lead 
to increased believability, contrary to Hare’s (1993) “silver tongued swindler.”  Perhaps 
the reason that psychopaths are able to manipulate others is that they are more willing to 
lie for selfish purposes, rather than having an innate skill.  Numerous studies have 
observed that people have a general “truth bias” to believe what others are saying, unless 
given specific evidence to the contrary (Street & Masip, 2015).  Psychopaths may be 
more willing to exploit the general desire for people to believe in the goodness of others.  
An additional possibility is that psychopaths’ gift for deception may not lie in an 
increased ability to lie, but with victim selection.  Numerous theorists have argued that 
psychopaths are social predators, who selectively choose targets to increase success of 
criminality (Book et al., 2007; Hare, 2001).  One line of research indicates that Factor 1, 
not Factor 2, psychopathy is positively correlated with successful victim selection.  
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Wheeler, Book and Costello (2009) observed that a subclinical population of 
undergraduate students who scored high on Factor 1 psychopathy were able to select 
vulnerable populations merely by observing their gait.  Book, Costello and Camalleri 
(2013) replicated these findings in a prison sample, indicating that Factor 1 psychopathy 
as assessed by the PCL-R is related to successful victim selection.  This line of reasoning 
indicates that the success of psychopaths may be a consequence of selectively choosing 
those who are easier to deceive, rather than the ability to lie more effectively.  
Conversely, socially dominant individuals did become significantly more 
convincing throughout the course of the interview, although they were not particularly 
effective liars.  One potential reason for this finding is that social dominance was 
measured through self-report, rather than observer ratings.  It is possible that in this 
study, participants may have an inaccurate or inflated view of their dominance in social 
interactions.  Simply, self-reported dominance may be a measure of an inflated view of 
self, rather than an accurate appraisal of dominance.  Another, perhaps more compelling, 
theory lies in the methodology of the study.  Social dominance involves a person who is 
highly motivated to, and is often accomplished at, taking control of social situations and 
exerting influence on decision making (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009).  The current research 
involves an inherent power imbalance; the interviewer asks the questions, and the 
participants answer them.  The interviewer is in the position of authority, controlling and 
directing the process.  Further, the current methodology directs the interviewer not to 
engage in any follow up questioning, or answer any questions of the interviewee.  The 
structured setting of the CIS does not allow for the interviewee to gain any control in the 
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interview, which may limit the effectiveness of socially dominant people to be viewed as 
more persuasive in this study.  
The current research provides further evidence for the combination of Reality 
Monitoring and an information gathering interview approach such as the CIS as a reliable 
deception detection method.  Trait social dominance and subclinical psychopathy were 
unrelated to the probability of being assigned to the Deception condition, indicating that 
individuals with these traits are unable to deceive the scale.  It is important that a uniform 
deception detection method such as an actuarial scale is effective regardless of the traits 
of the interviewee.  Reality Monitoring was hypothesized to be an effective measure as 
psychopathy and social dominance are often linked to the use of nonverbal rather than 
language-based cues to deceive or persuade others. The success of this scale was 
demonstrated as only 7 of 79 deceptive people were classified as truthful.  While these 
results do indicate that this scale accurately detects deception, and the aforementioned 
traits were not correlated with success, it is difficult to generalize the results of this study 
due to low power in the deceptive condition.  
In an attempt to address the power limitation in the deceptive condition, the verbal 
strategies that participants used during the interview were examined, regardless of 
success in defeating Reality Monitoring.  The results of this study indicate that people 
who are high on social dominance and psychopathic traits do not demonstrate patterns of 
verbal responses that are successful in defeating the Reality Monitoring scale by the 
conclusion of the CIS protocol.  Interestingly, when being deceptive, participants high on 
Factor 1 and social dominance demonstrate increased visual, spatial and temporal details 
during the initial questioning.  This finding indicates that these personality traits may lead 
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to an increased ability to appear honest during initial questioning.  However, these effects 
disappeared by the conclusion of the interview, potentially due to cognitive load.  In fact, 
individuals high on Factor 1 and total SRP-III demonstrated a significant decrease in 
spatial criteria at the conclusion of the interview in comparison to the first question, in 
contrast to the pattern of information demonstrated by truthful individuals.  These results 
support the use of the CIS in conjunction with Reality Monitoring.  While these 
individuals were not successful at defeating the scale in this sample, it is possible that 
individuals high on these traits may be more effective deceivers in a less cognitively 
taxing interview. 
Further, it should be noted that psychopathy and social dominance demonstrated 
differential results in the Truthful condition.  Logue et al. (under review) have argued that 
truthful individuals generally report higher baseline Reality Monitoring criteria during 
initial questioning, and reported details increase by the conclusion of the interview.  
However, in this sample Factor 1, Factor 2 and total SRP-III scores were all linked to 
lower temporal details provided during the initial questioning.  There were no significant 
differences between any Reality Monitoring details reported during the final question as a 
function of any personality trait.  While they should be interpreted with caution, these 
results highlight the possibility that people high on psychopathic traits may provide less 
Reality Monitoring criteria when telling the truth during basic questioning.  Despite this 
caveat, there were no differences in Reality Monitoring criteria reported at the conclusion 
of the CIS, providing further support the use of this interview in conjunction with Reality 
Monitoring. 
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4.4.1 Limitations and Future Research 
 The goal of this study was to provide insight into personality traits that may lead 
to increased ability to deceive others both prior to and after the CIS in a controlled 
experimental environment.  However, there are limitations that need to be addressed.  
First, the interviewees in this study were selected from a university, not correctional, 
sample.  This was necessary to provide a study of this size and scope.  Further, the SRP-
III has been linked to many behavioural signs of psychopathy.  Despite this, true clinical 
psychopaths may have been more successful liars.  Future research should use a clinical 
sample as assessed by the PCL-R.  A related concern is the sample size. While this 
sample lead to marginal significance for the findings that total and Factor 2 traits are 
related to lower ratings of truth after completing the CIS, particularly when truthful, the 
relative power of this study was low.  Power analysis indicates that 80 participants were 
required to find an existing effect, and some analyses did not meet that threshold.  
Additionally, the structured nature of the interviews may have served to limit the ability 
of socially dominant people to be deceptive.  While this research has direct bearing on the 
ability of socially dominant people to deceive law enforcement officers in a controlled 
interview setting, it cannot answer the larger question of whether socially dominant 
individuals may be more effective in deceiving others in conditions where they may be 
able to exert more control.  To our knowledge, there is little research on whether trait 
social dominance involves naturally using nonverbal cues that are more likely to be 
believed, or whether these individuals actively engage in deception to increase social 
influence.  While this is beyond the scope of this paper, the use of deception to increase 
social standing is an important topic with larger social implications.   
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Finally, there may be other personality traits that are more effective in deceiving 
others, even in controlled policing interviews.  Two obvious candidates are Narcissism 
and Machiavellianism.  Narcissism is defined as a feeling of entitlement, vanity and a 
grandiose sense of self-worth (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).  Machiavellianism is 
characterized as emotional coldness, manipulativeness and a willingness to sacrifice the 
good of others for individual success (Jonason, Slomski, & Partyka, 2012).  Both of these 
traits have been linked to subclinical psychopathy in a “dark triad” (Paulhus & Williams, 
2002).  This constellation of personality traits has been linked to many negative 
behavioural outcomes including: relationship infidelity (Brewer, Hunt, James, & Abell, 
2015), violence (Pailing, Boone, & Egan, 2013) and theft (Lyons & Jonason, 2015).  
Further, the dark triad has been linked to authoritative styles of social dominance.  Given 
the link between these traits and psychopathy, it is possible that these related personality 
traits may lead to more successful deception during the CIS.  Machiavellianism has been 
linked to deceptiveness in many studies.  Machiavellianism is a predictor of telling self-
serving lies (McLeod & Genereux, 2008), and effectiveness in telling high stakes lies 
such as academic dishonesty (Azili et al., 2016).  Further, as previously noted, 
Machiavellianism is linked to lying to manipulate others, and to taking great effort to 
develop a consistent and believable story.  Baughman, Jonason, Lyons, and Vernon 
(2014), noted that Narcissism is also linked to a willingness to commit academic 
dishonesty.  Given the link between the dark triad and negative behavioural outcomes, it 
is conceivable that persons high on these traits may be over represented in law 
enforcement interviews.  Further research should investigate whether Machiavellianism 
and Narcissism increase ability to be deceptive in law enforcement interviews. 
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The current study indicates that despite the general conception of psychopaths as 
prolific and effective liars, they were not able to successfully deceive observers during a 
modified version of the CIS.  Sub-clinical psychopathy was unrelated to successful 
deception, and secondary psychopathy was linked to the appearance of dishonesty, 
regardless of conditions.  Possible reasons for these findings are a lack of consistency in 
verbal stories demonstrated by psychopaths, and increased frustration and anger that is a 
hallmark of secondary psychopathy.  While social dominance was correlated to greater 
perceived truthfulness throughout the interview, it was not related to overall appearance 
of honesty.  One potential reason for this finding is the inability of those higher in social 
dominance to use strategies to control the social interaction in a structured suspect 
interview such as the CIS.  Collectively, the ineffectiveness of individuals with 
personality traits that have been linked to persuasiveness and deceptiveness during the 
interview process provides some evidence that the CIS is an effective interview strategy 
to eliminate potential effects of deceiver skill on deception detection.  Further research 
should consider personality traits such as Narcissism and Machiavellianism to confirm 
the effectiveness of the CIS.
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Table 4.1.  
Correlations between personality traits and observer ratings of honesty full sample. 
 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Total SRP Social 
Dominance 
CIS Question 1 Correlation -0.07  -0.13 -0.11  0.03 
 Sig.  0.52   0.22  0.31  0.78 
 
CIS  Question 5 Correlation -0.16  -0.19* -0.19* -0.06 
 Sig.  0.12   0.06  0.06  0.59 
 
Difference Score Correlation  0.12   0.09  0.11  0.12 
 Sig.  0.24   0.43  0.28  0.27 
Note: N = 93 
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Table 4.2  
Correlations between observer ratings of honesty and personality traits in the truthful 
condition. 
 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Total 
SRP 
Social 
Dominance 
CIS Question 1 Correlation    -0.09  -0.21 -0.16   -0.15 
 Sig.     0.63   0.20  0.33    0.37 
CIS Question 5 Correlation    -0.14 -0. 28* -0.23   -0.05 
 Sig.     0.40   0.09  0.17    0.75 
Difference Score Correlation     0.09   0.09  0.10   -0.18 
 Sig.     0.60   0.60  0.56    0.29 
Note: N = 36 
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Table 4.3.  
Correlations between observer ratings of honesty and personality traits in the deceptive 
condition. 
 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Total SRP Social 
Dominance 
CIS Question 1  Correlation -0.05 -0.04 -0.05  0.19 
 
Sig.  0.72  0.79  0.73  0.15 
 
CIS Question 5 Correlation -0.17 -0.11 -0.16 -0.05 
 
Sig.  0.21  0.42  0.25  0.71 
 
Difference Score Correlation  0.14  0.08  0.13  0.29* 
 Sig.  0.29  0.53  0.35  0.03 
Note: N = 57 
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Table 4.4.  
Predicted probability of being judged as truthful by Reality Monitoring as a function of 
personality traits in all conditions. 
 
  Truth Deceptive Total Sample  
Factor 1 Correlation  .06  .06  .09 
 Significance  .63  .61  .24 
     
Factor 2 Correlation  .09  .06  .13 
 Significance  .45  .61  .11 
     
Total SRP Correlation  .08  .06  .12 
 Significance  .50  .57  .13 
     
Social 
Dominance 
Correlation  -.18 -.02 -.16* 
 
Significance  .12  .87  .05 
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Table 4.5  
Descriptive statistics of personality variables as a function of success in deceiving Reality 
Monitoring scale in deceptive condition 
 
 Personality 
Variable 
Number Mean S.D. S.E Mean 
Social 
Dominance 
Failure 72 69.28 
 
10.55 1.24 
 
Success 7 71.14 11.58 4.38 
 
Factor 1 
Psychopathy 
Failure 72 77.39 15.74 1.85 
 
Success 7 74.86 13.62 5.15 
 
Factor 2 
Psychopathy 
Failure 72 67.35 15.04 1.77 
 
Success 7 66.29 12.59 4.76 
 
Total SRP III 
Score 
Failure 72 144.73 27.93 3.29 
 
Success 7 141.14 23.52 8.89 
Note: N = 79 
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Table 4.6 
Independent t-tests for successfully defeating Reality Monitoring in deceptive condition as a 
function of Psychopathy and Social Dominance  
  
  T Df Mean 
Diff. 
SE 
Diff 
Sig.  
(2 tail) 
Cohen’s     
d 
Social 
Dominance 
Eq. Var 
Assumed 
-0.44    77 -1.87 4.21 0.66  0.17 
 
Not 
Assumed 
-0.41 7.00 -1.87 4.55 0.69  
Factor 1 Eq. Var 
Assumed 
 0.41    77  2.52 6.17 0.68  0.17 
 
Not 
Assumed 
 0.46 7.65  2.52 5.47 0.66  
Factor 2 Eq. Var 
Assumed 
 0.18    77  1.06 5.89 0.86  0.08 
 
Not 
Assumed 
 0.21 7.77  1.06 5.08 0.84  
Total SRP Eq. Var 
Assumed 
 0.33    77  3.59 10.93 0.74  0.13 
 
Not assumed  0.38 7.74  3.59 9.47 0.72  
Note: N = 79 
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Table 4.7 
Correlation between Reality Monitoring criteria and initial CIS questioning in the deceptive 
condition. 
 
  Visual Audio Spatial Temporal Cognitive Affective 
Social 
Dominance 
Correlation 0.23*   0.11 0.24* 0.25* -0.05 -0.08 
 Sig (2-tail) 0.04   0.33 0.04 0.03 0.64  0.46 
 
Factor 1 Correlation 0.23*   -0.02 0.23* 0.23* 0.08 -0.12 
 Sig (2-tail) 0.04   0.88 0.05 0.04 0.49  0.30 
 
Factor 2 Correlation 0.11 -0.05 0.16 0.07 0.19 -0.01 
 Sig (2-tail) 0.34  0.69 0.15 0.54 0.10  0.97 
 
SRP Total Correlation 0.19 -0.02 0.22* 0.17 0.15 -0.07 
 Sig (2-tail) 0.09  0.90 0.06 0.14 0.20  0.54 
Note: N = 79 
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Table 4.8  
Correlations between Reality Monitoring criteria and final CIS question in the deceptive 
condition 
 
  Visual Audio Spatial Temporal Cognitive Affective 
Social 
Dominance 
Correlation  0.07 -0.01  0.15    0.08  0.05   0.14 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.53  0.92  0.18    0.47  0.67   0.24 
 
Factor 1 Correlation  0.16  0.05 -0.33  -0.15  0.01   0.12 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.15  0.67  0.01**   0.19  0.92   0.29 
 
Factor 2 Correlation  0.03  0.13 -0.20 -0.16  0.04  -0.02 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.78  0.25  0.08*   0.15  0.75   0.85 
 
SRP Total Correlation -0.08  0.10 -0.30*  -0.17  0.03  -0.06 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.51  0.39  0.01   0.13  0.82   0.63 
Note: N = 79. 
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Table 4.9 
Correlations Between difference scores of Reality Monitoring criteria and personality traits in 
the deceptive condition 
 
  Visual Audio Spatial Temporal Cognitive Affective 
Social 
Dominance 
Correlation -0.18 -0.08  -0.15 -0.07 0.05  0.13  
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.11   0.50   0.18  0.56 0.65  0.27 
 
Factor 1 Correlation -0.25* - 0.02  -0.33* -0.14 0.01  0.11 
 Sig (2-tail)  0.03   0.86 <0.01  0.24 0.91  0.32 
 
Factor 2 Correlation  -0.07  0.07  -0.20 -0.16 0.03 -0.03 
 Sig (2-tail)   0.53  0.57   0.07  0.17 0.80  0.79 
 
SRP Total Correlation -0.18  0.02  -0.30* -0.16 0.03  0.05 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.11  0.84   0.01  0.16 0.84  0.68 
Note: N = 79. 
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Table 4.10 
Reality Monitoring details provided as a function of personality traits in the truthful condition 
during initial question. 
 
  Visual Audio Spatial Temporal Cognitive Affective 
Social 
Dominance 
Correlation 0.10 -0.12   0.03 -0.09 0.12  0.08 
 
Sig (2-tail) 0.40  0.29   0.83  0.42 0.30  0.49 
 
Factor 1 Correlation 0.08 -0.04 -0.16 -0.34** 0.05 -0.03 
 
Sig (2-tail) 0.47  0.72   0.16 < .01 0.65  0.79 
 
Factor 2 Correlation 0.18 -0.11   0.05 -0.26* 0.15 -0.05 
 
Sig (2-tail) 0.12  0.33   0.66    .02 0.20  0.68 
 
SRP Total Correlation 0.14 -0.08  -0.08 -0.34** 0.11 -0.04 
 
Sig (2-tail) 0.23  0.48   0.51 < .01 0.36  0.71 
 Note: N = 78. 
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Table 4.11.   
Correlations between personality traits and Reality Monitoring criteria during the final CIS 
question for truthful participants 
 
  Visual Audio Spatial Temporal Cognitive Affective 
Social 
Dominance 
Correlation 0.07   0.17    0.07  0.08 -0.03 0.14 
 
Sig (2-tail) 0.56   0.14    0.56  0.49  0.82 0.23 
 
Factor 1 Correlation 0.11 -0.06  -0.09 -0.06  0.02 0.05 
 
Sig (2-tail) 0.33  0.58   0.46  0.63  0.89 0.64 
 
Factor 2 Correlation 0.01 -0.06  -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 0.12 
 
Sig (2-tail) 0.93  0.58   0.42  0.34  0.29 0.31 
 
SRP Total Correlation 0.08 -0.07  -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.09 
 
Sig (2-tail) 0.51  0.54   0.39  0.44  0.67 0.43 
Note: N = 78. 
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Table 4.12.  
Difference score correlations with Reality Monitoring criteria in the truthful condition. 
 
  Visual Audio Spatial Temporal Cognitive Affective 
Social 
Dominance 
Correlation  0.01   0.31*   0.05 0.17 -0.09 0.07 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.95   0.01   0.68 0.13  0.45 0.56 
 
Factor 1 Correlation  0.07  -0.05   0.04 0.26* -0.02 0.09 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.53   0.70   0.74 0.02  0.90 0.46 
 
Factor 2 Correlation -0.12   0.02 -0.14 0.13 -0.18 0.15 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.30   0.89  0.24 0.26  0.12 0.18 
 
SRP Total Correlation -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.23* -0.10 0.13 
 
Sig (2-tail)  0.90  0.86  0.72 0.05  0.39 0.26 
Note: N = 78. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 Collectively, the series of studies presented provide systematic and coherent 
evidence indicating that the specific combination of the Reality Monitoring scale and the 
Cognitive Interview for Suspects provides a consistent, effective, and robust method of 
increasing information gathered and detecting deception.  Reality Monitoring was 
demonstrated to increase deception detection accuracy under strictly controlled 
experimental conditions.  Further, this scale was demonstrated to be more accurate than 
subjective judgments provided by observers.  This method was not affected by 
personality traits that have been linked to increased ability to deceive, namely 
psychopathy and social dominance.  Finally, as originally hypothesized, the CIS was 
demonstrated to be an effective information gathering approach that significantly 
increased the amount of information gathered throughout the interview.  
 
5.1 The Effectiveness of Reality Monitoring as a Deception Detection Tool 
 As argued in the Introduction, a potential source of the poor deception detection 
accuracy observed in the literature may be a consequence of reliance on nonverbal cues.  
Language-based methods of deception detection have consistently demonstrated accuracy 
ratings above chance; however, they are currently not sufficient to be used in legal 
proceedings (Vrij, 2005).  The series of studies presented here provide evidence that the 
application of Reality Monitoring to CIS interviews led to a high degree of accuracy.  
The initial study of 157 students provided an accuracy rating of 86.6% (specificity = 
90%, sensitivity = 83%) at the conclusion of the interview.  Study 2 re-analyzed the full 
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sample using initial Reality Monitoring scores in conjunction with the difference scores 
of Reality Monitoring criteria between the first and last question of the CIS and 
demonstrated an accuracy rating of 88.5% (specificity = 89.7%, sensitivity = 87.3%).  
These results indicate that the Reality Monitoring scale is an accurate deception detection 
tool when applied to statements elicited by the CIS.   
It is important to note that, consistent with Signal Detection Theory (Green & 
Swets, 1966), this method was able to accurately classify both truthful and deceptive 
statements.  In Signal Detection Theory, developing methods to increase “Hits” often 
leads to an increase in “False Alarms”.  While it is important for law enforcement 
agencies to be able to accurately detect deception, there are negative consequences that 
may arise from incorrectly classifying truthful statements as deceptive.  Given the stakes 
of police investigations, it is important to develop a detection method that can correctly 
classify both truth and lies.  The goal of my thesis was to develop an effective 
interviewing method that increases deception detection accuracy without the 
corresponding increase in false alarms that often occurs.  The method proposed in my 
thesis accurately detected deception with a high degree of sensitivity and specificity. 
Further, Study 2 demonstrated the utility of calculating Reality Monitoring using 
the initial scores in conjunction with the difference scores of information reported during 
the first and last question of the CIS.  The truthful participants were hypothesized to 
provide more Reality Monitoring criteria at baseline.  The CIS was hypothesized to 
preferentially increase the amount of information recalled throughout the interview.  
Using the difference score not only increases overall accuracy, but allows for greater 
discrimination of truth and lies within given individuals.  First, using difference scores 
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provides a direct, within-subject comparison of the statement instead of relying on group 
differences.  Second, using the difference scores may allow for greater accuracy for 
people who are less verbose than others. 
 
5.2 The Cognitive Interview for Suspects as an Information Gathering Tool 
 The collective body of research presented has demonstrated that the CIS is an 
appropriate information gathering approach that increases the quantity of details provided 
in a suspect interview.  Study 1 demonstrated that truthful participants referenced more 
visual, auditory, spatial, and temporal details at the conclusion of the CIS than deceptive 
participants.  Consistent with McCormack et al’s. (2009) theory, deceptive individuals 
made more references to the cognitive processes of others.  Analyses presented in Study 
2 demonstrated that truthful participants provide significantly more Reality Monitoring 
details at the conclusion of the interview as compared to the initial question than 
deceptive individuals.  Specifically, truthful participants demonstrated significantly 
greater increase in visual, auditory, temporal, and affective details provided at the 
conclusion of the interview compared to deceptive individuals.  These results confirm the 
hypothesis that the CIS preferentially increases the recall of information provided by 
truthful participants and therefore it is an effective information gathering approach.  
However, it should be noted that the amount of information provided by deceptive 
individuals also increased from baseline in this interview, albeit at a much smaller rate 
than for truthful participants.  The strict experimental controls provided in this study may 
explain this finding.  Participants in both conditions met the same researchers and sat in 
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the same laboratory room.  Therefore, although the sequence of events was different for 
the groups, the deceptive condition had numerous Reality Monitoring criteria cues to 
draw on to construct a believable alibi.  Despite this confound, participants in the truthful 
condition demonstrated much higher increases in information provided in comparison to 
deceptive individuals, demonstrating the effectiveness of the CIS as an information 
gathering interview. 
5.2.1 Interrogation vs Information Gathering Interviews 
 My dissertation demonstrates that information gathering approaches can lead to 
increased levels of deception detection accuracy under controlled experimental 
conditions in comparison to average accuracy rates reported in the literature.  Further, it 
contributes to the debate between information gathering interviews and interrogation.  As 
argued in the Introduction, the most popular method of suspect interviewing in North 
America is the Reid Technique (Snook, 2010).  This method of interview has been 
criticized for its pursuit of confession rather than information.  Reid and similar 
techniques have been criticized for determining deceptiveness using unreliable cues, and 
adopting coercive interviewing techniques that limit the amount of information gathered 
(Kassin & Fong, 1999; Vrij et al., 2006).  Most alarmingly, this method has been linked 
to false confessions, particularly among vulnerable populations (Drizin & Leo, 2004; 
Kassin et al., 2010).  Unfortunately, less coercive approaches such as the PEACE model 
have not been demonstrated to effectively increase the amount of information gathered or 
provide an effective method of detecting deception (Clarke, Milne, & Bull, 2011).  A 
reasonable and more effective alternative may be required to move police services away 
from coercive interviews.  The series of studies presented here provides evidence for the 
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use of this information gathering approach in police interviews.  The CIS is an adapted 
form of a “best practice” model that has been adopted by police services globally.  It has 
been demonstrated to increase the amount of information provided, particularly by 
truthful individuals.  Finally, it has been demonstrated to increase the sensitivity of the 
Reality Monitoring scale. 
 
5.3 Actuarial vs Subjective Measures of Deception 
 The studies presented demonstrated that Reality Monitoring was more accurate 
than subjective observer ratings in this sample.  Study 2 directly compared the accuracy 
of observer ratings in comparison to Reality Monitoring in deception detection.  
Consistent with a large body of literature, observer ratings of deceptiveness hovered 
around chance levels of accuracy when rating the initial (52.73%) and final (47.82%) CIS 
responses.  Further, observer ratings were significantly less accurate after viewing the 
second question (t(389) = 4.75, p <.01).  Conversely, Reality Monitoring was more 
accurate, with a 92.5% overall accuracy rating in the same sample of interviews.  These 
results support the specific combination of Reality Monitoring and the CIS to ensure 
accurate deception detection.  Despite the increased information provided at the 
conclusion of the interview, observers were unable to accurately detect deception.  These 
findings contribute to a large body of literature that indicates that objective ratings 
outperform subjective judgments in a variety of contexts (Garb, 1989). 
 
 
155 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Consistency as a Measure of Deception Detection 
 The study of observer ratings of deceptiveness provided further insight into 
potential sources of ineffective lie detection techniques.  As previously discussed, 
observer ratings hovered around chance for both questions, but were significantly worse 
after viewing the second question.  While the research literature has highlighted a general 
propensity to rely on ineffective body language cues (Depaulo et al., 2003), this method 
does not readily explain why observers would be significantly worse at rating questions 
after observing more body language cues.  One potential source of error may be a 
measure of consistency.  Qualitative data collected during Study 2 indicated that many 
observers compared the answers to the first and last question of the CIS to look for any 
inconsistencies in the story that would indicate deception.  While this method has 
intuitive appeal, numerous studies have demonstrated that deceptive stories are not more 
inconsistent than true accounts after repeated tellings.  In fact, certain studies have found 
that deceptive individuals are more consistent throughout their stories (Granhag & 
Stromwall, 2002; Blair et al., 2012).  This finding may be compounded by the 
information gathering approach of the CIS.  This method uses memory based-retrieval 
cues to increase the quantity of details recalled, particularly by truthful individuals.  This 
increase in quantity of details may have been interpreted as a sign of deception by 
observers as the story grows and therefore changes throughout the interview. 
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5.4 The Effects of Personality Traits on Deception Detection 
 The collection of studies under examination contribute to the understanding of the 
effects of personality attributes of the deceiver on both subjective and objective ratings of 
deception.  The empirical literature has provided mixed evidence on the effectiveness of 
psychopaths as effective liars.  While certain studies have indicated an increased 
propensity for psychopaths to use deception in a variety of contexts, other researchers 
have not substantiated this link (Hare, Forth & Hart, 1989; Poythress, Edens, & Watkins, 
2001).  Further, while Hare (1993) has described psychopaths as “silver tongued 
swindlers,” other researchers have found psychopathy to be linked to less coherent and 
convincing narratives.  Researchers have argued that psychopaths use nonverbal cues to 
deceive others.  A potential source of this conflict may be the lack of separation of 
psychopathy into separate factors.  Lee, Klaver, and Hart (2008) argued that Factor 1 
psychopathy was linked to increased deceptiveness, in contrast to Factor 2 psychopathy 
which was linked to increased perception of deceptiveness, regardless of whether the 
person was telling the truth. 
In the present research, Reality Monitoring was hypothesized to be unaffected by 
psychopathic traits, as this scale focuses on verbal, not body language cues.  Consistent 
with this theory, psychopathic traits were found to be unrelated to the ability to defeat 
Reality Monitoring, providing further support for the use of this scale.  However, these 
results should be interpreted with caution, as only a small number of participants defeated 
the scale regardless of personality traits, thereby limiting experimental power.  
Interestingly, psychopathic traits were not linked to an increased ability to deceive 
observers.  In fact, psychopathic traits, particularly Factor 2 psychopathy, was linked to 
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being seen as less believable by the end of the questioning, even when telling the truth.  
These findings provide partial support for Lee, Klaver, and Hart’s (2008) suggestion that 
the underlying factor structure of psychopathy may lead to differential ability to deceive 
others.  Specifically that Factor 2 psychopathy may be related to a decreased ability to 
deceive others over time.  This may be explained by the finding that those high on Factor 
2 are seen as less believable over time, making successful deception more difficult.  
Similarly, trait dominance was not linked to an ability to defeat the Reality Monitoring 
scale, providing further support for its use with the caveat of low power in this sample.  
This result was predicted as trait dominant individuals are believed to achieve influence 
using nonverbal rather than verbal cues.  However, trait dominant individuals were rated 
as more believable over time by observers.   
 
5.5 Limitations and Future Directions   
 The series of studies under examination provide support for the application of the 
Reality Monitoring scale to statements elicited by the CIS as an effective information 
gathering method that allows for accurate deception detection.  This scale method has 
been demonstrated to be more effective than observer ratings and is not affected by 
psychopathic traits, or trait social dominance.  Although this study has provided evidence 
for the use of language based deception detection techniques in combination with an 
information gathering interview, there are limitations that need to be addressed.  First, it 
is important to note that this study used modified versions of Reality Monitoring and the 
CIS.  Reality Monitoring initially began as a theory, and researchers have used different 
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subsets of 8 main criteria to create scales to measure deceptiveness. While there is no 
universal scale, Reality Monitoring often includes criteria such as: emotionalism, realism, 
coherence and vividness, in addition to direct references to sensory, spatial and temporal 
details reflected in a statement (Masip et al., 2005).  In my thesis I chose to adopt the 6 
criteria used by Vrij in a series of studies (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 
2010).  This scale focuses on direct verbal references to visual, auditory, spatial, 
temporal, affective and cognitive details and does not consider subjective impressions of 
statements.  The purpose of using these items was to limit subjectivity of judgment that 
may be challenged in court.  While I believe that focusing on directly observable verbal 
criteria over subjective judgments will increase the probability that this method will be 
adopted by police services and accepted in court, it should be noted that a specific subset 
of criteria were used, which may limit the generalizability of these results to Reality 
Monitoring research. 
 Similarly, my thesis used a modified version of the CIS to interview participants 
in a mock theft scenario.  I consciously chose to standardize the rapport building stage, 
and to eliminate the open ended, follow-up questioning that was recommended by 
Geiselman (2012).  The purpose of using a standard written template read by a student 
interviewer with no follow-up questioning was to ensure that it was to ensure that it was 
the process, not the skill or beliefs of the interviewer that determined the results.  The 
goal of this research is to develop an interviewing protocol that may be used by officers 
of all skill levels to increase the amount of information gathered and deception detection 
accuracy.  While the protocol of this study was necessary to establish an initial effect, it 
should be noted that a modified version of the CIS was used, limiting the ability to 
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generalize from this study to the CIS as proposed by Geiselman (2012).  Future research 
should consider the full CIS including an initial rapport building stage and open ended 
interview questions by trained investigators to determine the efficacy of this method.  
Interestingly, converging lines of research have provided a potential method of improving 
accuracy.  Geiselman’s CIS calls for a series of open ended questions in the middle of the 
interview.  One of the more effective methods of deception detection noted in the 
literature is the “Strategic Use of Evidence” (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Kronkvist, 
2006).  There are cases in law enforcement interviews where investigators do have 
evidence that may implicate a suspect whom they are interviewing such as: fingerprints, 
DNA, or video surveillance.  The literature on Strategic Use of Evidence has indicated 
that selectively introducing evidence throughout the interview increases deception 
detection accuracy over confronting the suspect with evidence at the beginning of the 
interview (Luke et al., 2016; Hartwig et al., 2006).  This method appears to be compatible 
with the original CIS, and perhaps using “SUE” during the open-ended question phase 
would increase deception detection accuracy. 
 The decision to use a student interviewer and a written template provided a 
further limitation of the research.  As previously stated, this protocol was used to ensure 
that the process, not the interviewer determined the results.  Many research protocols 
involving interviewing allow for interviewers to control questioning, which provided 
difficulties in providing a comparison or control group for this study.  A comparison to a 
“standard police interview” or alternative methods such as the Reid technique would have 
been confounded by the skill or beliefs of the interviewer.  Now that initial effects have 
been established, future research should directly compare the CIS to alternative 
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interviews within the same study.  Finally, a further limitation of the experimental design 
was the use of a single deception paradigm.  The decision was made to conduct this study 
using a high number of participants in a single mock theft scenario, in order to 
demonstrate the validity of this approach in a large sample under controlled experimental 
conditions.  The mock theft scenario utilized in this study was chosen to provide a high 
degree of empirical control.  This study allowed for direct monitoring of the deception 
manipulation, and provided a strict test of Reality Monitoring by providing the deceptive 
participants with many cues to construct a believable alibi.  This method had the further 
benefit of being used in multiple studies to provide a measure of between study 
comparison of deception detection accuracy.  Future research should investigate this 
method using a variety of experimental manipulations of deception and comparing the 
effects of the CIS to competing interview methods. 
Although this series of studies demonstrated initial promise, future avenues of 
research have been illuminated that would provide further direction to the development of 
this method.  First, this method should be applied to “field studies.”  My dissertation 
adopted an experimental design that allows for empirical control and an established 
ground truth in order to demonstrate the validity of this protocol.  However, numerous 
researchers have suggested that experimental studies may lack the ecological validity to 
determine effectiveness in real life scenarios (ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Mortensen & 
Cialdini, 2010).  Considering the stakes of real world criminal investigations, it may be 
difficult to begin with studies on CIS interviews with actual suspects of crime.  However, 
because the CIS is adapted from the original Cognitive Interview that has been utilized 
for many years, it is conceivable that police departments may adopt this protocol with 
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witnesses in order to investigate the efficacy of this method.  Reality Monitoring could be 
applied to CIS witness statements in a fashion similar to the original CBCA studies to 
determine the efficacy of this method.  
 A second area for future research in the field of deception detection involves the 
use of the CBCA in conjunction with the CIS.  Criteria-Based Content Analysis is a 
competing form of language based deception detection techniques that has been 
comparable to Reality Monitoring in many studies (Masip et al., 2005).  This method has 
been accepted and utilized in the court process for many years.  The current dissertation 
proposes that Reality Monitoring may be more readily applicable to law enforcement for 
many reasons.  First, the criteria are less ambiguous and more easily applied by officers.  
Second, references to cognitive processes of others may be indicative of deception 
(McCormack et al., 2009), and this criterion is a part of the Reality Monitoring scale.  
This is in contrast to the CBCA, which focuses on the probability that a statement is true.  
Further, Reality Monitoring lends itself better to the application of difference scores for 
deception detection.  The highest level of accuracy achieved considered the pattern of 
information provided in the interview.  It is unclear how CBCA criteria such as “realism” 
would be interpreted using difference scores.  Despite these caveats, Criteria Based 
Content Analysis is a legitimate form of language based deception detection.  Future 
research should consider the use of this scale on statements elicited by the CIS. 
 A relative weakness in the empirical literature on deception detection is the lack 
of consideration of the skill of the deceiver.  While my dissertation attempted to bridge 
this gap by focusing on psychopathic traits and trait social dominance, further research is 
necessary.  First, it should be noted that psychopathic traits were assessed in a student 
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sample, not using the PCL-R.  The current experimental paradigm could be adapted to 
prison populations to determine whether psychopaths are able to defeat the RM scale.  
Additionally, while trait social dominance and psychopathic traits have not been 
demonstrated to effectively defeat the Reality Monitoring scale, it is possible that other 
personality traits might be more successful.  Narcissism and Machiavellianism have been 
highlighted as potential personality traits that may lead to an increased ability to deceive.  
Narcissism is defined as grandiose sense of self-worth and entitlement.  This trait has 
been linked to academic dishonesty (Baughman, Jonason, Lyons, & Vernon, 2014; 
Paulhus & Williams, 2002).  Machiavellianism is characterized by a ruthless, cold and 
manipulative personality that pursues personal gain at the expense of others.  These traits 
combine with psychopathy to form the dark triad, a personality style that has been linked 
to many negative behaviours.  Machiavellianism has been linked to dishonesty in 
relationships, self-aggrandizing lies, and academic dishonesty (Azili et al., 2016; Brewer, 
Hunt, James, & Abell, 2015; McLeod & Genereux, 2008).  Perhaps more importantly, 
this personality trait differs from psychopathy in that Machiavellianism is linked to an 
increased effort to tell a coherent and believable story.  This personality trait may lead to 
an increased ability to defeat the Reality Monitoring scale.  While the scale has proven to 
be effective thus far, further research must be conducted to determine whether it is 
susceptible to defeat by certain personality types. 
 Finally, this protocol relies on language base deception detection techniques.  One 
potential area of future research would be the effectiveness of this method on individuals 
with differential skills in the language that the interview is conducted in.  Studies have 
indicated that both police officers and lay persons are less accurate at classifying honest 
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and deceptive accounts of those interviewed in a second language, in comparison to 
native speakers (Leach, Snellings & Gazaille, 2017; Leach and Silva, 2013).  Potentially, 
this effect may be maintained during this protocol, as those who are interviewed in a 
second language may not be as descriptive during their accounts.  One method of 
addressing this concern would be to use the difference scores from initial test to baseline 
to determine the relative improvement, however future research should investigate this 
issue.  Similarly, relying on a language based approach may have some limitations when 
considering the statements of special populations, such as cognitive delay or dementia.  
The original CI has been demonstrated to increase the amount of information recalled for 
people of various age groups and cognitive deficiencies, and therefore the modified CIS 
is hypothesized to provide similar results (Fisher et al., 2000 Robinson & McGuire, 2006; 
Wright & Holliday, 2007).  However, future research should directly test the efficacy of 
this method in these populations.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 Collectively, the series of studies presented provide evidence that the combination 
of Reality Monitoring and the CIS is a potentially effective method of police interviewing 
that allows for increased information gathering and improved deception detection 
accuracy.  The CIS has been derived from a best practice model that has been used by 
police services across North America.  It does not rely on coercive strategies or 
behavioural based deception detection techniques that have been criticized in the 
empirical literature.  Further, the studies presented demonstrate that this method of 
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interviewing increases the quantity of details provided.  Reality Monitoring has been 
demonstrated to outperform subjective observer judgments of deception.  Further, 
considering the pattern of information provided throughout the interview appears to lead 
to an increased degree of accuracy of the scale.  Finally, this method has been 
demonstrated to be robust against personality traits that are linked to influence and 
deception; trait social dominance and psychopathy.  Future research should expand the 
study of this protocol using field tests, comparing Reality Monitoring to the CBCA, and 
considering the effect of other personality types of the interviewee on the deception 
detection accuracy of the Reality Monitoring scale.  
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Appendix A: Study 1 Informed Consent 
 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Date:                                                                                                                                          
Project Title: Deception Detection in Interrogation  
Principal Student Investigator (PSI): Michael Logue (Ph.D. Candidate)                           
Department of Psychology                                                                                                         
Brock University                                                                                                         
Ml10da@brocku.ca  
Faculty Supervisor: Angela Book                                                                                     
Department of Psychology                                                                                                         
Brock University (905) 688-5550 Ext. abook@brocku.ca  
INVITATION  
You are invited to participate in a study being conducted by Michael Logue (Principal 
Student Researcher), Shelby Amos, Paul Frosina, Tylor Huizinga, and Rachel Cole under 
the supervision of Dr. Angela Book. We are interested in how people tell stories about 
their experiences, and how convincing these stories are to other people.  
WHAT’S INVOLVED  
As a participant, you will be asked to perform a variety of tasks, including filling out a 
brief questionnaire, reading stories, participating in games and answering questions based 
on your experience. Certain portions of this study will be video recorded.  Participation 
will take approximately 1 hour of your time.  
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS  
Depending on how convincing your story is, you can earn up to $10. Further, you are 
able to use your participation as part of course requirements in classes such as 
Psychology 1F90. There also may be risks associated with participation. You may feel 
uncomfortable during the interview portion of the study, and if you should feel this way, 
you can immediately inform the interviewer, at which point the interview will end and 
you can discontinue participation. If you are still uncomfortable, the researchers have 
provided information on the counseling services available at Brock on the Debriefing 
Sheet that you will receive at the end of this session.  
CONFIDENTIALITY  
When participating in this study, you will be asked to identify yourself with your first 
name to speak to the researcher. Data will be collected using arbitrary numbers, and your 
170 
 
 
 
name will not be linked with the data you provide or appear in any publications. All 
information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included or, in 
any other way, associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, because our 
interest is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be 
identified individually in any way in written reports of this research. Because some 
portion of the session will be videotaped, there is the possibility that you will be 
recognized by people in a future study who will be rating the videos on how convincing 
the story is. We have a separate video consent form where you can choose whether your 
video is used for a) the present study, where only the researchers will see the video, b) a 
future study, where the videos will be rated by others, or c) not for any purpose, at which 
point the video would be deleted in front of you.  
Data collected during this study will be stored on laboratory computers for using case 
numbers. Only the researchers listed on this consent form will have access to these 
materials. Data will be kept for 5 years following publication, as stipulated by the 
American Psychological Association after which time the files will be erased. Video data 
will be retained for 5 years following publication of the future study, but only if you have 
agree to have your video used for this purpose.  
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION  
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any 
questions or participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to 
withdraw from this study at any time and may do so without losing the credit for 
participation. However, because the $10 is dependent upon how convincing your story is, 
you can only get the money if the story part of the session has been completed.  
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS  
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at 
conferences. Feedback about this study will be available. Please contact the principal 
investigator, Michael Logue, regarding the results of this study.  
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE  
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact 
Michael Logue using the contact information provided above. This study has been 
reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock 
University (file # 12-60). If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a 
research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 
3035, reb@brocku.ca.  
Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please keep a copy of this form for your 
records.  
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CONSENT FORM  
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on 
the information I have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity 
to receive any additional details I wanted about the study and understand that I may ask 
questions in the future. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time.  
Name: _________________________________________ 
Signature: ______________________________________ Date: ___________________  
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Appendix B: Deception Detection in Interrogation: Photograph/Video Consent Form 
This study has received ethical approval (REB file #12-060). It is being conducted by 
Michael Logue, Paul Frosina, Shelby Amos, and Tylor Huizinga under the supervision of 
Dr. Angela Book (abook@brocku.ca).  
Please indicate below which purposes you would like the video recording to be used for:  
1. Coding for the present study  
I agree to have my video coded for verbal and nonverbal behaviors by the researchers 
listed on the consent and debriefing forms.  
__________________________________                                        _______________  
Participant Signature                                                                            Date  
I do not agree to have my video coded for verbal and nonverbal behaviors by the 
researchers listed on the consent and debriefing forms.  
__________________________________                                          ______________  
Participant Signature                                                                           Date  
2. Future Study  
I agree to have my video used in a future study where participants will rate the story on 
deception/truth.  
__________________________________                                          _____________  
Participant Signature                                                                            Date  
I do not agree to have my video used in a future study where participants will rate the 
story on deception/truth.  
__________________________________                                          _____________  
The signature below verifies that I, the researcher for Deception Detection in 
Interrogation, will abide by your video recording request and operate in accordance with 
the above statement(s).  
__________________________________                                          ______________  
Researcher Signature                                                                            Date 
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Appendix C: Study 1 Alibi Template 
 
 
“You entered the room and played a few games of connect four with [researcher two]. 
Connect four is a board game similar to tic-tac-toe played with discs similar to checkers 
pieces. The goal of the game is to be the first to line up 4 pieces on the board while taking 
alternating turns. A short time later, [researcher one], who shares the laboratory, enters 
the room and you all have a brief conversation and he leaves. The game continues until 
[researcher two] receives a phone call and leaves the room before returning. The game 
continues until [research confederate] comes back into the lab and locates the wallet that 
is on the desk. This person opens the wallet, and claims that there is $10 missing.” “The 
wallet is sitting on the table in the corner of the room. Take the $10 out of the wallet. You 
will be interviewed by a separate person to determine whether you took the $10. If you 
convince the interviewer that you did not take the money, you will get to keep the $10” 
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Appendix D: Cognitive Interview for Suspects Script 
 
Stage 1:  Rapport Building 
 
As you know my lab-mate (Researcher 2) is missing money, and we just want to find out 
what happened.  I am not necessarily blaming you, but I would like you to provide me a 
story that makes sense so I can understand what happened in the previous room. Before 
we start, I would like to learn a little more about you, so that I have an idea of who I am 
dealing with. I would like you to answer a few questions, not about what happened, but 
about yourself to get to know you better. 
 
1.) What did you do last weekend? Mention all details and give as much information as 
you can. 
 
2.) Where do you see yourself 5 years from now? Mention all details and give as much 
information as you can. 
 
Ok, now that I know a little more about you, I would like to start with the interview when 
you are ready. 
 
 Stage 2: CIS Questions 
 
1) ‘Please tell me, in as much detail as possible, what happened when you were in the 
room with (Researcher 1) just now? Mention all details, all conversations that took place, 
and give as much information as you can about everyone who entered the room, however 
irrelevant it may seem. Please tell me as much as you possibly can as I will use all the 
information you give me to decide whether or not I think you are telling me the truth.’ 
 
After a short break participants will then be asked: 
 
2) Here is a sketch pad with a piece of paper in front of you. ‘Please tell me, in as much 
detail as possible, what happened when you were in the room with (Researcher 1) just 
now? Mention all details, all conversations that took place, and give as much information 
as you can about everyone who entered the room, however irrelevant it may seem. Use 
the sketch pad to demonstrate what happened in the room with (Researcher 1), in what 
order, and show me where you were in the room. Please tell me as much as you possibly 
can as I will use all the information you give me to decide whether or not I think you are 
telling the truth. 
 
The sketch pad will be removed and Participants will then be asked the following 
question: 
 
3) ‘Please tell me, in as much detail as possible, what happened when you were in the 
room with (Researcher 1) just now, but in reverse order. This means I would like you to 
start with opening the door to meet me, and work your way backwards, in order, to when 
you originally met (Researcher 1). Mention all details, all conversations that took place, 
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and give as much information as you can about everyone who entered the room, however 
irrelevant it may seem. Please tell me as much as you possibly can as I will use all the 
information you give me to decide whether or not I think you are telling me the truth. 
Participants will then be challenged on their statements with the following question: 
 
4) I have listened to all of your answers and at this point there are inconsistencies in your 
story. I think you have been lying to me this entire time. Please tell me again what 
happened in the room with (Researcher 1). Mention all details all conversations that took 
place and give me as much information as you can about everyone who entered the room, 
however irrelevant it may seem as I will use all the information you give me to decide 
whether or not I think you are telling the truth. 
 
Participants will then be asked the following question. 
 
5) Now that you have answered the previous questions, I will again ask you to tell me 
your story in a way that is believable to me. Please tell me in as much detail as possible, 
what happened when you were in the room with (Researcher 1). Mention all details all 
conversations that took place and give as much information as you can about everyone 
who entered the room, however irrelevant it may seem as I will use all the information 
you give me to decide whether or not I think you are telling me the truth. It is very 
important that you tell me all of the information that you told me throughout the 
interview, even if you have mentioned these things in previous questions, as well as 
anything else you would like to add. This will be your last chance to convince me that 
you are telling the truth. 
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Appendix E: Reality Monitoring Scoring Sheet 
 
 
Participant Number: 
 
 
 
 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 
Visual  
 
    
Audio  
 
    
Spatial  
 
    
Temporal  
 
    
Cognitive  
 
    
Affective  
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Appendix F: Study 1 Debriefing Form 
 
Deception Detection in Interrogation Participant ID: __________  
Thank you for participating in this research project. This research was conducted through 
the Psychology Department at Brock University and carried out by researcher Michael 
Logue, Paul Frosina, Shelby Amos, Tylor Huizinga, and Rachel Cole under the 
supervision of Dr. Angela Book. The study has been reviewed and received ethical 
clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University (REB file #12-060).  
The purpose of this study is to further the current understanding of lie detection. Despite 
popular media myths, physical cues such as body language, rate of speech and pupil 
dilation are not reliably linked to deception. The failure of these techniques has led 
researchers to abandon non verbal methods of deception detection in favour of verbal 
cues. There are various methods of verbal lie detection, and the purpose of this study is to 
test one method, the cognitive interview. Some participants in this study actually 
participated in a brief scenario where they played games of Connect 4, met 2 other 
people, and one of the other people lost $10 from a wallet. The other participants were 
provided a similar script covering the main events of the scenario that they could use to 
construct an alibi. Some of these participants were directed to take the $10 out of the 
wallet and some were not. All participants were brought into the interview room and 
asked the same questions in the same order. The interviewer was asked to rate if they felt 
participants had actually experienced the event or were in the alibi group. Researchers 
have developed scales that they apply to statements that can be used to help determine 
whether a person is telling the truth. At a later date, these scales will be applied to the 
video of these interviews to determine if these measures can detect deception. This 
research has practical applications for law enforcement. If this interviewing technique 
and the assessment scales can accurately detect deception, police officers may be able to 
more accurately determine whether a witness or suspect is telling the truth and may be 
able to arrest the guilty party in a more efficient fashion. We will also be having another 
sample of participants rate the videos on deception/truth, if you have agreed to this on the 
video consent form. We apologize that we were unable to reveal the purpose of the study 
in the beginning of the session, however, in order to determine whether this method 
works, it is important that all participants demonstrate their natural reactions without 
prior preparation and expectations. The scenario and alibi stories were necessary to 
ensure the accuracy of the events, and to ensure that the interviewer was speaking to 
people who were talking about the same event. The scenario is necessary to test the 
cognitive interview in a setting that may be similar to real life.  
The videotape that was collected will be coded for a variety of characteristics that are 
associated with truth in witness statements. If you consented for your data to be utilized 
in further studies, that means that collected videotapes could be shown and rated for how 
convincing the story was by student and community samples, at a later date.  
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Your participation was voluntary, and all data (including the videotape) will be 
deleted/destroyed in your presence should you withdraw your consent during the session. 
Should you decide at a later date that you would like to withdraw your participation, 
please retain this debriefing form (with the participant ID on it), and refer to the number 
when asking for your data/video to be deleted. If you should ask to withdraw, all 
materials will be deleted/destroyed at that time.  
We apologize if you were uncomfortable at any time during the interview. It was not the 
intention of any member of the study to make you feel guilty. The study was conducted 
in a manner similar to the cognitive interview which is used for victims, independent 
witnesses, and now potentially, suspects.  
Thank you for your participation in our research. Again, information that you gave was 
completely confidential. In the event that you have any complaints, concerns or questions 
about the research, please feel free to contact Dr. A. Book, (905-688-5550, ext: 5223). 
You may also contact the Research Ethics Officer (email: reb@brocku.ca or telephone: 
905-688-5550, ext: 3035), who can provide answers to pertinent questions about the 
research participants’ rights.  
For the benefit of this research, we ask that the true nature of this study be kept 
confidential and that you not discuss the content or deception involved in this study with 
other students, as awareness among other students could contaminate results.  
Sincerely  
Michael Logue.  
Information for Counselling Services:  
http://www.brocku.ca/personal-counselling  
Les McCurdy-Myers, lmccurdy@brocku.ca  
Phone: 905-688-5550, ext. 4750  
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Appendix G: Study 2 and 3 Observer Ratings of Deception Scale 
 
 Please rate the story in each video on the following scale and make a judgment as 
to whether you think they are telling the truth or being deceptive.  Please also use the 
following six-point scale to indicate how confident you are in your judgments for each 
video.  A rating of 1 indicates “Not at all confident” and a rating of 6 indicates “Very 
confident”. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Very 
Untruthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Slightly 
Untruthful 
 
Slightly 
Truthful 
 
Truthful 
 
Very 
Truthful 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 Rating 1 Truth/ 
Deception 
Confidence 
Rating 1 
Rating 2 Truth/ 
Deception 
Confidence 
Rating 2 
 
1 
      
 
2 
      
 
3 
      
 
4 
      
 
5 
      
 
6 
      
 
7 
      
 
8 
      
 
9 
      
 
10 
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Appendix H: SRP-III 
 
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements about you. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
     
1. I’m a rebellious person. _____ 
 
2. I’m more tough minded than other people. _____ 
 
3. I think I could “beat” a lie detector. _____ 
 
4. I have taken illegal drugs (e.g., marijuana, ecstasy). _____ 
 
5. I have never been involved in delinquent gang activity._____ 
 
6. I have never stolen a truck, car, or motorcycle. _____ 
 
7. Most people are wimps. _____ 
 
8. I purposely flatter people to get them on my side. _____ 
 
9. I’ve often done something dangerous just for the thrill of it. _____ 
 
10. I have tricked someone into giving me money. _____ 
 
11. It tortures me to see an injured animal. _____ 
 
12. I have assaulted a law enforcement officer of social worker. _____ 
 
13. I have pretended to be someone else in order to get something. _____ 
 
14. I always plan out my weekly activities. _____ 
 
15. I like to see fist fights. _____ 
 
16. I’m not tricky or sly. _____ 
 
17. I’d be good in a dangerous job because I make fast decisions. _____ 
 
18. I have never tried to force someone to have sex. _____ 
 
19. My friends would say that I am a warm person. _____ 
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20. I would get a kick out of ‘scamming’ someone. _____ 
 
21. I have never attacked someone with the idea of injuring them. _____ 
 
22. I never miss any appointments. _____ 
 
23. I avoid horror movies. _____ 
 
24. I trust other people to be honest. _____ 
 
25. I hate high speed driving. _____ 
 
26. I feel so sorry when I see a homeless person. _____ 
 
27. It’s fun to see how far you can push someone before they get upset. _____ 
 
28. I enjoy doing wild things. _____ 
 
29. I have broken into a building or vehicle in order to steal something or vandalize. 
_____ 
 
30. I don’t bother to keep in touch with my family anymore. _____ 
 
31. I find it difficult to manipulator. _____ 
 
32. I rarely follow the rules. _____ 
 
33. I never cry at movies. _____ 
 
34. I have never been arrested. _____ 
 
35. You should take advantage of other people before they do it to you. _____ 
 
36. I don’t enjoy gambling for real money. _____ 
 
37. People sometimes say that I’m cold hearted. _____ 
 
38. People can usually tell if I am lying. _____ 
 
39. I like to have sex with people I barely know. _____ 
 
40. I love violent sports and movies. _____ 
 
41. Sometimes you have to pretend you like someone to get something out of them._____ 
 
42. I am an impulsive person. _____ 
182 
 
 
 
 
43. I have taken hard drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine). _____ 
 
44. I’m a soft hearted person. _____ 
 
45. I can talk people into anything. _____ 
 
46. I never shoplifted from a store. _____ 
 
47. I don’t enjoy taking risks. _____ 
 
48. People are too sensitive when I tell them the truth about themselves. _____ 
 
49. I was convicted of a serious crime. _____ 
 
50. Most people tell lies every day. _____ 
 
51. I keep getting in trouble for the same things over and over. _____ 
 
52. Every now and then I carry a weapon (knife or gun) for protection. _____ 
 
53. People cry way to much at funerals. _____ 
 
54. You can get what you want by telling people what they want to hear. _____ 
 
55. I easily get bored. _____ 
 
56. I never feel guilty over hurting others. _____ 
 
57. I have threatened people into giving me money, clothes or makeup. _____ 
 
58. A lot of people are “suckers” and can easily be fooled. _____ 
 
59. I admit that I “mouth off” without thinking. _____ 
 
60. I sometimes dump friends when I don’t need any more. _____ 
 
61. I would never step on others to get what I want. _____ 
 
62. I have close friends who served time in prison. _____ 
 
63. I purposely tried to hit someone with a vehicle I was driving. _____ 
 
64. I have violated my probation from prison. _____ 
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Appendix I: SSSS Questionnaire 
 
Indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement below by writing 
a number between 1 and 7 in the space provided.  
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Agree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
____ Members of my peer group respect and admire me.  
____ Others do not value my opinion. (R)  
____ Members of my peer group do not want to be like me. (R)  
____ I have gained distinction and social prestige among my peers.  
____ I am held in high esteem by those I know.  
____ Others always expect me to be successful.  
____ There are some matters on which I am considered an expert by others.  
____ My unique talents and abilities are recognized by others.  
____ I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.  
____ I enjoy having control over others.  
____ I do not like to give orders. (R)  
____ I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want.  
____ I try to control others rather than permit them to control me.  
____ I don’t have a forceful or dominant personality. (R)  
____ Others know it is better to let me have my way.  
____ I do not enjoy having authority over other people. (R) 
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Appendix J: Study 2 and Study 3 Informed Consent 
 
Informed Consent 
   
Date: 
Project Title: Catch Me If You Can! 
 
Principle Student Investigator (PSI): Michael Logue (Ph.D. Candidate) 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
Ml10da@brocku.ca 
 
Faculty Supervisor: Angela Book 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext.5223 
abook@brocku.ca 
 
INVITATION 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by researchers 
including Michael Logue (Principal Student Researcher), under the supervision of Dr. 
Angela Book.  We are interested in how accurate people are in judging deception in 
others, and how that relates to personality traits.  The study has been reviewed and 
received ethical clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University (REB 
file # 14-043). 
 
WHAT’S INVOLVED 
 
As a participant, you will be asked to view 20 videos of people telling true and false 
stories in an interrogation experiment.  After each video (1 to 2 minutes in length), you 
will be asked to rate the believability of the story.  After watching and rating these 
videos, you will be asked to complete a short personality questionnaire (5 to 10 minutes) 
that includes questions about antisocial behaviors.  Participation will take approximately 
1 hour of your time. 
 
POTENTAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
 
There are no known or foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study.  The 
results of this study may provide important information regarding deception detection in 
interrogation contexts, and may be of interest to the field of law enforcement in the 
future.  While results will not directly be shared with law enforcement, we will be 
publishing in journals that exame the intersection of psychology within the legal system. 
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COMPENSATION 
 
You are able to use your participation as part of course requirements in classes such as 
Psychology 1F90 and other Psychology of courses that have this requirement.  In total, 
you will receive 1 hour of research participation credit. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
All the data collected in this study will be identified using arbitrary numbers, and your 
name will not be linked with the data you provide or appear in any publications.  All 
information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included, or in 
any other way be associated with data collected in this study.  Furthermore, because our 
interest is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be 
identified individually in any way in written reports of this research.   
 
Because the video clips were also collected at Brock, there is the possibility that you may 
recognize a participant from the first study.  All people who were videotaped consented 
to having their stories rated for believability and were aware of the possibility of being 
recognized under the understanding that future participants would be asked to maintain 
their confidentiality.  Please do not discuss this study with others and refrain from 
breaking the confidentiality of previous and present participants.  
 
Data collected in this study will be stored on password protected computers within the 
locked laboratory of Dr. Angela Book.  Only researchers in the laboratory of Dr. Angela 
Book will have access to the data, which will be kept for 7 years following publication, as 
stipulated by the American Psychological Association, after which time the data will be 
erased.   
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  If you wish, you may decline to answer any 
questions or participate in any component of the study.  Further, you may decide to 
withdraw from the study at any time and do so without losing the appropriate credit for 
participation (1/2 hour participation = 1/2 hour credit).  Because your data will be 
assigned an arbitrary number, it is only possible to withdraw from the study until you 
have left the session.  After that , it will not be possible, as we will not be able to link 
your name to your participant identification number. 
 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and at conferences.  
Feedback on this study will be available by Fall 2015.  Please contact the principle 
investigator, Michael Logue, regarding this study. 
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CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact 
Michael Logue using the contact information provided above.  This study has been 
reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock 
University.  If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research 
participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 ext. 3035, 
reb@brocku.ca 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this project.  Please keep a copy of this form for your 
records. 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
I agree to participate in this study described above.  I have made this decision based on 
the information I have read in the Informed-Consent Letter.  I have had the opportunity to 
receive any additional details I wanted about the study and understand that I may ask 
questions in the future.  I understand that I can withdraw my consent at any time. 
 
Name: __________________________________________ 
 
Signature: _______________________________________    
 
Date: _______________________ 
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Appendix K: Study 2 and Study 3 Debriefing Sheet 
 
Catch Me If You Can! 
 
Thank you for participating in this research project.  This research was conducted through 
the Psychology Department at Brock University and carried out by Michael Logue and 
researchers under the supervision of Dr. Angela Book.  The study has been reviewed and 
received ethical clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University (REB 
file # 14-043). 
 
The purpose of this study is to further the current understanding of lie detection.  You 
viewed 20 videos (1 to 2 minutes in length) and were asked to rate the 
truthfulness/believability of each story.  Some of the stories were true, while others were 
false.  Despite popular media myths, lie detection through observation has not been 
shown to be accurate, although law enforcement manuals still emphasize the use of body 
language cues to judge deception in an interrogation context (Hartwig, Granhag, 
Stromwall & Vrij, 2004; Geiselman, 2012).  We hope to compare the accuracy rates from 
subjective judgments (your ratings after observing part of the interview) to the accuracy 
of a validated and standardized deception detection tool called Reality Monitoring.  This 
research has practical applications to law enforcement.  If the assessment scales more 
accurately detection, police officers may be able to more accurately determine whether a 
witness or suspect is telling the truth. 
 
We were also interested in whether personality (specifically, the tendency to engage in 
antisocial behaviors) is related to the ability to judge deception in others.  If so, this 
would support current perspectives that antisocial traits may enable deception and 
cheating detection. 
 
Your participation was voluntary and you were free to withdraw your consent at any 
point during the session.  You were able to use your participation for 1 hour of credit in 
applicable courses (e.g. Psychology 1F90). 
 
Thank you for your participation in our research.  Again information that you gave was 
completely confidential.  In the event that you have any complaints, concerns or 
questions about the research please feel free to contact Dr. Angela Book (905-688-5550, 
ext.5223).  You may also contact the Research Ethics Officer (email: reb@brocku.ca or 
telephone: 905-688-5550, ext: 3035) who can provide answers to pertinent questions 
about the research participant’s rights. 
 
Sincerely 
Michael Logue 
